by Yaakov Lappin
The creation of precision missile bases throughout the Middle East, which Iran could activate at any time against Israel, Arab-Sunni states, or American forces, was a vision Soleimani worked hard to achieve, with only partial success.
Qassem Soleimani, photo via Wikimedia Commons
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,477, March 10, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The
killing by US drone strike of Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem
Soleimani on January 3 has the potential to seriously dent Iran’s malign
activity in the Middle East and beyond. But how long this effect will
last is still very much an open question. The answer depends on how the
US responds to future tests.
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani was
undoubtedly a central component of Iran’s aggression and terrorist
export program. The months leading up to his assassination provide ample
examples of that leadership.
The Iranian regime, led by Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei, has been economically bled by American sanctions, and it
responded by activating Soleimani and his Quds Force, as well as the
wider Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to take increasingly
aggressive action.
These steps included a piracy-like campaign of mine attacks on international shipping in the Persian Gulf area, the June downing of an American drone, and September’s surprise assault on
Saudi oil fields. In that incident, 25 Iranian cruise missile and drone
strikes caused substantial damage to the Saudi oil industry. The
Islamic Republic exhibited high-end offensive capabilities, intimidating
the Sunni-Arab countries.
The IRGC and Quds Force have been busy
proliferating these capabilities around the region. Soleimani’s arms
network planted advanced cruise missiles in Syria to target Israel,
trafficked mid-range ballistic missiles to Shiite militias in Iraq, and
proliferated long-range ballistic missiles to the Houthi forces in
Yemen, who are also part of the Iranian terror axis and who routinely
fire missiles at Saudi cities.
Soleimani’s role should be seen in the broader
context of Iran’s pattern of conduct. He was a key enabler in boosting
the country’s malign regional activity. His actions, and those of the
broader IRGC, demonstrated that Iran has increased its confidence,
ability, and willingness to take bold action.
The killing of Soleimani, and the accompanying
(and sorely needed) restoration of American deterrence, has the
potential to turn this trend on its head.
Soleimani’s role was unique. He was not just
another military-terrorist commander. He formulated an entire doctrine
based on the idea of installing armed proxies throughout the region, on
the borders of Israel and US-allied Arab states, and using them to
activate force. These proxies meant Iran could go much further than
threatening the region with missiles on its territory.
Soleimani was not just another link in the chain
of command. It is far from clear whether his successor, Esmail Gha’ani,
can use the same funds and resources that were at Soleimani’s disposal
and achieve the same things.
Part of Soleimani’s power stemmed from his charismatic personality, which gave him the ability to fly to Russia in 2015 and convince President Vladimir Putin to become involved in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime.
Soleimani’s ability to sit down with Assad to
formulate a war strategy for defeating the Sunni rebels was another
expression of his character. Replicating these actions is not merely a
question of funds or resources. A certain leadership personality is also
required.
It does appear that Gha’ani is hard at work. The reported February 14 airstrikes on
Iranian targets around Damascus seem to be an indication of fresh IRGC
and Quds Force efforts to traffic advanced weapons into Syria.
Soleimani was a driving force behind the ongoing
arms flow to Iran’s Lebanese proxy force, Hezbollah. Its arsenal of
150,000 rockets and missiles has been at the center of an Iranian
upgrade effort, which aims to take inaccurate projectiles and turn them
into precision guided missiles (PGMs).
Hezbollah, a terrorist army that is not
accountable to any government except the Iranian regime, is considering
building factories on Lebanese soil that would convert such rockets into
PGMs. Israel has made it abundantly clear that it will not tolerate
this development, and Soleimani’s elimination from the scene, together
with Israel’s warnings, may help postpone Iranian-Hezbollah plans for
constructing such factories.
The creation of precision missile bases throughout
the Middle East, which Iran could activate at any time against Israel,
Arab-Sunni states, or American forces, was a vision Soleimani worked
hard to achieve, with only partial success.
An Israeli prevention campaign involving hundreds
of air strikes stopped some of this vision from turning into reality,
but Soleimani and his subordinates in the IRGC and Quds Force were able
to create a number of such missile bases.
An Iranian proxy like Hezbollah, armed with the
ability to hit targets with an accuracy radius of 30 meters, can decide
to hit a building with precision, causing major disruption to the
targeted country. This capability means the Iranians and their proxies
can threaten strategic sites or try to assassinate high-profile leaders.
Within Iran, military industries continue to churn
out accurate missiles, using miniaturized technology and new navigation
technology. The IRGC and Quds Force’s role under Soleimani was to get
those missiles into the hands of radical militias. It is safe to assume
that Gha’ani, Soleimani’s replacement, will try to continue that work.
Only consistent American, Israeli, and
international determination to stop these actions has the potential to
make Iran abandon this objective.
The upheaval that Soleimani was so instrumental in
fomenting in the region is likely to have aftershocks well into the
future. The war between the Iranian-Russian-Assad coalition and Sunni
organizations created some 9.5 million displaced people in Syria,
resulting in a whole generation of people who lack homes, jobs, or, for
that matter, hope.
The chances that people growing up under such
conditions will be receptive to Westernized democratic ideas is not
high. In contrast, messages from radical Islamist actors could be well
received by young people living such unstable lives. The next
recruitment ground for radical ideas is already taking shape.
This is an edited version of an article published by The Algemeiner on March 2, 2020.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/iran-soleimani-loss/
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