by Prof. Benjamin Miller
Developments over the past few decades, culminating in the American intervention in Iraq and the “Arab Spring,” have resulted in major Iranian achievements irrespective of the nuclear issue.
Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khameini, image via Wikimedia CC
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 706, January 4, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Iran has emerged as the
big winner of the so-called “Arab Spring.” Russia also benefited
greatly – it achieved its aims in Syria by helping to preserve the Assad
regime, and in the process, became the key broker of the postwar
settlement – but Tehran made major gains not only in Syria but in Iraq,
Yemen, and Lebanon as well.
Iran has emerged as the winner of the so-called
“Arab Spring,” a state of affairs some lay at the feet of the Obama
administration. When the US administration (together with five other
powers) signed a nuclear accord with Tehran to curb its nuclear program,
it did not insist on a halt to Iran’s assorted aggressions in the
Middle East.
But Obama is not entirely to blame for Iran’s
success. In each of the four Arab countries in which Tehran has made
incursions, its rivals inadvertently played a key role in strengthening
the Iranian position through the trans-border Shiite connection.
In other words, interventions by other foreign
powers unintentionally strengthened the pro-Iranian Shiite group in each
of the countries in question. In some cases (though not all), the
outcome was influenced by nationalist opposition to foreign
interference. In all four cases, however, the interventions reinforced a
regional transnational sectarian connection that is enabling the
fulfillment of Iranian aspirations to become the dominant force in the
Middle East.
How have the other intervening powers helped Iran win the Middle East game (at least for now)?
Iraq
In the case of Iraq, another enemy of the Islamic
Republic accidentally brought about Iranian dominance in a country that
used to be a major rival. In this instance it was the US that played the
key role. Following their 2003 occupation of Iraq, the Americans tried
to democratize the country. But elections in an ethnically and
religiously fragmented state like Iraq mean that the largest ethnic or
sectarian group is going to win.
The Shiites are the majority group in a polarized
Iraq, and some of their leaders are allies of the Iranian Shiite regime.
This trans-border connection has guaranteed significant Iranian
influence in Iraq. Thus, the US invasion and democratization project in
Iraq brought to power forces allied with its main enemy in the region –
even if the alliance with Tehran is not welcomed by all Iraqis,
including some Shiites.
Syria
The third case of an external intervention that
resulted in growing Iranian influence is the Russian involvement in
Syria. In this instance, the intervening power is not an enemy of Iran’s
– at the moment. It was one for a very long time, however, and the
future of the alliance is uncertain.
At any rate, the Russian bombing in 2015 was the
decisive factor that ultimately brought about the victory of the Assad
regime in the Syrian civil war. This is the case even though Tehran,
Hezbollah, and other Iranian-led Shiite militias had been fighting
alongside the regime since well before the Russian bombing started.
As in the other cases, the support of Iran and its
Shiite allies for the Alawite regime in Damascus is based at least
partly on a common sectarian affiliation, as the Alawites are considered
an offshoot of Shiite Islam. The Assad regime’s dependence on the
Iranian/Shiite militias’ support seems to guarantee that Tehran will
remain a major influence in Syria.
While the Russian bombing provided the coup de
grâce, the Iranians and their allies continue to provide the ground
forces necessary to preserve the regime. Israel is worried that the
regime’s debt to Iran will translate into a continuous Iranian/Hezbollah
military presence in Syria near the border with the Israeli-controlled
Golan Heights. Recent Russian statements seem to indicate Moscow’s
acceptance of such a military presence. This forward military deployment
of Iran and its allies creates the potential for escalation, whether
intended or inadvertent.
Yemen
Finally, there is the case of the war in Yemen,
which grinds on at great cost to the civilian population. We can’t be
sure about the outcome as the war is still ongoing, but at least one
thing is clear: The persistent bombing by the Saudi-led Sunni coalition
has failed to remove from power the Shiite-affiliated Houthis, who still
control a considerable part of the country. Moreover, the Sunni
military campaign against them has reinforced the Houthis’ alliance with
Tehran and probably alienated a large proportion of the Yemeni
population from the Saudis and their Sunni allies, creating another
bastion of Iranian influence in the Arab world.
In this case the stronghold is adjacent to Iran’s
number one opponent in the Arab world: Saudi Arabia. Here, too, the
situation contains the potential for an escalation in which the
Iranian-Saudi cold war turns hot.
Conclusion
The instability and polarization that characterize
the Middle East raise doubts about the future of the Iranian rise.
Still, developments over the past few decades, culminating in the
American intervention in Iraq and the “Arab Spring,” have resulted in
major Iranian achievements irrespective of the nuclear issue. The causes
of these gains in the four countries discussed here are 1) the
sectarian divisions in the region, particularly the trans-border Shiite
connection; and 2) the effects of external intervention.
In most cases, those effects – which were based on
nationalist/sectarian resentment of the external intervening force –
were unintended. In the Syrian instance, however, the outcome reflects
the military victory of the intervening force. In all four cases, Iran
is the regional power that has gained the most.
This poses a major challenge to Riyadh and its
Sunni allies, as well as to Israel. It largely explains the recent
Saudi-Israeli rapprochement, manifested in the recent, unprecedented
interview of Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. General Gadi Eisenkot by a Saudi
news outlet. In the interview, Eisenkot highlighted the perception of
the Iranian threat shared by the two parties and declared Israel’s
willingness to share intelligence with Riyadh. Such developments could
augur a major realignment in the Middle East with far-reaching
implications for both war and peace.
For war, the key implication is the rising
likelihood of a confrontation between Israel and Iranian allies in Syria
and Lebanon, notably Hezbollah, although mutual deterrence is likely to
reduce the probability of actual fighting.
For peace, the emerging Israeli-Saudi/Sunni
alliance, based on the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” principle,
creates the potential for progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process. But in that context, there is a crucial role for the Trump
administration, which maintains good relations with both Israel and the
Saudis.
This will be a key challenge for the US
administration, which thus far has essentially maintained US
disengagement from the Middle East. That disengagement is likely to
accelerate with the destruction of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The new
developments in Israeli-Sunni relations create a great opportunity for
the administration. It might be tempted to take advantage of it to rack
up some accomplishments in foreign policy, which have been sparse so
far.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/how-iran-became-dominant/
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