by Uzi Rubin
These weapons most certainly can win wars, and Israel should do everything in its power not only to prevent defeat by them but to use them to defeat its enemies.
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1607, June 16, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The received wisdom
that “missiles and rockets don’t win wars,” always a dubious assertion,
is now obsolete and demonstrably false. Modern precision-guided missiles
have the same combat effectiveness as fighting aircraft yet are easier
to operate and less vulnerable as they don’t rely on huge, immovable,
target-rich air bases. Precision-guided missiles and rockets can
paralyze the civilian and military infrastructures of entire countries,
thus paving the way to their defeat in war. These weapons most certainly
can win wars, and Israel should do everything in its power not only to
prevent defeat by them but to use them to defeat its enemies.
The emergence of pinpoint precision-guided rockets
and missiles on the battlefield is a turning point in the history of
warfare. This is because they provide terror organizations and
non-government militias with the means to achieve air superiority
without operating any combat aircraft.
Air superiority means having access to hostile
airspace while denying the enemy access to friendly airspace. It
provides its possessor with the freedom of action to strike the enemy at
will. This freedom of action is achieved through conventional air power
by suppressing the hostile air force and neutralizing the enemy’s
ground-based air defenses. The point of such a costly and expensive
effort is not the satisfaction of shooting down enemy aircraft or
destroying its air defense batteries, but the degradation of the enemy’s
war-making capacity by destroying its ground and naval forces and
paralyzing its economy.
Every campaign in WWII opened with a bid for air
superiority. The Nazi Luftwaffe succeeded to doing so in Poland, Norway,
and France, bringing about the swift defeat of their armies and the
overrunning and occupation of their national territories by Hitler’s
Wehrmacht. The Luftwaffe failed to achieve air superiority over Britain,
leading to the cancellation of Hitler’s planned invasion of the British
Isles (Operation Sea Lion). The defensive victory in the Battle of
Britain had far-reaching strategic consequences: it initiated the long
and hard-fought process of defeating and occupying Nazi Germany.
In 1967, Israel opened the Six-Day War with
Operation Focus, which obliterated the air forces of Egypt, Jordan, and
Syria. The purpose of this operation was twofold: to deny the enemy’s
capability to strike Israel’s territory and armed forces from the air;
and to provide an umbrella for the IDF’s offensive, which ultimately
defeated the opposing land forces. Egypt under Anwar Sadat unleashed a
similar operation when it launched the October 1973 War, but the results
were inconclusive; hence Egypt’s failure to achieve its military goals
(though it succeeded in achieving its political goals). In Operation
Mole Cricket 19 at the opening stage of the 1982 Lebanon War, the Israel
Air Force gained full air supremacy over Syria and Lebanon, thus
largely knocking Syria’s ground forces out of the war.
Spectacular air battles, rows of enemy emblems
painted on the noses of victorious fighter aircraft, and video clips
showing demolished air defense batteries lift the morale of the nation,
depress the enemy, and elevate fighter pilots to the status of media
stars. But this is not the purpose of the immense effort and expenditure
involved in establishing and maintaining a modern air force, nor does
it justify the losses in air battles. The strategic purpose of the
effort and pain is twofold: first, to deny friendly airspace to the
enemy; and second, to open enemy airspace to friendly forces so they can
strike its territory at will.
Ever since the early 20th century, when
flying machines evolved from rich men’s toys into lethal weapons of
war, all the world’s armies have invested heavily in countering the
threat from the air. Initially, such efforts were focused on access
denial: in other words, preventing hostile aircraft from collecting
visual intelligence about friendly troop dispositions and blocking
hostile bombing of troops and cities. The response was the perfection
and deployment of integrated air defenses that relied on interceptor
aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery (later replaced by ground-to-air
missiles). The Battle of Britain was the first victory of this access
denial strategy, with Britain managing to combine radar, fighter
aircraft, and fire control centers into the first modern integrated air
defense system.
Later on during WWII, when Britain’s integrated
air defense became virtually impenetrable to the Nazi Luftwaffe, the
Germans conceived the idea of bombing by missile rather than by
aircraft. Since the air defenses of the time were unable to intercept
missiles plunging at supersonic speeds, ballistic missiles promised the
penetrability that conventional bomber aircraft had lost.
This marked a major shift. In making this
adjustment, Germany achieved the essence if not the form of classic air
superiority—namely, the freedom to strike the enemy’s territory at
will—with no loss of aircraft or pilots.
While Germany’s ballistic and cruise missiles
wreaked havoc and killed thousands in Britain and later in Belgium,
their poor accuracy prevented them from changing the course of the war.
The disproportion between the immense effort of the Germans in
developing, building, deploying and launching the missiles—a brilliant
technical achievement—and their minimal impact on the war was
internalized by all post-war military establishments, including the IDF.
The expression “Missiles and rockets don’t win wars” blinded Israel for
years to the looming missile threat.
Between WWI and WWII, several air
forces—particularly the British and American—worked to achieve the
second goal of air superiority, that of gaining access to enemy airspace
with fleets of strategic bombers. During WWII, strategic bombing by
swarms of heavy bombers caused unimaginable damage to German cities and
killed at least 1 million civilians, but the effect on the course of the
war is still up for debate. Allied air losses caused by Germany’s own
integrated air defenses were at unacceptable levels. Only in the waning
phases of the war, when the Luftwaffe’s capabilities were nearly
exhausted, did the Allied bombers gain access to German airspace with
acceptable losses.
Air offense and air defense clashed next in
Southeast Asia, when the dense array of North Vietnam’s ground-to-air
missiles, backed by the judicious use of interceptor aircraft, nearly
blunted the US’s air superiority and extracted a heavy price in downed
US aircraft and lost aircrew.
Another landmark—if largely forgotten—clash
between air offense and air defense occurred during the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-88). Once Saddam Hussein’s plan to defeat Iran by a lightning
campaign fizzled out, the conflict deteriorated into a war of attrition
over the course of which Iraqi jet bombers, purchased from the Soviet
Union, bombed Tehran and other Iranian cities. The Iranian air force was
still equipped at the time with cutting-edge US interceptor aircraft
purchased by the Shah prior to the Islamic Revolution. The consequence
was that Iran managed to down many Iraqi bombers, forcing Saddam to call
off his strategic bombing campaign.
In desperation, Saddam—like Hitler before
him—turned to ballistic missiles. His fleet of Soviet Scud missiles was
too short-ranged to hit deep within Iran. Using the expertise of
aerospace companies in Europe and South America, he developed an
extended-range version and converted most of his Scud stockpile. The new
missile, dubbed Al-Hussein, was used for strategic bombardment.
Almost 200 missiles were fired at Tehran and three
other major cities deep within Iran, killing thousands, destroying
houses, and compelling millions to evacuate the cities. The common
wisdom among most analysts is that those missile attacks were the last
straw that compelled Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini to “drink
the poison chalice” and agree to a ceasefire. After eight years of
bloodletting, Iraq emerged victorious. It can be safely concluded that
in that case, missiles did win the war.
Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser also chose a
strategy of using ballistic missiles as surrogate air power. Nasser was
astute enough to realize the inferiority of his air force vis-à-vis the
IAF after the 1956 Sinai War. When his request for Soviet ballistic
missiles was rejected, he hired German experts to develop an indigenous
ballistic missile that could hit any target “south of Beirut”—i.e., in
Israel’s entire territory. The logic behind Nasser’s move emulated
Hitler and anticipated Saddam. Because he was unable to achieve air
superiority with his manned combat aircraft fleet, he strove to achieve
it with missiles.
A similar logic compelled Hafez Assad, Syria’s
ruler, following the trouncing of his air force in the 1982 Lebanon war,
to acquire a huge fleet of Scud missiles tipped with home-developed
chemical warheads. His minister of defense, Mustafa Tlass, pointed out
the interchangeability between aircraft and missiles when he wrote that
“the 1982 war was an air war, the next one will be a missile war.”
The non-state terror organizations now confronting
Israel from Lebanon and Gaza, Hezbollah and Hamas, have never had the
option of acquiring air forces. Hence they have equipped themselves with
huge stockpiles of simple missiles—aka rockets—and have used them to
terrorize Israel’s homeland, killing hundreds of civilians and causing
considerable property damage and economic losses.
Rockets and missiles as originally conceived
during WWII were not very accurate, making them unfit for precision
strikes. As a result, they were used mainly to saturate troop
concentrations and terrorize population centers. Improved accuracy could
only be achieved via heavy, extremely costly, and highly complicated
electromechanical guidance systems. Precision strikes thus remained the
sole domain of manned combat aircraft that could close in upon targets
and hit them with short-range precision-guided munitions.
Over time, however, technology has caught up.
Today’s smartphones contain all the wherewithal necessary for precision
guidance of vehicles, be they automobiles, drones, or missiles. For
about a decade, it has been possible to incorporate such technologies
into even simple Grads, converting unguided rockets into pinpoint
precision missiles at modest expenditure.
This technological shift makes missiles as
effective as air power for precision strikes. Precision-guided missiles
are being developed and deployed today by all the major world powers as
well as by many smaller states. In the Middle East, Iran is leading the
way; it is currently converting all its older rockets and missiles into
precision weapons. It also supplies its allies in the region with
expertise and materials with which to build their own precision missile
capabilities—hence the Precision Project of Hezbollah and other Iranian
proxies in the region.
Why is Israel so anxious to frustrate Hezbollah’s
Precision Project? Because once it is achieved, it will elevate
Hezbollah’s war-making capability to that of a state military force.
Hezbollah will possess all the advantages of an offensive air force
without needing to own a single combat aircraft. Its precision missiles
will be able to paralyze any vital installation or terrorize any
civilian population center in Israel.
One of the biggest advantages of ground-launched
rockets and missiles is their small footprint. Precision rockets and
missiles enjoy the same advantage: their launchers are as small,
stealthy, and hard to find and destroy as those of their more imprecise
predecessors. Air power, by contrast, has the Achilles’ Heel of a
reliance on huge air bases replete with kilometers-long runways,
aircraft hangars, workshops, communication centers, and so on.
The vulnerability of giant, stationary air bases
to precision missile strikes was demonstrated during the January 2020
Iranian missile strike on the US-operated Ein Assad air base in Iraq.
Prior to the attack, the US teams at that base had launched a fleet of
Predator UAVs for patrolling the base perimeter. One of the incoming
Iranian missiles hit an underground communications conduit and cut the
fiber optic lines between the UAV’s control vans and the system’s
transceivers. This caused a loss of ground control over the entire UAV
fleet. It took hours to reestablish communication via satellite and
bring the UAVs back in.
Needless to say, US combat aircraft based in Iraq
were powerless against this missile strike. Simply put, Iran gained air
superiority over the air base by virtue of its precision missiles.
Once Hezbollah is equipped with precision
missiles, it stands to reason that it will launch an Operation Focus of
its own in the opening stage of any future war with Israel, firing
salvoes of precision missiles to paralyze Israel’s air bases. Israel’s
active defense structure—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and any future high
power laser defense system—will probably be able to destroy most
incoming missiles, but not all of them. Active defense cannot guarantee a
hermetic defense. Whatever precision missiles do manage to leak through
the defensive shield could erode the IAF’s capability—witness what
Iranian precision missiles did in Iraq.
Against a precision missile threat, active defense
is a necessary but insufficient condition. It requires complementary
measures. One such measure is passive defense, meaning the shielding of
vital installations with thick concrete walls that could withstand
direct hits. While technically feasible, this kind of response is very
expensive and time-consuming. Even if the necessary budgets were
allocated, there is no guarantee that the shielding would be completed
in time.
Another response would be to diversify the IAF’s
offensive capability to compensate for degradation of its offensive
power during the initial phase of future war. If Hezbollah can establish
an “air force without aircraft,” so can Israel.
Israel’s own Precision Project is more than a
decade old. Israel’s defense industries have developed and tested a
number of ground-launched precision missiles with varying ranges and
warheads. To date, the IDF has agreed to buy only the shortest-range
version, and even that only in limited numbers. Longer-range precision
missiles, such as the recently tested 400 km range LORA, are
successfully exported to foreign armies, but not to the IDF.
A recent article in Israel Defense
magazine disclosed that this was the product of IAF objections to the
provision of Israel’s ground forces with an independent precision strike
capability beyond the range of 100 km. If that is true, then the
obstacle in the path of augmenting the air force with “air power without
aircraft” is not technological or operational but rather prestige and
budgetary battles within the IDF.
Such inter-service turf wars are not unique to the
IDF. One of the most notorious occurred in the US, when the US Air
Force fought tooth and nail against the introduction of ballistic
missiles into the US Navy submarine fleet as they would “compete” with
its own strategic bombers. It took years for the Pentagon to resolve
this battle.
It is far from sure that Israel can afford that kind of time.
A proposal to establish an Israeli missile strike
force to back up Israel’s aircraft strike force was mooted a couple of
years ago. As far as is known, it was rejected by the IDF. The
relatively short-range precision missiles now acquired are slated to
provide ground forces with long-range artillery support for ground
operations, not to back up and complement the IAF’s capability to
conduct strategic strikes when its bases are under precision missile
fire.
The received wisdom that “missiles and rockets
don’t win wars,” always a dubious assertion, is now obsolete and
demonstrably false. Modern precision missiles have the same punch as
combat aircraft yet are less vulnerable, as they don’t rely on huge,
immovable, target-rich air bases. Precision-guided missiles and rockets
can paralyze the civilian and military infrastructures of entire
countries, paving the way to their defeat.
Today, precision-guided missiles and rockets most
certainly can win wars. Israel should do everything in its power not
only to prevent defeat by such weapons but to use them to defeat its
enemies.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-precision-guided-missiles/
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