by Maysam Behravesh
The first signs of the thaw between Saudi Arabia and Israel appeared in 2015 when both nations opposed the nuclear deal struck between Iran and the six world powers known as the P5+1.
Shortly
after Iranian protesters took to the streets on Dec. 28, Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu posted a video on his Facebook page wishing
"the Iranian people success in their noble quest for freedom." In Saudi
Arabia, meanwhile, state-run media hailed the protesting Iranians with
such joyful hysteria that Saudis could be forgiven for believing that
the regime in Tehran was on the verge of collapse.
Israel and Sunni Saudi Arabia have no
formal diplomatic ties and decades of enmity behind them. However, their
mutual pleasure over the grass-roots demonstrations in Iran
is the latest manifestation of a growing convergence of political
interests, between the two Middle Eastern countries against their shared
regional nemesis: Iran.
If the Saudi-Israeli rapprochement
continues, their collaboration could lead to improved Israeli relations
with other Arab states, removing Iran's security buffer and possibly
making Tehran more vulnerable to direct Israeli military action.
The first signs of the thaw between Saudi
Arabia and Israel appeared in 2015 when both nations opposed the nuclear
deal struck between Iran and the six world powers known as the P5+1.
According to the terms of the deal, Tehran would cut back its nuclear
program in return for relief from economic sanctions. To compensate for
its nuclear concessions and concerned that Washington might not honor
its commitment to the agreement, Iran followed its signing of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action by intensifying the consolidation of its
regional power base.
To that end, the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps and their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, doubled
down on their support for like-minded and mostly Shiite paramilitary
groups across the Middle East.
In Syria, Iranian intervention in favor of
President Bashar Assad, coupled with a relentless Russian air campaign
against the rebels, finally turned the tide of civil war and kept Assad
in power. Tehran also took the opportunity to help oust extremist
anti-Shiite groups like Islamic State from Syria. Iranian leaders
insisted their intent was to "nip terrorism in the bud," but their tacit
goal was also – and more importantly – to maintain land access and
supply lines to their main proxy, Lebanon's Hezbollah, as part of the
Islamic republic's commitment to the "axis of resistance" and its
"strategic depth" policy in the region.
The recapture of Aleppo by Syrian
government forces in December 2016 relieved Iranian-backed militia
forces stationed in northwestern Syria of a formidable battlefield
challenge, enabling them to concentrate their manpower and firepower on
the southwestern and eastern fronts. This sounded alarm bells for the
Israeli government, which feared entrenchment of Iran's military
foothold in its immediate neighborhood.
Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to
Iran's supreme leader, has spoken figuratively of a "resistance highway"
that starts in Tehran and continues through Mosul, Damascus and Beirut
to the Mediterranean. Similarly, with the expulsion of IS from Syria's
eastern province of Deir ez-Zor, IRGC-affiliated media outlets such as
Mashregh News and Javan Online have promoted the establishment of a land
"corridor," linking Iran to the Mediterranean Sea and potentially
useful for military as well as trade purposes.
Israel has responded to this perceived
threat militarily and politically. On the military front, it has
embarked on a sustained campaign of targeted airstrikes against weapon
convoys believed to be delivering "game-changing" weapons to Hezbollah
as well as a reported Iranian military base in Syria. On the political
front, Israel has sought to build an anti-Iran "coalition" with the Arab
Sunni bloc led by Saudi Arabia.
In an unprecedented Nov. 16 interview with
Elaph, the popular independent Arabic news site, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.
Gen. Gadi Eizenkot offered to cooperate with Saudi Arabia against
Tehran, which he labeled the "biggest threat" in the Middle East. "We
are ready to exchange experiences with moderate Arab countries and to
exchange intelligence to confront Iran," he said, adding that "in this
matter, there is complete agreement between us and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia."
Less than two months later, in a Dec. 28
BBC interview, Education Minister Naftali Bennett echoed Eizenkot,
explaining that Israel hoped to form "coalitions" with "moderate" Arabs,
in order to "contain" Iran.
Riyadh, too, has been cautiously building
closer ties with Tel Aviv. In the summer of 2016, one year after Iran's
nuclear deal, a Saudi delegation headed by retired general Anwar Eshki
met with Israeli foreign ministry officials and Knesset members in an
unusual visit to Jerusalem. During the meeting, Eshki tried to persuade
the Israelis to accept the Arab Peace Initiative, arguing that a
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would foil Iran's
attempts to exploit the Palestinian cause and delegitimize its support
for anti-Israeli groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah. Israel
made no commitments but welcomed the improvement of ties with Arab
states.
The growth of Iranian power and influence
in the region, however, is not the only driver of Saudi-Israeli entente.
The Trump administration's determination to counter the Islamic
republic, along with Washington's close relations with Saudi Arabia and
Israel, have facilitated bilateral efforts to form such an alliance.
In November 2017, Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman summoned Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud
Abbas to Riyadh and presented him with the blueprint for a U.S.-devised
peace plan that favored Israelis. The powerful prince then demanded that
Abbas either accept the scheme or resign. Tellingly, the Palestinian
leader's urgent trip to Riyadh came less than two weeks after Jared
Kushner, President Trump's son-in-law and advisor on the Middle East,
visited the Saudi capital to discuss the plan with bin Salman.
As delegates gathered at the World Economic
Forum meeting in Davos this week, there were no official Saudi-Israel
meetings reflected on the public program. But Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and top Saudi officials, including Foreign Minister Adel
Jubeir, are at the summit and have already made it clear, in formal
panel discussions and conversations with reporters, that their
governments view countering the threat from Iran as a primary foreign policy goal.
Davos is famous for its backroom meetings
as well as the inevitable spontaneous encounters that occur when
attendees are crowded into an Alpine conference center; it is not
unreasonable to assume that these discussions could solidify
relationships out of the public eye.
Iranian leaders are clearly worried about
the emerging Saudi-Israeli alliance, which is likely to bring Riyadh's
Sunni allies, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, into its
fold as well.
In a recent address to the Iranian
parliament, President Hassan Rouhani declared that Iran would not resume
its ties with Saudi Arabia unless Riyadh ended its friendship with
Israel. The new realpolitik of the Middle East means that Tehran may
face even greater strategic challenges in the future.
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/opinions/the-unlikely-mideast-alliance-that-threatens-iran/
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