by Dr. Alon J. Doenyas
If the world press is anything to go by, the Turkey-Iran courtship is getting serious, and Russia is playing best man.
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,278, September 5, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: If the world press is
anything to go by, the Turkey-Iran courtship is getting serious, and
Russia is playing best man. The two countries’ strengthening ties are
based on shared regional goals, the most prominent of which is Syria.
But how sincere is the burgeoning relationship?
The horrific civil war in Syria is a matter of
deep concern to both Turkey and Iran. What will Syria look like when the
war ends? Who will rule? Will the country be split up? Will the Kurds
of Syria try to establish an independent state? And what about the
refugees who have fled to Turkey and become a burden there?
Common concerns over Syria have led to deepening
ties between Ankara and Tehran, as reflected in the many high-level
meetings that have occurred in recent years between officials of both
countries, including presidents Erdoğan and Rouhani. Four summits on
Syria have been held by Turkey, Iran, and Russia; the latest was in
Sochi earlier this year and was hosted by President Putin. Photos from
those summits and meetings went viral, strengthening the image of a love
story in the making.
It is no secret that the beleaguered Islamic
Republic has always wanted to get closer to neighboring Turkey. Whenever
a more Islamic-oriented party is in power in Ankara, the Iranians
approach. This occurred in the 1990s, when Erbakan was in power; the
same is happening today with the AKP (Justice and Development Party)
government.
Doing this makes sense from an Iranian perspective
for several reasons. First, Turkey, with its population of over 80
million, is a great economic market in general, and a huge potential
market for Iranian oil in particular. Second, Turkey is a regional
superpower, so it is wise to be on its side. Third, and most important,
the Turkic-Azeri population of Iran is estimated to be a full quarter of
the Iranian population. With a Turkic minority of that size, it is
sensible to keep the biggest and most important Turkic country in the
world close by.
It is nevertheless questionable that Ankara and
Tehran will ever get particularly close. Major obstacles stand in the
way. Turkey and Iran are the two major Muslim non-Arabic players in the
Middle East. Both have a good deal of territory and big populations of
over 80 million. Officially, Turkey is a secular republic populated by
mostly Sunni Muslims; Iran is an undemocratic Islamic Republic populated
mostly by Shiites. The sects are totally different in their beliefs and
method of practicing Islam. The two countries designate themselves as
playing a leading role in the Muslim world, but their completely
different perspectives on Islam might clash.
Moreover, Turkey has reason to worry about
Tehran’s global Islamic ambitions because Iran affects all of Turkey’s
Muslim-bordering countries. It is true that in Syria, neither country
wants to see an independent Kurdish state emerge and they will do what
they can to prevent that from happening. But Iran has thrown its lot
behind Bashar Assad’s regime, which Turkey opposes. Though the majority
of the Syrian population is Sunni, the regime is Alawite (which is
associated with Shiite Islam). Ankara may have wished the “Arab Spring”
to culminate in a new Sunni leadership for the Sunni state, but in the
absence of such a result, it does not want to watch Assad massacre his
Sunni subjects. For its part, Tehran is backing the regime that is not
only conducting these massacres but pushing millions to flee Syria –
often for Turkey, where they are a great burden.
The case of Iraq is instructive. Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq was a Sunni-governed state, but after the fall of his regime, Iraq,
where Shiites constitute over two-thirds of the population, came under
Shiite domination – with Tehran playing an ever-growing role in its
neighbor’s domestic affairs. In the process, Turkey was geographically
cut off from the rest of the Sunni world. Its neighboring countries are
either Christian or Shiite. This being the case, Turkey does not want to
see a stronger Iran with greater regional influence on its own border.
Turkey and Iran are also competing for influence
in Central Asia’s Muslim republics. Many that were part of the Soviet
Union are Turkic, and they view Turkey as a role model. Pan-Turkic
ideology is common in some of these countries, and their leaders want to
maintain good relations with Ankara. But Iran, which is geographically
closer, very much wants to gain influence over them. The spread of
revolutionary Islam is, after all, one of the Islamic Republic’s core
principles.
Neither the Shiite Iranian ambition to influence
the Muslim world, nor Tehran’s dogged drive for nuclear weapons, is in
the Turkish interest.
It is also important to remember that Turkey is
part of NATO and maintains relations with both the US and Israel
(despite recurrent tensions), which the ayatollahs refer to,
respectively, as the “Great Satan” and the “Little Satan.” Furthermore,
according to a Turkish official, Ankara stopped purchasing Iranian oil
in May as a result of the US sanctions.
It is undeniable that Turkey and Iran are getting
closer thanks to their common interests, particularly in Syria. But many
obstacles stand in the way of a genuine alliance.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/iran-turkey-friendship/
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