by Dr. Doron Itzchakov
Given the Islamist regime’s careful monitoring of international responses to its actions, failure to offer an adequate response to its provocations is certain to increase its temerity.
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| Baghdad protest, image via Iran Focus Twitter feed |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: With
many Iraqis (including Shiites) blaming Tehran for the social
restiveness engulfing their country, Iranian policymakers fear the
weakening of Tehran’s grip on its neighbor.
While the popular unrest that has swept across
Iraq over the past few weeks is primarily a result of the Baghdad
government’s failure to address the country’s socioeconomic woes, many
Iraqis (including Shiites) blame it on Tehran’s interference in Iraqi
domestic affairs. They are particularly incensed by the brutal
suppression of the protests by the Iranian-controlled militias, which
has exacted hundreds of civilian fatalities and thousands of casualties.
Iranian representations and institutions in Baghdad, Karbala, and Basra
have been attacked, and an extensive media campaign was launched under
the slogan “Let it rot” (خليها_تخيس#), urging Iraqis to boycott Iranian-imported products.
The Islamist regime in Tehran responded swiftly to
these developments, disparaging the protests as instigated by “foreign
hands” – the standard pejorative used by Middle Eastern dictatorships to
delegitimize domestic opposition. At the same time, the repressive
measures used by the Iraqi security forces were remarkably reminiscent
of those used by the Iranian authorities to suppress the 2009 and 2018
mass protests, combining wholesale blocking of internet communication
with brutal repression of demonstrations.
This response reflects the importance attached by
Tehran to its newly gained influence in Iraq. For while the Islamist
regime tends to present its policies in purely defensive terms – “creating strategic depth in order to protect Iranian sovereignty”
– this is but a ploy to harness the weary and disillusioned Iranian
masses behind its hegemonic ambitions, which have remained largely
unabated since its inception in 1979. The catchwords and slogans used in
justification of these ambitions have of course changed over time in
line with the vicissitudes in Iranian public attitudes and a declining
readiness for collective sacrifice: from “exporting the revolution” to
“advancing the axis of resistance” to “creating strategic depth” against
foreign enemies. But the overriding goal has remained unchanged: the
attainment of regional hegemony as a steppingstone toward the “formation
of a single, universal [Muslim] community” (in the words of the Iranian
constitution).
Viewed from a 40-year vantage point, Iranian
success in achieving its goals has varied in accordance with the
existence of the following key variables:
- local population that is amenable to religious, social, ethnic, and economic influences
- popular support gained through soft power activities (establishing cultural centers, helping the poor and the needy, building schools, medical centers etc.)
- fertile ground for the formation of local proxy militias
- solid economic and logistic infrastructure for supporting loyal local forces
- asymmetric warfare capabilities, gained (in most cases) by blurring Tehran’s fingerprints
- lack of a strong local leadership that can challenge Iranian policies
- absence of great-power intervention
- public support and absence of effective opposition within Iran for the regime’s foreign policies
- a veneer of legality/legitimacy (e.g., official invitation, a la Syria) to deflect international intervention
Given the Islamist regime’s careful monitoring of
international responses to its actions, failure to offer an adequate
response to its provocations is certain to increase its temerity. This
is all the more true as the Islamic Republic’s relentless isolation
since its inception, exacerbated by the eight-year Iran-Iraq War and
prolonged international sanctions, has made defiance and confrontation
the main hallmarks of the regime. Conversely, regional developments
attending the US-led invasion of Iraq (2003), especially the collapse of
autocratic regimes during the Arab upheavals, have created a golden
opportunity for Iran to advance its “strategic depth” strategy.
The popular restiveness in Iraq is highly
detrimental to this strategy, not least because Baghdad’s subservience
to its larger neighbor to the east has enabled Tehran to deploy military
force and hardware on its territory and to use its vast spaces to
establish a land corridor from the Iranian border to the Mediterranean.
For the moment, Tehran seems disinclined to
moderate its anti-protest policy despite international pressure. The
longsuffering Iraqis, in turn, disillusioned with their government and
fed up with Iranian meddling in their domestic affairs, are ignoring
pleas by prominent Iraqi religious figures, notably Ayatollah Ali
Sistani and Muqtada Sadr, to calm the situation.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/tehran-restive-iraqis/
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