by Dr. Doron Itzchakov
The protests sweeping across Iran reflect the deep tension between the regime’s commitment of vast resources to the assertion of Tehran’s hegemony and the yearning of middle class Iranians for an improvement in their economic well-being.
Iranian towns affected by protests in last
week of December 2017 (red: 28 Dec, orange: 29 Dec, yellow: 30 Dec),
image by Uwe Dedering via Wikipedia
BESA Center Perspectives No. 705, January 3, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The
social protests now sweeping across Iran reflect the deep tension
between the Islamic regime’s commitment of vast resources to the
assertion of Tehran’s regional hegemony and the yearning of middle class
Iranians for an improvement in their economic wellbeing. And while the
Islamist establishment that took power in the 1979 revolution is keenly
aware of the perils of popular restiveness, history teaches that
prolonged retention of power often makes regimes oblivious to the needs
and yearnings of their subjects. This could upset the delicate balance
between state and society.
The social protests currently taking place in Iran
arise from the gap between the Islamic leadership’s ambition for
regional hegemony and ordinary people’s desire for a lower cost of
living and an improved standard of living – expectations stemming from
promises made by President Hassan Rouhani during his first term in
office and reinforced by the July 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and the
attendant release of Iranian assets worldwide.
This restiveness differs from the mass protests
that erupted after the June 2009 elections on several counts. First, in
2009, the protesters had declared leaders (Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi
Karoubi, who are under house arrest to date). The current protests, by
contrast, are spread across a broad axis but have no single leader who
enjoys widespread political support. Second, the current protests are
the result of cumulative dissatisfaction over a long period of time
while the 2009 protests broke out over a specific issue
(election-rigging).
A third difference is the geographical axis of
events. Today’s protests began in the periphery and the provinces, while
the focus of the 2009 protests was Tehran, the capital. Finally, it
seems that for the time being, the main force of the protest lies in its
decentralization rather than the number of demonstrators involved.
Still, there is a clear line connecting the two
protests: the widespread use of social networks to bring citizens into
the streets. According to the local media, behind the mobilization of
the masses for the demonstrations is an exiled journalist who reaches
the people through the Telegram network.
In contrast to the social unrest that led to the
1979 Islamic Revolution, in which tapes and written messages were widely
used, social media now constitute the main tool by which the masses are
mobilized. This approach reduces the need for a charismatic leader
during the first stage, though the appearance of such a leader is
essential for the process to be sustained.
The Iranian security establishment, which strives
to thwart the demonstrators, has grown more aggressive, leading to an
increase in the number of casualties and detainees. Moreover, the
current regime’s leaders and commanders arose from the melting pot of
the Islamic Revolution, where they gained considerable experience in
undermining the stability of an incumbent regime.
It is also worth noting that the current protests,
which began in the city of Mashhad, were initially aimed at President
Rouhani and not at the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The fact that
Mashhad is the hometown of Ibrahim Raisi, Rouhani’s rival in the May
2017 elections, suggests that the protests were the result of an
initiative by the conservative establishment opposed to Rouhani.
Raisi’s role as head of the powerful charity
“Ostan-e Qods-e Razvi”, and his family connection to the prayer leader
at the mosque where the eighth imam of the Twelver Shi’a is buried,
directly motivate his circle of supporters in Mashhad. According to
Iranian sources, among the Mashhad protestors were prominent Basij
members and other loyalists associated with Raisi. But the protests
spread like wildfire and took on a completely different character from
that envisioned by their initiators.
Initially, the protest focused on the high cost of
living and the corruption that has spread through the executive branch.
Before long, however, it turned to the Supreme Leader and the manner in
which he holds the reins of power. Contrary to the slogans used in
previous protests (the student protests of 1999 and the 2009 protests),
this is the first time a call has been made to restore the rule of the
Pahlavi dynasty. Although it was made by individuals, such a call
constitutes an outright rejection of the revolutionary regime and the
legacy of the Islamic Republic’s founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini.
To understand the roots of the protest, one must
analyze the plight of ordinary Iranians, with an emphasis on the weaker
sectors of society. While the regime’s spokesmen have spent their time
lauding the Islamic Republic’s achievements in expanding the “axis of
resistance” through proxy groups acting on its behalf, the scale of
domestic unemployment has exceeded 12%. Indeed, in a recent statement to parliament
the Iranian interior minister admitted that the unemployment situation
in peripheral regions is much worse than the national average and could
reach as high as 60%.
Moreover, the cost of living continues to be a
heavy burden on Iranian households, as reflected in a significant
reduction in the basic basket of products among middle- and lower-class
families. This is despite Rouhani’s success at reducing the inflation
rate compared to his predecessor. Moreover, the level of drug
trafficking and addiction in Iran is one of the highest in the Middle
East and poses a major challenge to the law enforcement system of the
revolutionary regime.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the
allocation of vast sums of money in the wake of the nuclear agreement to
the “axis of resistance” led to great frustration among ordinary
Iranians who expected some of the money to go towards easing their
domestic burdens.
The extent of popular disappointment in President
Rouhani’s policies is not related solely to his failure to meet his
electoral pledges, including the reduction of corruption in the
political establishment. It stems, first and foremost, from the fact
that in his second term in office Rouhani does not seem to stand up to
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the way he did in his
first term.
It is true that Rouhani is an integral part of the
revolutionary establishment, where he serves as chairman of Iran’s
Supreme National Security Council. It is also true that the Islamic
Republic’s constitution presents the president with considerable
challenges, as the ultimate reins of power rest with the Supreme Leader
and not with him. In addition, the dual structure of the Iranian regime,
including the economic system, leaves the president very little room to
maneuver.
With that said, during his first term, Rouhani
strove to implement a policy that was often criticized by his
conservative rivals and the security establishment. His second term, in
contrast, has been characterized by a change of direction towards the
line dictated by the IRGC. That shift has been at the expense of the
economic welfare of Iranian citizens.
The eminent 14th century historian Ibn
Khaldun maintained that tribal solidarity (Asabiya) is the social glue
that both binds people together and enables them to confront the
“Other.” At the same time he argued that dynasties and cultures have a
built-in lifespan, because the same solidarity that enables growth also
contains the seeds of its eventual disintegration. In other words, the
cycle of expansion directly affects social cohesion and hence is its own
worst enemy.
Tehran’s quest for regional hegemony has led to
considerable achievements as the vacuum left by the “Arab Spring” opened
a unique window of opportunity for the Islamic Republic to expand its
regional influence. However, the commitment of vast resources to this
hegemonic ambition has created social unrest inside the country.
It is impossible to know what the future holds,
but the rift between the Islamic regime and Iranian society cannot be
ignored. The social protests that erupted as a result of socioeconomic
distress contain an indisputable premise, not least since this is hardly
the first crack to have opened in the Islamic Republic. The first
emerged not long after the establishment of the Islamic regime in 1979
as a result of Khomeini’s decision to turn on his revolutionary partners
who had helped him topple the shah. Fissures also arose on ethnic,
religious, geographical, and intergenerational grounds, and of course as
a result of political and personal struggles for power, status, and
control.
There is little doubt that the security
establishment that emerged from the Islamic Revolution is keenly aware
of the dangers of social unrest and knows how to deal with them; after
all, the regime’s leaders were themselves part of the social revolution
that brought down the monarchy in 1979. But if history teaches us
anything, it is that prolonged retention of power often blinds regimes
to the needs and yearnings of their subjects. That blindness is liable
to result in blunders that might leave the population deeply scarred and
upset the delicate balance between state and society.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/protests-iran-social-challenges-foreign-policy/
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