Quid pro What?

by Shlomo Cesana

The decision to release 104 Palestinian terrorists has been characterized by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's confidantes as a "diplomatic necessity." This painful step led to the renewal of serious peace negotiations with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, without having to freeze settlement construction or commit to the 1967 borders. This was a smart move, yet a majority of the Israeli public views the decision to release terrorists with blood on their hands as a mistake that carries too high a price.

It was futile to try to make the release more palatable by dividing it into four stages. Any student of history, like the prime minister is, should remember the dynamic of the Oslo Accords. Gaza and Jericho first? Those were merely words. Once the "process" gets going, no one is capable of taking responsibility for halting it.

Netanyahu is now paying a price for the public's lack of confidence in disproportionate gestures made toward the Palestinians. The public wants to know what Israel is getting in return. Are the Palestinians finally willing to accept Netanyahu's list of conditions and sign a permanent peace deal? Will they recognize Israel as a Jewish state? Will they agree to Israel having defensible borders? Will they give up on Jerusalem and the right of return?

Netanyahu deserves credit for his effort to reach a peace agreement, even if few believe that it can happen.

Meanwhile, Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett is trying to have it all. Bennett is not able to take responsibility for decisions he makes. "I and my party's ministers voted no," Bennett wrote on his Facebook page about the decision to release Palestinian terrorists, hoping that the public would click "Like" and forget about his overall responsibility as a minister in the government. Also, Bennett's attempt to blame Hatnuah leader Tzipi Livni for the prisoner release looked like an evasion.

This week, we learned that Bennett has yet to internalize that "taking responsibility" is not just an electoral catchphrase.

Shlomo Cesana

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=6121

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Kerry & Netanyahu Spar in Rome

by P. David Hornik


 

AP reported this week that Iran’s deputy foreign minister Abbas Araghchi “predicted…the nuclear talks could take as long as a year…with the first milestone coming in three to six months and negotiations concluding within the year.”

That “prediction” should come as no surprise. The same report says “significant gaps remain between what the Iranians offered” in last week’s first round of talks and what the P5+1 countries are seeking “to reduce fears Iran wants to build nuclear weapons.”

In other words, Iran’s strategy is to make an offer it knows even its eagerly “peace”-seeking interlocutors are quite capable of refusing—and then take lots of time seemingly whittling down that offer toward something more acceptable. Meanwhile Israel—if this goes according to plan—gets diplomatically closed out of taking military action and incurring universal wrath by wrecking “peace” and “progress.”

Also this week The New Republic posted a long interview with Amos Yadlin, Israel’s previous chief of military intelligence and current head of its leading security think tank.

Interviewer Ben Birnbaum notes that in September 2012, when many thought an Israeli strike on Iran was imminent, Yadlin told an Israeli journalist: “They say that time has almost run out, but I say there is still time. The decisive year is not 2012 but 2013. Maybe even early 2014.”

That is, a direct clash with Araghchi’s assessment of another leisurely year for talks.

Does Yadlin still see it the same way? It emerges that he does:

…I think 2012 was the wrong year to do it, because in 2012, it was a bright red light from Washington. I would like to emphasize, Israel is not asking for a green light. Israel only doesn’t want to do something that is going 180 degrees against American vital interests as long as it is not a response to a threat that is almost an existential threat. I think in late 2013 or early 2014, especially if America sees that Iran is not serious about reaching an acceptable agreement and only continues to buy time, the U.S. will accept an Israeli attack because a nuclear Iran is absolutely against American vital national security interests.

Yadlin adds later:

The most problematic issue has nothing to do with Israel. It’s nonproliferation in the Middle East. It’s the fact that the Saudis, the Egyptians, and the Turks will go for nuclear weapons if Iran gets them, and…miscalculations, unintended escalations, nuclear weapons to terrorists will be multiplied tenfold—it will be a nuclear nightmare.

Meanwhile, in a tour of European capitals this week Secretary of State John Kerry tried to assuage, in particular, Israeli and Saudi concerns about Washington’s Iran policy. According to a New York Times report on Thursday, Kerry had little success.

The Times notes that “Saudi officials have made it clear they are frustrated with the Obama administration,” which is viewed in the region at large as simply seeking to avoid confrontations and hence quite amenable to Iran’s approach of drawing out the talks and playing for time.

And as for Kerry’s seven-hour-long meeting in Rome on Wednesday with Binyamin Netanyahu, the Times says “Kerry’s comments appeared to do little to persuade” the Israeli prime minister, with “the United States and other world powers…willing to explore a deal that is far less stringent” than any Netanyahu would consider acceptable.

In other words, the picture that emerges is less optimistic than former intelligence chief Yadlin’s expectation of U.S. understanding for a possible Israeli attack in a matter of months.

The next round of talks with Iran on November 7-8 should help clarify whether the U.S. and its European allies are capable, even at this late date, of relating to the danger with a modicum of seriousness.

Israel, for its part, should be thinking about forestalling the nuclear nightmare without even an amber light from Washington.


P. David Hornik

Source: http://frontpagemag.com/2013/davidhornik/kerry-netanyahu-spar-in-rome/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Partitioning Syria

by Gary C. Gambill


After two-and-a-half years of steadily metastasizing violence in Syria, the harsh reality is that the country isn't going to become a stable, unified state again in the foreseeable future, let alone a remotely democratic one. It may be time to start thinking about alternatives.

Syria has already fragmented into increasingly well-defined enclaves. A multiplicity of Sunni Arab rebels control large swaths of the north and east, while the regime is dominant in the capital and major cities, the largely non-Sunni coastal provinces, and a corridor connecting them. Kurds control small border areas in the far northeast. The Druze, heavily concentrated in southwest Syria, have formed militias to fend off rebel incursions, while tending otherwise toward neutrality.

Although the rebels are likely to eventually bring down the minoritarian regime of President Bashar Assad, as Michael O'Hanlon helpfully analogizes, the fall of Damascus will "no more end the war in Syria than the overthrow of Saddam in 2003 brought stability to Iraq." Pro-regime forces will fall back toward the coast, Kurds and Druze will fortify their enclaves, and the Sunni rebels will fight each other to reclaim what's left of the Syrian capital.

It could be many years before any coalition in Syria is sufficiently powerful, willing, and united to impose a state monopoly of force. By that time, the country will have lost hundreds of thousands of lives, most of its urban infrastructure, and a generation's worth of economic growth and development. The collateral damage of a grinding fight to the finish could render the dominion of whoever wins all but ungovernable and destabilize the rest of the Levant.

Keenly aware of this, Obama administration officials continue to place their hopes on brokering a negotiated settlement providing for a peaceful transition to majoritarian rule in Syria. The problem is that powerful jihadist rebel factions and their wealthy donors in the Arab Gulf will never accept a political accord that curtails their pursuit of an Islamic state in Syria, while most Alawites and other minorities will reject any transition plan that doesn't. There's no way to bridge the gap until someone reins in the jihadists, and that clearly isn't going to happen before pro-regime forces are decisively defeated (if then).

The most viable alternative to the violent restoration of Sunni Arab hegemony in Syria is partition – either "hard," resulting in two or more independent states (e.g. Sudan, 2011), or "soft," as O'Hanlon proposes,[1] resulting in autonomous centralized cantons under a weak federal government (e.g. Bosnia, 1995).

Of course, Syria is not neatly divided into geographic ethno-sectarian constituencies. Apart from Jabal Druze and the coastal hinterland of Latakia and Tartous provinces, there are few sizable blocs of Syrian territory where any one minority is a majority (though there are plenty where Sunnis predominate). All of the major cities are confessionally mixed.[2] However, insofar as refugees from government-controlled areas are disproportionately Sunni and those fleeing rebel-held areas are disproportionately non-Sunni, territories under the control of both the regime and the opposition are becoming steadily more homogenous.

As in Lebanon during its 1975-1990 civil war, de facto partition is happening every day. The question at hand is whether the international community should encourage a settlement that reifies and institutionalizes this fragmentation, rather than seeking to propel one side or the other to victory.

Though explicit advocacy of either soft or hard partition is deeply taboo in Syria (an unfortunate legacy of French colonialism), it appears that most Alawites, nearly all Kurds, and many Christians and Druze would prefer some form of secession or extreme decentralization over the uncertain outcome of majoritarian (and almost certainly Islamist) rule, particularly if it means an earlier end to the fighting.

Most Sunni Arabs vehemently oppose partition, not so much because they see Syria's sovereignty and current borders as sacrosanct (in fact, the more deeply religious see both as largely irrelevant), but because they expect to win out under majority rule in a unitary Syria. However, Sunnis may come to support partition if it means escaping Assad's grip without paying the catastrophic costs of defeating him. They may also come to prefer living in a more homogenous polity less susceptible to outside (particularly Iranian) influence. Jihadists will unquestionably reject partition, but no more than they have rejected all other conceivable political outcomes acceptable to a critical mass of minorities (and perhaps less so, insofar as a rump Sunni Arab state with fewer minorities has fewer obstacles to their political ascendancy).

At the regional and international level, partition is no one's first choice of outcome. However, with the exception of Turkey (always a stickler about Kurdish autonomy anywhere), neither is it anyone's last choice. Jordan and perhaps Israel would find a friend in a Druze statelet, while a coastal Alawite-dominated statelet would be sure to align with Tehran and Moscow (indeed, partition could be Russia's best hope of holding onto its naval facility at Tartous long-term). The Kurdish zone would likely form a close relationship with its counterpart in Iraq. The Arab Gulf states would own the center (literally, in many places). Partition could prove to be a stable equilibrium, an arrangement from which regional and international players have little incentive to unilaterally depart once it is in place.

Partition obviously won't solve all of Syria's problems, least of all its authoritarian political culture. Assad and his minions will surely dominate the coast, while Islamists will reign supreme in the bulk of what's left. The largest and most militarily powerful Kurdish group, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), is deeply autocratic. Those not belonging to the dominant ethno-sectarian group in their statelet are going to have a hard time of it. Such a solution would be a travesty if prospects for peaceful reunification and democratization weren't so abysmal. Under the present circumstances, according to New York Times columnist (and former Beirut bureau chief) Thomas Friedman, it "might actually be the most stable and humanitarian long-term option."[3]

Nor will geopolitical fragmentation of the Levant solve all of America's problems. Partition would mean a less-than-complete Iranian strategic defeat in Syria. However, this outcome can be mitigated by ensuring that the coastal state does not encompass territory contiguous either with Iraq or with the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement's fiefdom in Lebanon, and it must be weighed against the hefty price tag of dealing Iran a complete defeat – a Sunni Islamist capture of power in Damascus. While an interior Sunni Arab state will surely have a decidedly Islamist bent, it will be less fractious than its multiconfessional predecessor, and therefore a more reliable buffer against Iranian encroachment in the Arab world.

This doesn't mean the Obama administration should propose partition as the answer in Syria, at least not at a time when most domestic and regional actors continue to loudly repudiate the idea. But neither should it insist on a negotiating framework that explicitly disallows partition (by mandating a transitional government of "mutual consent" as the cornerstone), as those who dare not speak its name today are likely to gravitate toward it in practice as the war drags on. Even Turkey is now losing enthusiasm for the rebel effort. Down the road, it's not inconceivable that Assad's inner circle can be persuaded to abandon the interior without a bloodbath in exchange for Western recognition of an Alawite-dominated mini-state. If that is what it takes to avert the calamities yet to come in Syria and the region, Washington should keep an open mind.

[1] Michael O'Hanlon, "Solving Syria: Is There a Realistic Way for America to Help Stop the Civil War?" The Daily Beast, September 27, 2013. [2] For an excellent discussion of demographic barriers to partition, see Mustafa Khalifa, "The Impossible Partition of Syria," Arab Reform Initiative, October 2013. [3] See Thomas Friedman, "Syria Scorecard," The New York Times, June 22, 2013.


Gary C. Gambill is an associate fellow at the Middle East Forum, and was formerly the editor of Middle East Intelligence Bulletin and Mideast Monitor.

Source: http://www.meforum.org/3650/partitioning-syria

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Sisi to Egyptian Islamists: Surrender or Die

by Jonathan Spyer


Jerusalem Post, 26/10: 

A suicide bombing this week at Egyptian Military Intelligence headquarters in the city of Ismailiya has been claimed by Ansar Beit al Maqdis. This organization is a Salafi Jihadi group with links to organizations of a similar kind in the Gaza Strip. Eleven people, including six soldiers were wounded in the bombing. 

The Ismailiya attack is the latest episode in a growing Islamist insurgency against the de facto rule of General Abd al Fatah al-Sisi and the military in Egypt. It was of particular significance because the city lies just west of the Suez Canal, outside of the Sinai Peninsula. In the poorly policed area of northern Sinai, jihadi groups have been active since the military coup of July 3, and even before it. 

But the Ismailiya bombing represents only the second time that Ansar Beit al Maqdis has managed to strike west of the canal. This attack may well be a sign of things to come. 

Yet while the growing violence in Egypt undoubtedly constitutes a security headache for the Egyptian regime, it contains no political threat to General Sisi and those around him. 

Salafi terrorists are not going to take power in Egypt. They are an irritant, but the political result of their activities is likely to be growing support for Sisi, and calls for harsher measures mirroring Hosni Mubarak’s crackdown on similar groups in the 1990s. 

A crackdown would have wide public support. The ongoing activities of the jihadis, meanwhile, at least as long as they do not exceed a certain volume, provide a useful backdrop to the continued presence of the army at the center of public life in Egypt. 

The growing pitch of Islamist violence is an indication of the vanishing options that Sisi has left available to the Islamists. 

Since the July 3 coup, he has deliberately sought to exclude the Islamists from political life in every possible way, thus leaving them only the options of effective marginalization or a turn to force. 

Shortly after the coup, the Muslim Brotherhood was declared an illegal organization and its assets seized. Leaders of the movement, including incumbent President Mohammed Morsy, were arrested. On August 14th, the army engaged in a bloody crackdown on the movement’s sit-in at the Rabia Mosque in Cairo. 

Subsequent months have seen a series of stormy and violent demonstrations by the Brotherhood, demanding the release of their leaders and the dropping of all charges against them, and that the group be permitted to return to political activity. 

The latest of these took place on October 6th, the day on which Egyptians mark the ‘victory’ of the 1973 October War. Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood sought to make their way to Tahrir Square, while protesting the detention of Morsy and calling al-Sisi a ‘murderer.’ 

The response of the security forces was harsh and uncompromising. Around 50 people were killed in the subsequent clashes. Scores were wounded, 200 members of the Muslim Brotherhood were detained. 

Along with the uncompromising response on the streets, the military government has sought to directly link the stormy Brotherhood demonstrations in the cities with the insurgency erupting in Sinai. 

Thus, a statement released to the press by Interior Minister General Mohammed Ibrahim after the Ismailiya attacks asserted that “The Muslim Brotherhood has a new source of funding, as is indicated by the attack on Monday morning against South Sinai Security Directorate using a booby-trapped vehicle driven by a suicide bomber.”

By turning to force, Egypt’s Islamists would be ‘playing’ the security forces on the latters’ home turf, with no hope of victory. But political activity is also closed to them. 

In current discussions over amending the Egyptian constitution, meanwhile, it appears that an amendment to article 54, which deals with the foundation of political parties, is set to be approved. The amendment will prohibit the creation of political parties on a religious basis, or political activity based on religion. 

Even the Salafi al-Nour party, which is largely cooperating with the military controlled government, initially objected to this (though it now appears to have recanted.) 

Other Islamist groups are struggling to come up with a response. The Gamaa al-Islamiya movement, a formerly terrorist group which entered politics after the toppling of Mubarak, expressed the Islamists’ dilemma in the clearest way.

Speaking to al-Ahram newspaper, one of its leaders said that after Mubarak’s fall, they had ‘became engaged in the political process. We made some mistakes, of course. Such is the nature of the political game. But now society wants to ban us. How are we supposed to persuade our youth not to engage in politics and not to turn to violence again?”

The answer, from the point of the view of the present Egyptian authorities, is something like ‘that’s your problem.’ General Sisi’s approach may appear unfamiliar to contemporary western observers because he is not seeking to hold the Islamists to a stalemate and then seek an accommodation. Rather, his goal appears to be strategic victory in his battle with the Muslim Brotherhood and the smaller Islamist factions. To this end, he is offering them two alternatives: accept political oblivion – or choose to resist it, and be destroyed by the army. 


Jonathan Spyer

Source: http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/10/sisi-to-egyptian-islamists-surrender-or-die/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

A Global Espionage Festival

by Boaz Bismuth

"Gentlemen do not read other gentlemen's mail," declared Henry Stimson, who was U.S. secretary of state (1929-1933) and war secretary for two separate terms (1911-1913 and 1940-1945). Stimson even ordered the shut down of the War Department's code cracking unit, essentially dismantling U.S. intelligence. At the end of World War II, the legendary general William Donovan was asked to rebuild American intelligence capabilities by forming the CIA.

We are now in a period of time when everyone spies on everyone, while simultaneously condemning the phenomenon -- mostly after being caught. There is a great deal of hypocrisy in the reactions to the wiretapping scandal exposed by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, who told the world that the NSA has been listening to everyone. It even eavesdropped on 35 heads of state, including the German chancellor.

We grew up on John le Carré's spy novels, when the Americans were the good guys and the Soviets were the bad guys. These were the days when Western European governments would hail the considerable intelligence gathering capabilities of America, which stood by them in the face of the communist threat. London, Paris and Bonn (the then-capital of West Germany) welcomed the creation of the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office in 1961, which became one of 16 American intelligence agencies. Its objective was to plan, build and operate satellite surveillance systems.

The French news paper Le Monde revealed how in one month Washington intercepted over 70 million phone calls and text messages from France. The elders of France, though, recall very well that former President Charles de Gaulle was fully aware that France's historical ally was keeping tabs on his country. The book "The White House and CIA Files on French Presidents from 1958 to 1981" documents that the Americans knew the shoe sizes of the mistresses kept by French presidents, even if they were more interested in France's foreign policy in general and its nuclear program in particular.

These days everyone feigns extreme shock and disgust at such revelations. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her French counterpart François Hollande are pushing a "no-spy" initiative in the EU, while Germany and Brazil (two states targeted by the NSA whose leaders have been hugely offended) are formulating a decision to be presented to the U.N. General Assembly demanding the cessation of espionage and what they call the excessive invasion of privacy during the era of the war on terror. 

I must admit that this whole story was much simpler in the past, when the world was split in two and spying was primarily for security purposes. I really loved knowing that America's ears had reached the bunkers of Baikonur (in Kazakhstan), from where the Soviet Union would have launched its missiles threatening the free world. 

The Cold War may be over, but the world is still not the happiest place. In addition to military espionage, we have added economic and political espionage, which has been a boon for the spying business. It even happens between friends, maybe mostly between friends.

Since November 1985, convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard, an American Jew, has been locked up in federal prison serving a life sentence. Pollard, a former U.S. Navy Intelligence analyst, gave Israel information about the threats against Israel posed by Arab states, not information that posed a danger to his own country. He was never accused of treason. 

The late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was the first to act on Pollard's behalf. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has continued the sacred task of securing his release, which is considered part of the national consensus. 

Pollard's intention was not to hurt the United States. His intention was to help Israel. He did this in an illegal manner and has paid the price for doing so. America, of all places, should understand better than anyone that there is also such a thing as friendly espionage.

Boaz Bismuth

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=6115

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Netanyahu: Israel doesn't Fear Solitude on Iran, but We're not Alone

by Tovah Lazaroff

PM says many in int'l community share Israel's views on Iran.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu at the weekly cabinet meeting, 

October 27, 2013.  

Photo: Marc Israel Sellem/The Jerusalem Post

 

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu told his cabinet on Sunday he does not fear standing alone as an advocate for increased economic pressure on Iran, even as he assured the ministers that many in the international community shared Israel's views.

"I have been asked if I am concerned about standing alone in an isolated position against the world. First of all, the answer is no," Netanyahu said.

In the past months the prime minister has been portrayed as leading a solitary campaign to increase economic pressure on Iran precisely at a time when the international community is disposed to refrain from further financial penalties as a good will gesture to help improve the chances of a negotiated solution.

On Sunday he defended that characterization, even as he explained he does not believe its reflective of reality.

"This [halting Iran's nuclear program] is vital and important for the security of Israel and, in my view, the peace of the world. Then certainly we are willing to stand alone in the face of world opinion or changing fashion," Netanyahu said.

"But in fact we are not alone because most, if not all, leaders, those with whom I have spoken, agree with us. There are those who say so fully and there are those who whisper and there are those who say so privately. But everyone understands that Iran cannot be allowed to retrain [sic] the ability to be within reach of nuclear weapons," Netanyahu said.

He briefed his cabinet on his conversation in Rome last week with US Secretary of State John Kerry and explained that halting Iran's nuclear weapons program was one of the main topics in their seven hour meeting.

He also reacted to conflicting reports out of Iran with regard to whether it had halted or continued to enrich uranium up to 20%.

Netanyahu said the debate was "unimportant" because the standard of 20% uranium enrichment was no longer a sign of whether Iran would have nuclear military capacity.

"The importance of the issue became superfluous in the wake of the technological improvements that allow Iran to enrich uranium from 3.5% to 90% in a number of weeks," Netanyahu said.

Israel believes that once that happens, Iran would be able to produce a nuclear weapon. 

It believes it has held off from such production of the economic sanctions that were leveled against it and out of fear of the new round of sanctions which the Senate was expected to vote on this week.

The White House, however, has asked the Senate to hold off on the vote as a gesture to Iran, which is now engaged in negotiations with the six parties — the US, Russia, China, France, Great Britain and Germany — to allow time for a diplomatic solution.

But Netanyahu has told the US, that the economic pressure against Iran should be increased as long as the country continues to enrich uranium and has not dismantled is nuclear weapons program.

"The clear position that I outlined there during and after the discussions, and to the media, which we are presenting around the world is that Iran must dismantle its enrichment ability and its heavy water reactor as part of the process of preventing it from achieving nuclear weapons," Netanyahu said.

"And because it is continuing to enrich, sanctions must be increased. Iran with nuclear weapons will change the Middle East and the world for the worse," Netanyahu said.

In Vienna at International Atomic Energy Association headquarters on Monday,  Yukiya Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, will meet with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi for about an hour.

It will be followed by a new round of negotiations later the same day, also in Vienna, between senior officials from both sides over a stalled IAEA investigation into suspected atomic bomb research by Iran, which denies the charge.

In Geneva next week the six parties will renew their negotiations with Iran on November 7 and 8.

In Washington next week, Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew will hold a briefing on Thursday on the status of nuclear talks with Iran for members of a US Senate committee considering tough new sanctions on Tehran, Senate aides said on Friday.

Reuters contributed to this report.

Tovah Lazaroff

Source:http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Netanyahu-Israel-doesnt-fear-solitude-on-Iran-but-were-not-alone-329873

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Israel and Saudi Arabia – Alliance of Interests

by Jonathan Spyer


PJMedia, 24/10

Recent remarks by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have fuelled renewed speculation of behind the scenes links between Israel and the Gulf monarchies. 

Netanyahu, speaking at the UN, said that “The dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran and the emergence of other threats in our region have led many of our Arab neighbours to recognize, finally recognize, that Israel is not their enemy.”

He added: “This affords us the opportunity to overcome the historic animosities and build new relationships, new friendships, new hopes.”

There have been subsequent rumors of visits by senior Gulf officials to Israel, to discuss matters of common interest. 

While it is difficult to acquire details of these contacts at the present time, it is a near certainty that they exist, on one level or another. Conversations with Israeli officials suggest that much is happening behind the scenes. 

Israel and the key states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (most importantly Saudi Arabia) share core views on the nature of key regional processes currently under way, and their desired outcome. These commonalities have existed for some time, and it is likely that the contacts are themselves not all that new. 

There are three areas in which Israel and the countries of the GCC (with the exception of Qatar) are on the same page. 

They are: the urgency of the threat represented by the prospect of a nuclear Iran, the danger represented by the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood over the last two years, and the perception that the United States fails to understand the urgency of these threats and as a result is acting in a naïve and erroneous way on both. 

On the Iranian nuclear issue, Riyadh is deeply troubled by the current Iranian ‘charm offensive’ and its apparent effects on the west. Most importantly, the Saudis fear the prospect of a nuclear Iran, which could force Riyadh and the Gulf states to bend to its will, in return for guaranteeing the flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz, and avoiding direct encroachment on their sources of energy. 

Saudi Arabia faces Iran, directly across the Gulf. It is a far more fragile construction than its Shia, Persian neighbor. Over the decades, Riyadh and the other Gulf states sought to balance Iranian encroachment of this type through alliance with the US. 

But the US no longer seems such a reliable ally. So new strong and like-minded friends are needed. 

On the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudis feared the spread of this movement across the region, and were infuriated by the role of Qatar in supporting its successes in recent years. 

Israel too was deeply concerned at the prospect of a new alliance of Sunni Islamist states, with AKP led Turkey and Morsi’s Egypt chief among them. 

Over the past year, the advance of the Muslim Brothers has been halted and partially reversed. In Tunisia and Egypt, the MB administrations have gone. Qatar has a new, less activist emir. The Muslim Brothers and Qatar have grown weaker among the Syrian rebels. 

Saudi Arabia has been responsible for some of this, through financial support and political action. It has welcomed all of it. So has Israel. 

On the US: the Saudis think that the current US Administration is hopelessly naïve on the Middle East. They were shocked at the abandonment of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in 2011. They are equally vexed at the current indications of American and western willingness to lift some sanctions against Iran in return for cosmetic concessions that would leave the core of Teheran’s nuclear program intact. 

The Saudis were the first to congratulate General Abd al-Fatah al Sissi following his military coup in early July. They are utterly dismayed by the current US withholding of part of Washington’s package of military aid to Cairo because of what the US regards as the insufficiently speedy transition back to elections in Egypt.

Again, Israel shares these perspectives. The absence of American leadership may well be the key factor in causing Israel and the Gulf states to draw closer. 

On the face of it, any alliance between Jewish Israel and Salafi Saudi Arabia might appear an absurdity. Israel is a liberal democracy and a Jewish state. Saudi Arabia is a repressive absolute monarchy, based on a particular Salafi Muslim outlook which is deeply anti-Jewish and anti-Christian in nature. 

This ideology is not a dead letter for the Saudis. Rather, they invest heavily in spreading their particular rigid form of Islam in the west and elsewhere. Their media and education system are rife with anti-Jewish prejudice. 

But a clear distinction is made by the Saudis between the world of ideology/media/culture and the realm of raison d’etat. Hence, there is no reason to think they would not be able to publicly vilify Israel, while maintaining off the radar links with it against more immediate enemies. 

In this regard, it is worth remembering the Wikileaks revelation of remarks made in private by Saudi King Abdullah to American General David Petraeus in April, 2008 in which he recommended military action against the Iranian nuclear program. The King referred to Iran as the ‘head of the snake,’ which should be cut off. No similarly venomous remarks on Israel were quoted from the conversation, which took place far from the public eye. 

Of course the common interests only go so far. Saudi Arabia supports Salafi Islamist forces in both Syria and Egypt. Saudi money finds its way to Salafi elements among the Palestinians. But the areas of comminality are on issues of cardinal importance to both countries. 

The de facto, unseen alliance between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries is one of the most intriguing structures currently emerging amid the whirling chaos of the Middle East. 


Jonathan Spyer

Source: http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/10/israel-and-saudi-arabia-alliance-of-interests/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Ahead of prisoner release, Bennett attacks Netanyahu, Livni

by Shlomo Cesana, Daniel Siryoti

Second wave of Palestinian prisoner releases will be carried out as planned this Tuesday • Habayit Hayehudi proposes law which makes prisoner releases as part of peace talks illegal • Netanyahu objects: "The proposal restricts the political echelon."

Palestinians after their release from Israeli prisons [archive] | Photo credit: Lior Mizrahi

Families of terror victims protest outside the Supreme Court in August

|

Photo credit: Yonatan Sindel

Senior Palestinian sources in Ramallah on Sunday told Israel Hayom that the second wave of Palestinian prisoner releases will be carried out as planned this Tuesday. A senior official in Ramallah told Israel Hayom that they had not yet received the list of prisoners from Israel and that the identities of the prisoners to be released are as yet unclear. He said that in any case it will be a subset of 26 prisoners from among the 104 prisoners jailed in Israeli prisons prior to the signing of the Oslo accords in 1994. 

According to the senior Palestinian Authority official, almost all the prisoners to be released in the second round were convicted of murder, aiding and abetting murder and manslaughter out of nationalistic motives. 

"The list will include prisoners defined in Israel as 'prisoners with blood on their hands,' but the list will contain only Palestinian prisoners who are residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and not Israeli Arabs or residents of east Jerusalem." 

The senior Palestinian official also said that as part of the memorandum of understanding signed by the sides prior to the start of negotiations, Israel would have the right to decide which of the released prisoners could return to his home in the West Bank and which West Bank residents would be banished to the Gaza Strip based on the demands of the Israeli defense establishment. The defense establishment will decide which are the most dangerous prisoners in terms of the likelihood that if allowed to return to the West Bank, they would re-establish terror cells and terror infrastructure there. 

Meanwhile, against the backdrop of the expected release of terrorists this week, there has been a severe conflict between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Habayit Hayehudi Chairman Naftali Bennett. 

The arena of the conflict is mainly in the ministerial committee on legislation, which will convene on Sunday to discuss a proposed law that Bennett is promoting and whose purpose is to prevent large-scale releases of prisoners in the future. 

Netanyahu opposes the law, claiming that it limits the maneuvering room of the diplomatic echelon, and at this stage it is unclear whether it will gain enough support to pass, because the result depends on the vote of several Likud ministers who are under pressure to oppose the bill. Foremost among these ministers are Interior Minister Gideon Sa'ar and Culture and Sport Minister Limor Livnat. 

Last week, incidentally, a decision passed the ministerial committee for legislation not to allow negotiations over dividing Jerusalem without the support of 80 Knesset members. 

In the proposed Basic Law: The President of the State, Amendment: Prisoner Releases, which was proposed by MK Orit Struck (Habayit Hayehudi) and supported by Likud MKs and also signed by Coalition Chairman MK Yariv Levin, it is explained that "any government decision to release terrorists as part of what is called a 'diplomatic gesture' empties of all content the president's authority to use his personal judgment regarding the granting of a pardon to individual terrorists in question." 

In tandem with the fight over the proposed law, Habayit Hayehudi and parts of Likud-Beytenu continue their efforts to halt the government's decision about three months ago to release 104 terrorists as part of the agreement to conduct negotiations with PA President Mahmoud Abbas. 

At the time, the government decided that the terrorists would be released in four rounds over a period of nine months, in parallel with progress in the negotiations. 

This coming Thursday, the second wave of 26 prisoners is expected to be released. The prime minister's attempt to soften the release by promoting building in the settlements -- encountered resistance and a direct attack by Habayit Hayehudi on Netanyahu and on the person described as his "partner," Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, who is leading the negotiations with the Palestinians on the government's behalf. 

The chairwoman of the ministerial committee on legislation, Livni, does not intend to bring to a vote on Sunday Habayit Hayehudi's proposed legislation to prevent the release of terrorists. 

Her associates say that the matter only came up on Friday and has not yet been studied by professionals and that a final decision will be made this morning. In Habayit Hayehudi they are criticizing Livni and saying that talks with Saeb Erekat are not a good reason to release murderers, or to delay the proposed law preventing the release of prisoners. 

"The release of prisoners in exchange for the dubious right of Tzipi Livni to meet with Saeb Erekat is most terrible. With all due respect, halting the release of murderers is even more important than justifying Livni's being in the government," said the statement. 

Associates of Livni said over the weekend that "Habayit Hayehudi prefers building in the settlements over any other Israeli national or security interest. We will continue to lead the negotiations in coordination with the prime minister." 

The prime minister and his office did not address the subject at the end of the week, and government ministers, including Bennett, refrained from addressing the issue publicly and left the arena to MKs from their parties. The deputy minister in the Prime Minister's Office, MK Ofir Akunis (Likud), said that "releasing the prisoners is a step that is immoral, goes against security and does not advance peace. Since the previous release, the number of terror attacks has only increased." 

Deputy Defense Minister Danny Danon (Likud) called on the cabinet ministers to halt the release of prisoners. "Any other decision gives a tailwind to terrorism." 

In Habayit Hayehudi, the attack is harsher and MK Ayelet Shaked said that "releasing prisoners in exchange for negotiations is a moral injustice and a diplomatic injustice. There is no connection between construction and prisoner release." 

Another member of her party, MK Yoni Chetboun said, "It's better for Tzipi Livini to be outside the coalition than a danger to the security of Israeli citizens. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority is adamantly denying reports that as part of the second wave of prisoner releases, Jerusalem and Ramallah have reached an understanding regarding the continued Israeli building in the settlements."

PLO Executive Committee Secretary Yasser Abed Rabbo said, "There haven't been and there won't be such understandings and if Mahmoud Abbas knew that Israel would connect these two things, we would not have returned to the negotiating table."

"Terrorists' bodies will not be returned to the PA" 

Israel's diplomatic echelon is denying reports disseminated of late by the Palestinians, to the effect that Israel will also transfer to the PA bodies of terrorists as part of the waves of prisoner release.

According to a senior diplomatic source, Israel clarified to the PA that returning the bodies of terrorists is done in coordination with their families and not with any particular organization. "Israel's message was loud and clear, there will be no commerce in bodies." 

Habayit Hayehudi's reaction also stated that democracy also requires bringing to a vote laws that Livni does not necessarily agree with. Close associates of the justice minister accused the party and its chairman, Naftali Bennett, of incitement.

The ministerial committee for Palestinian prisoner release headed by Netanyahu is expected to convene Sunday evening to discuss the list of prisoners expected to be released in the second round. 

Over the weekend, Habayit Hayehudi released a statement in which it accused Livni of pushing Netanyahu to hold negotiations with the Palestinians, and that it is due to her that murderous prisoners are being released. 

On the other hand, Hatnuah says that the entire government decided on the release of murderers, first and foremost Netanyahu. "The people who caused the release of prisoners is Habayit Hayehudi," MK Meir Sheetrit (Hatnuah) told Army Radio, "Their demands from the prime minister were dogged day after day. They pressured the prime minister not to freeze settlement construction and to release prisoners. And it's clear that the opposite was the right thing to do." 

Meanwhile, Environmental Protection Minister Amir Peretz from Hatnuah warns that "incitement," as he calls it, of Habayit Hayehudi towards Livni and Hatnuah could lead to disaster. What starts with spitting, he said, could lead to murder. He was responding to the arrest last week of a 17-year-old youth from a moshav in the north on suspicions that he spat on MK Elazar Stern from Hatnuah. According to Peretz, the members of Habayit Hayehudi are acting hypocritically. 

"On the one hand they enjoy the perks of being in the government and on the other hand, attack the government over the decision to release prisoners, when they themselves participated in the vote," Peretz said. 

He also said it would have been possible to avoid the release of prisoners if Habayit Hayehudi had agreed to freeze settlement construction during the negotiations. 

MK Ayelet Shaked responded that Peretz was lying because the spitting incident against Stern was not out of diplomatic motives. She also said that the possibility never came up to freeze construction in Judea and Samaria in place of releasing Palestinian prisoners. She added that nothing would come out of the diplomatic negotiations except for the release of prisoners. 

Meanwhile, a protest is planned for Monday evening at the Ofer prison, from where the Palestinian prisoners will be released. Posters for the demonstration call on participants to form a "human chain" around the prison, to "stop the release of terrorists." The protest is organized by Almagor, the terror victims' association, the Likud young leadership division, the young leadership of Habayit Hayehudi, and the nationalist faction of the Likud, and posters advertise the participation of "bereaved families and government ministers."

Shlomo Cesana, Daniel Siryoti

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=12871

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Syrian Civil War Spreads to Lebanese City of Tripoli

by Ariel Ben Solomon, Reuters

Fighting enters 7th day in Tripoli leaving 16 dead, 80 injured.

Flags of Hezbollah, Assad's Syria Photo: REUTERS/Ali Hashisho

At least 16 people were killed and 80 were wounded on Sunday as fighting continued, for the seventh day, between supporters and opponents of Syrian President Bashar Assad in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli.

The Lebanese army reinforced its presence in the city, setting up checkpoints. The streets were empty and shops remained closed, the Beirut-based Daily Star reported.

Most of the violence took place between Sunnis and Alawites.

Meanwhile, in Syria, the Sunni-dominated rebels claimed they killed at least 15 Hezbollah fighters on Saturday in the Ghouta district, on the outskirts of Damascus, Al-Arabiya TV reported. Six wounded Hezbollah fighters were reportedly taken to Lebanon for treatment.

A video posted on the Internet showed dead soldiers with Hezbollah patches on their uniforms.

The war in Syria continues to spill over into Lebanon. The Lebanese government has been unable to form a government since April.

The Syrian war has caused 2 million people to flee into neighboring countries and exacerbated regional sectarian divides.

The spillover from the fragmentation of the Syrian state is causing “Lebanon’s deepest crisis since the end of the 15-year civil war that ran from the mid- 1970s to the late 1980s,” Hussein Ibish wrote in The National newspaper based in the UAE.

“The irony is that Syria’s transition into a Lebanese-like reality may destroy the ability of Lebanon to maintain its own uneasy equilibrium,” he said.

In Syria, 40 people died when a car bomb exploded outside a mosque in Wadi Barada in Damascus province on Friday, said the anti-Assad Observatory, which verifies reports through a network of sources around Syria.

State news agency SANA said many terrorists – a term it uses for those fighting Assad – were killed in the explosion and quoted a witness who said the mosque’s two entrances collapsed when the bomber struck before the end of Friday prayers.

State TV reported on Friday that Abu Muhammad al-Golani, leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, a rebel group that has claimed responsibility for several suicide bombings, had been killed.
Fighters from the Islamist group told Reuters Golani was alive.


Ariel Ben Solomon, Reuters

Source: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Syrian-civil-war-spreads-to-Lebanese-city-of-Tripoli-329861

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Egypt: Constitution Committee Eliminates all Barriers to Building Churches in Egypt

by Ahram Online

Committee votes to lift restrictions on church building, postpones decision on article stipulating 'absolute freedom of belief' for all citizens

 

A minaret of a mosque is seen beside a church in Cairo February 23, 2013 (Photo: Reuters)

Egypt's 50-member committee tasked with amending the suspended 2012 constitution adopted on Sunday a transitional article that will cancel existing restrictions regulating the building of new churches.

According to Ahram Arabic news website, the committee also initially adopted an article [47] which stipulates "absolute freedom of belief" for Egyptian citizens and endows the state with the responsibility to ensure free practice of religion.

However, under pressure from representatives of Egypt's highest Sunni authority Al-Azhar, which has demanded that freedom of religion be restricted to the three monotheistic beliefs, the committee opted to postpone its vote on article 47 until Monday.

Sources at the meeting told Ahram that representatives of the church, who have until now strongly supported complete freedom of religion, sided with Al-Azhar's objection.

Christians, who make up 10 to15 percent of Egypt's 85 million, need special presidential permits in order to build or renovate churches in Egypt.

Supporters of equal rights for all citizens have long demanded the freedom to build and renovate churches without restraint in order to ensure parity between Egypt's religions. 

Islamic extremists have attacked tens of churches, destroying many, in the past 15 years.

Following the police's bloody dispersal of two sit-ins supporting ousted president Mohamed Morsi, churches and Christian homes and businesses have been attacked nationwide.

Amnesty International, a London-based rights group, says that upwards of 200 Christian-owned properties have been attacked and 43 churches torched or seriously damaged across the country since Morsi's ouster.

None of Egypt's previous constitutions included a law to regulate the building of mosques.
Cairo, the country's capital, is known as the "City of a thousand minarets" for its extensive ancient Islamic architecture. 

Articles regarding religion have been especially contentious during the committee's drafting session.

Article 47, allowing for complete freedom of religion, is controversial because it could be extended to other Egyptian minorities, such as Egypt's Baha'is and Shia Muslims.

Shias and Baha'is are not allowed to practice their beliefs in public and have suffered sectarian attacks by Sunni extremists over the years. 

In June, shortly before Morsi's ouster, an angry mob led by Salafist sheikhs torched and attacked houses of Shias in the small village of Zawyat Abu Musalam in Giza governorate, killing four citizens, including a prominent Shia figure.

Last Sunday, five people were killed and at least 17 others injured after unknown assailants opened fire at a wedding ceremony held at a church in Cairo's suburb of Al-Warraq.

The Islamist-drafted 2012 constitution, which is currently being amended by the 50-member committee, did not grant equal rights to Christians and failed to recognise non-Sunni Muslims.


Ahram Online

Source:

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