by Rauf Baker
Israel’s good neighbor policy was intended to encourage the striking of a “gentlemen’s agreement” to maintain security in the north.
An
injured civilian from the Syrian civil war being transferred to Ziv
Medical Center in Israel.
Photo by Simon Haddad - Ziv Medical Center via
Israel 21C
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 683, December 13, 2017
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The
war in Syria has resulted in many changes to its society, including a
perceptible shift in the Sunni Arab majority’s attitude towards Israel.
However, that shift remains very limited in scope. Much still needs to
be done on both sides of the border to root out the Syrian culture of
anti-Semitism.
When Syrian opposition figure Farid Ghadry
appeared before Israel’s Knesset in 2007, he provoked the ire of many of
his compatriots. The move sparked controversy perhaps no less
acrimonious than that witnessed when Bassam al-Adel escaped with his
MiG-23 fighter jet and landed in Israel in 1989. However, when Syrian
opposition figure Kamal Labwani visited Israel three years ago, his
action did not cause a similar stir.
It may not be coincidence that all three belong to
Syria’s Sunni Arab majority and were born either in the governorate of
Idlib (in the north) or the countryside of Damascus (in the south). Both
were opposition strongholds to the ruling Alawite family of al-Assad.
After more than six years of war, a period that has resulted in the
killing and displacement of at least one-third of Syria’s Sunni Arabs,
the question arises: Does the major component of Syrian society still
adhere to the regime’s teachings, which dictate that Israel is their
number one enemy?
Sunnis refuse to be called a sect, viewing
themselves as the genuine representatives of Islam. As the majority,
they never formed a united single bloc, so it was easy to penetrate them
politically. The war has made their divisions more entrenched than
ever.
Sunni Arabs in northern and eastern Syria were
ruled by fundamentalist factions that applied religious rulings. These
regions include the governorates of Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Idlib, and large
portions of rural Aleppo. Terrorist militias such as ISIS, the al-Nusra
Front, and even armed factions that adopted fundamentalism left a deep
ideological impact on these Sunni Arab communities that will last for
generations to come. Millions of Sunnis lived under the laws of these
groups for nearly three years, dealt with them on a daily basis, and
engaged with their governing structures. This constant contact resulted
in somewhat normalized relations, a point that should not be overlooked.
It is hard to believe the claim that the terrorist
militias – only a small proportion of whose members were foreign – did
not find support from a considerable segment of the society. A new
generation of what can be described as “phoenix jihadists” has formed in
these regions – youth who gradually adopted an Islamic fundamentalist
dogma. They cannot be expected to hold positive feelings towards the
State of Israel and the Jewish people.
Sunni Arabs who live in al-Assad-controlled areas –
” regime Sunnis” – maintain the regime’s traditional anti-Israel
approach and consider themselves its legitimate bearers. Moreover, the
war has boosted their national chauvinistic spirit. This is a new
development as they – particularly Sunnis from Damascus and Aleppo – had
little sectarian awareness in the first place. This chauvinism causes
them to regard Iran’s and Hezbollah’s activities in Syria as a positive.
They are willing to support Shiite forces whom they see as attempting
to restore Syrian national dignity.
In the central governorates of Homs and Hama, as
well as Sunni Arab pockets in the western coastal region, the regime’s
suppression prompted a sectarian reaction. Many residents reverted to
fundamentalism as a haven from the regime’s sectarian tactics,
especially after its militia targeted Sunnis in the rural regions of
Homs and Hama. Those areas abut the former Alawite state and are
currently dominated by extremists. Homs governorate, the largest of
Syria’s 14 governorates, was emptied completely, but the religiously
conservative city of Hama agreed to a truce to avoid destruction. Sunni
Arabs in the coastal region are thus scattered in isolated pockets.
There is little to suggest that they can be an effective part of any
attempt to change the overall perception of Israel in Syria.
Still, Sunni Arabs in the south are more likely
than others to abandon their hostility towards Israel thanks to their
experience of the past few years, when Israel provided relief and even
military assistance and hospitalized thousands of wounded civilians and
opposition militants. Those Syrians who are in the most contact with
Israel are the most willing to revise their position on it. And as Sunni
Arab communities in southern Syria are characterized by tribalism, one
might estimate that every wounded person treated by Israel has 10 to 15
close relatives to whom he can convey his positive impressions.
Israel’s good neighbor policy was intended to
encourage the striking of a “gentlemen’s agreement” to maintain security
in the north. In the process, it affected the hearts and minds of Sunni
Arabs in Syria’s south who no longer see Israel as the devil. But
Israel must recognize that its wartime aid strategy will not be enough
on its own.
It is very much in Israel’s interest that the
population of southern Syria not be forced to choose between Assad and
the extremists, and also that its animosity towards Iran and Hezbollah
be kept alive. Israel needs the support of the Sunni Arabs in southern
Syria to turn their territories into a de facto “South Syria
Security Belt.” Such a belt is necessary in the face of Iran’s attempts
to establish a foothold near the border and to prevent efforts by Sunni
terrorist groups to carry out attacks against Israel.
Syrian migrants in Europe and neighboring
countries, who are mostly Sunni Arabs, are also divided in their views
based on the region they come from and their living conditions and level
of integration into their new countries. Those in Turkey mostly come
from northern and central Syria, while their peers in Lebanon and Jordan
are primarily from Syria’s central and southern regions. They fled
areas controlled either by the regime, by the opposition, or by
extremists, and therefore don’t share a collective view on Israel. But
many of those who live in Jordan and Lebanon have managed to evade Arab
nationalist sentiments because of their living conditions in those two
countries. As for those who sought asylum in Europe, quite a few either
coexisted or fought alongside extremists, or are willing to adopt their
ideology in the future. Considering the failure of integration policies
in EU states, these sentiments are likely to lead to a relapse into
religious identity. However, a small number will display a tendency to
explore “the unknown Israel” and liberate themselves from the taboos
dictated to them during their upbringing.
It should be noted that any shift in the attitudes
of Syria’s anti-regime Sunni Arabs towards the Palestinians and
Hezbollah is most likely due to the fact that the Lebanese militia
and Palestinian militant groups backed the regime. The shift can still
be beneficial to Israel, however, as many Sunni Arab Syrians might be
willing to understand Israel’s position towards Palestinians from a
nationalist pan-Arab point of view and towards Hezbollah from a
religious-sectarian perspective.
A change has occurred in the attitude of Syria’s
Sunni Arabs towards Israel, but it is limited rather than comprehensive
and largely incomplete. A change is required in a mentality that has
prevailed for decades and perhaps centuries. Eradicating anti-Semitic
culture will be a long and complex process, one that will require
Israeli patience – and a strategy that should not be limited to sending
diapers or even a few bullets. As for the other side, Syria’s Sunni
Arabs cannot befriend Israel solely by taking a stand against Israel’s
enemies.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/sunni-syria-israel/
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Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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