by Prof. Hillel Frisch
Islamic Jihad seeks fully-fledged confrontation as part of an Iranian strategy to deflect attention from its Syrian military buildup and regional expansion.
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| A rocket being launched from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, on November 18, 2012. (Image source: Dima Vazinovich via IDF) |
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,342, November 13, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Unlike Islamic Jihad,
both Hamas and Israel have an interest in keeping the present round of
hostilities short. The question is whether in the fog of battle, the two
sides will succeed in achieving their mutual goal.
The latest conflagration, which erupted within
hours of the killing of Islamic Jihad senior commander Biha Abu Ata,
underscores the crucial differences between Hamas, Gaza’s ultimate
ruler, and Islamic Jihad – the second strongest force in the Strip.
Most important are the two terror groups’
divergent strategic objectives, at least since the summer 2014
confrontation between Hamas and Israel – the longest and fiercest round
of hostilities over Gaza to date.
While Hamas views the use of violence as a means
for increasing the volume of trade with Israel and securing the inflow
of Qatari money, both of which enhance the welfare of its hard core and
the Gaza population at large, Islamic Jihad seeks fully-fledged
confrontation as part of an Iranian strategy to deflect attention from
its Syrian military buildup and regional expansion.
These strategic goals reflect the differences in
the political and organizational makeup of the two terror groups. A
Sunni mass-based organization that is clearly identified with the wider
Muslim Brotherhood movement, Hamas operates like fish in water in a
society that is almost exclusively Sunni, with most of its members being
truly devout. If there are any Gazan Shiites, they maintain their
beliefs and rituals strictly to themselves.
In devising its strategy, Hamas must take into
consideration this popular base, which at the very least comprises the
50,000 men and women whose salaries depend on Hamas’s retention of
control of Gaza. Hamas is also consistently the major force in the
institutions of higher learning, labor organizations and other social
organizations.
There is a world of difference in this regard
between Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which is known for its strong links to
Iran and which has no popular base. Though valued for its sacrifices,
most Gazans suspect its members as being Shiites in disguise. A form of
love-hate relationship thus prevails between the general population and
Islamic Jihad, a disposition that has become more pronounced as the
conflicts between Shiites and Sunnis in Syria, Iraq and Yemen
intensified.
This is why election after election in Gaza
universities and trade unions, as well as repeated polling surveys,
Islamic Jihad secures a mere 2-3% support. By contrast, Hamas and the
rival Fatah movement have rarely secured less than 15%; and nothing has
changed in this regard over the past three decades.
A telling indication of Islamic Jihad’s limited
popularity was afforded by the real-time airing of Abu Ata’s funeral
procession just hours after his killing, where it was hard to count more
than 100 participants. (Of course, the extremely paltry count is
partially due to most of its members being either busy firing rockets or
hiding in underground tunnels, which is why participants were not
masked to hide their identities.)
Despite the façade of unity the “Joint Command of
the Palestinian Factions” sought to emit, the only flags in the funeral
were the black background flags and banners, thus indicating that not
only is Islamic Jihad not a mass-based organization but it is also
relatively isolated.
Though these features might be construed as
limiting the luster of Islamic Jihad, they are a boon for Tehran. For
one thing, Islamic Jihad’s paltry popular base means its dependence on
Iran is all the greater. For another, the organization can operate
purely as a fighting arm without the need to take into account the
welfare of the Gaza population.
For Hamas, of course, none of the above is new.
Its leaders are keenly aware who wags Islamic Jihad’s tail, the reasons
behind its activities, and the ways its strategy contradicts Hamas’s
current agenda.
By the same token, Hamas cannot afford to bring an
immediate end to the rockets. After all, targeting high-level
commanders is a red line for Hamas too, especially when this comes as a
complete surprise rather than in retaliation for specific terror
attacks.
At a deeper level, Hamas can only constrain rather
than stop Islamic Jihad because it needs Iran as well. ISIS demise and
the killing of its founding leader, Abu Bakr Baghdadi, bring home to
Hamas that the power of a terrorist organization depends to a large
extent on the quality and number of its state allies. ISIS had none and
hence its demise. Hamas can hardly be choosy since most of the Sunni
Arab states oppose its activities (probably because of its affiliation
with the Muslim Brotherhood), while a much more sympathetic Turkey has
its own concerns in Syria.
This in turn means that, at least in the
short-run, Israel and Hamas have a mutual interest: to keep the
conflagration short and not too lethal. Israel because it does not want
to deflect attention away from Tehran’s expansionism and nuclear strive;
Hamas because it wants to maintain power in Gaza and needs to cater to
the welfare of its population, or at least its hard core base.
The question of course is whether in the fog of battle, the two sides will be able to control events to meet their common goals.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/gaza-hamas-islamic-jihad/
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