Basic thoughts for the new Prime Minister Part I and II

 

by Louis René Beres

1^st and 2^nd part of 3  

It's farewell to the drawing-room's civilized cry,
The professor's sensible whereto and why,
The frock-coated diplomat's social aplomb,
Now matters are settled with gas and with bomb.
— W.H. Auden, Danse Macabre

PART I: HOW TO NEGOTIATE WITH ENEMIES WHO MAY PREFER WAR TO PEACE

Israel has elected a new prime minister. From the start — and even before he begins to consider assorted specific issues for negotiation with other governments and organizations — Benjamin Netanyahu will have to determine whether any form of diplomacy is actually indicated. Although, on the surface, such advice may appear distinctly odd or foolish at best, there will be clear benefits to Israel of proceeding diplomatically only after first cultivating genuine understanding.

From the very start, from its imperiled beginnings in May 1948 — and indeed, even before statehood — Israel sought heroically to negotiate with its enemies. Always, always — Jerusalem has preferred peace to war. Nonetheless, challenged by relentless and interminable Arab aggressions, diplomacy has almost always failed Israel. Significantly, this lamentable conclusion is pretty much incontestable. So, the new prime minister is now obligated to ask: What real chance is there that, somehow, things might be different?

Although ultimately settling upon Operation Cast Lead, a manifestly correct policy choice, previous Prime Minister Olmert, of course, had determined to seek Israel's basic security in diplomacy. Although there was assuredly nothing inherently wrong with such a conciliatory posture, especially as Israel had remained under constant pressure from Washington to negotiate, there was also very good reason for skepticism. From Oslo to the so-called "Road Map," diplomacy over Israel's rights and obligations has always been a determinably asymmetrical process. "Land for nothing" In essence, this unspoken mantra has been Israel's persistent "marching order" from the "civilized world."

Ironically, Israel's principal enemies remain candid. On some things they actually do not lie. On their irremediable intention to annihilate the Jewish state, for example, they are utterly sworn to truth. Israel's new prime minister should listen to them.

The key disputing Palestinian factions (Fatah or Hamas, it makes little effective difference) and Iran will never accept anything less than Israel's destruction. This is obvious to anyone who cares to pay attention. They say this every day, either openly or obliquely. Moreover, in a corroborating bit of cartography, every "official" PA or Iranian map of "Palestine" already includes all of Israel.

Toward the end of his corrupted and ill-fated regime, then Prime Minister Olmert had released several hundred Palestinian terrorists as a "goodwill gesture." Together with then U.S. President George W. Bush, he had aided Fatah against Hamas with outright transfers of weapons and information. Soon after (surprise, surprise) the American and Israeli guns were turned against Israel. As for Mr. Olmert's graciously extended "goodwill," it only served to elicit the next round of rocket fire. Matters were not helped at all by Washington's corollary support for a Palestinian state, thoroughly misconceived support now extended by new U.S. President Barack Obama.

Let Prime Minister-Designate Netanyahu take note. Regarding formal diplomacy, the more things change, the more they remain the same. Rooted deeply in Jihadist interpretations of Islam, there is an obvious and enduring inequality of objectives between Israel and its principal enemies. For both Palestinian insurgents and Iran's president, conflict with Israel is always an all or nothing proposition. In this starkly polarizing view of incessant strife between "the world of war" and "the world of Islam," there can be no place for authentic treaties or settlements with the Jewish State, save as a temporary tactical expedient.

For Israel, on the other hand, a negotiated peace with its Arab "neighbors" and Iran persists as an elusive but desperate hope. This is true even when the prospect of Islamic reciprocity is plainly preposterous and historically unimaginable.

A truly fundamental inequality is evident in all expressions of the Middle East Peace Process. On the Palestinian and Iranian side, Oslo and "Road Map" expectations have never been seen as anything more than a cost-effective method of dismantling Israel. On the Israeli side, these expectations have generally been taken, quite differently, as a presumably indispensable way of averting further war and terror.

Israel's new prime minister should take note: The core problem of Israel's life or death vulnerability lies in the Jewish State's ongoing assumptions on war and peace. While certain of Israel's regional enemies, state and nonstate, believe that any power gains for Israel represent a power loss for them — that is, that they coexist with Israel in a condition of pure conflict — Israel assumes something else. For Mr. Netanyahu's several immediate predecessors, relations with certain Arab states, the Palestinian Authority/Hamas and Iran were not taken to be pure "zero-sum," but rather a mutual-dependence connection. In this view, conflict is always mixed with cooperation.

For no identifiable reason, it would seem, Israel may still believe that certain of its Arab enemies and Iran reject zero-sum assumptions about the strategy of conflict. Israel's enemies, however, do not make such erroneous judgments about conformance with Israeli calculations. These enemies know further that Israel is wrong in its belief that certain Arab states, Iran and the Palestinians also reject the zero-sum assumption, but they shrewdly pretend otherwise. There has remained, therefore, a dramatic and consequential strategic disparity between Israel and certain of its frontline Islamic enemies.

Israel's strategy of conflict has, at least in part, been founded upon multiple theoretical miscalculations and upon an indifference to certain primary and flagrant enemy manipulations. The barbarous policies of Israel's enemies, on the other hand, have been and remain founded (a) upon correct calculations and assumptions; and (b) upon an astute awareness of Israel's strategic naiveté. This means that Israel's new prime minister should now make certain far-reaching changes in the way that Israel conceptualizes the continuum of cooperation and conflict. A "new Israel," ridding itself of injurious wishful thinking, should finally acknowledge the zero-sum calculations of its enemies, and thus begin to accept that the constant struggle must still be fought largely at the conflict end of the spectrum. Right now, this means, especially (and somewhat belatedly, in the particular case of Iran) attention to several preemption imperatives.

Left unchallenged by its new prime minister, Israel's mistaken assumptions, and the combining of these assumptions with correct premises of its enemies, could undermine Israel's very survival. These still-remediable Israeli errors have had the additional effect of creating an odd "alliance" between Israel and its enemies. This is surely not the sort of coalition that can ever help the Jewish State, but is rather a one-sided and unreciprocated "pact" in which Israel actively and ironically serves its enemies.

To be sure, the new prime minister should not become the best ally that Israel's Arab enemies and Iran could hope to have. Instead, he should now seek to serve Israel's long-term survival with real wisdom, supplanting the false assumptions that stem from misguided hopes with correct premises based upon sound reasoning. In the end, it is all about logic.

What does this really mean? In the language of formal logic, invalid forms of argument are fallacies. The basic problem with Israel's continuous search for "peace" through negotiated surrenders (Land for nothing!) has been its persistent commission of fallacies. Unlike simple instances of falsity, these particular arguments are especially insidious because they could involve a devastating policy outcome. Distinguishable from singular mistakes, these deviations from correct thinking ensure that all subsequent calculations will also result in error. This means that it is in the very process of strategic thinking, and not in the assessment of particular facts and issues, that Israeli policy changes are now most sorely needed.

PART II: AGREEING TO A TOOTHLESS STATE WOULD BE NO LESS OF A DANGER

When I first wrote about problems of Palestinian demilitarization in February 1998, Binyamin Netanyahu was prime minister. Today, he is again and — once again — he is on record against full sovereignty for "Palestine." Instead, he continues to speak either of a Palestinian "autonomy" or of various "attributes of restricted sovereignty."

From a domestic political standpoint, of course, Netanyahu's position on this issue is quite sensible. Internationally, however, it is clear that neither main Palestinian faction (Hamas, Fatah — it makes no difference) would negotiate for anything less than complete statehood. This is because full statehood would be widely supported throughout the world, and because such support could arguably be enhanced by authoritative terms of (1) the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (the 1933 treaty on statehood, sometimes called the Montevideo Convention) and (2) the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Any expected Israeli arguments for Palestinian autonomy or restricted sovereignty would be certain non-starters. It is only the actual Palestinian position that will need to be acknowledged by the prime minister before Palestinian statehood can be effectively countered.

The most likely scenario in this matter will confront Prime Minister Netanyahu with a seemingly stark decision: to agree completely to creating a Palestinian state, or to reject it outright. But as neither polar prospect could work easily — one option would create intolerable strategic threats while the other would elicit intolerable global condemnation — a "compromise" position is apt to emerge. This position would involve Israel's formal acceptance of Palestinian statehood, yet only contingent upon the new Arab state's "demilitarization." Assuming that the Palestinian side would even agree to such an arrangement, could Palestinian demilitarization be acceptable to Israel? Or would a demilitarized Palestinian state in Judea/Samaria (West Bank) and Gaza still represent an unbearable peril?

LEAVING aside expected pressures from US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Netanyahu should understand that demilitarization could turn out to be a very problematic compromise. There are hidden and significant dangers to the demilitarization route. The existential threat to Israel of any Palestinian state would lie not only in the presence or absence of a particular national armed force, but also in the many other enemy armies and insurgents that would inevitably compete for power in the new Arab country.

There is another, less obvious, reason why a demilitarized Palestine would present a substantial security threat: International law would not necessarily expect Palestinian compliance with pre-state agreements concerning armed force. As a new state, Palestine might not be bound by any pre-independence compacts, even if these agreements had included certain US guarantees to Israel. Also, because authentic treaties can be binding only upon states, a non-treaty agreement between the Palestinians and Israel could be of no real authority and little real effectiveness.

What if the government of a new Palestinian state were willing to consider itself bound by the pre-state, non-treaty agreement? Even in these relatively favorable circumstances, the new Arab government would have ample pretext to identify various strong grounds for lawful treaty termination. It could, for example, withdraw from the "treaty" because of what it regarded as a "material breach" (a violation by Israel that had allegedly undermined the object or purpose of the agreement). Or it could point toward what international law calls a "fundamental change of circumstances" (rebus sic stantibus). In this connection, should Palestine declare itself vulnerable to previously unforeseen dangers — perhaps even from the forces of other Arab armies — it could lawfully end its codified commitment to remain demilitarized.

THERE is another factor that explains why a treaty-like arrangement obligating Palestine to accept demilitarization could quickly and legally be invalidated after independence. The usual grounds that may be invoked under domestic law to invalidate contracts also apply under international law to treaties and treaty-like agreements. This means that a Palestinian state could point to errors of fact or to duress as perfectly appropriate grounds for termination.

Any treaty is void if, at the time it was entered into, it was in conflict with a "peremptory" rule of general international law (jus cogens) — a rule accepted and recognized by the international community of states as one from which "no derogation is permitted." Because the right of sovereign states to maintain military forces essential to self-defense is certainly such a rule, "Palestine" could be entirely within its lawful right to abrogate any agreement that had previously compelled its demilitarization.

Netanyahu should thus take little comfort from the legal promise of Palestinian demilitarization. Should the government of any future Palestinian state choose to invite foreign armies or terrorists onto its territory (possibly after the original national government had been displaced or overthrown by more militantly Islamic anti-Israel forces), it could do so not only without practical difficulties, but also without necessarily violating international law.

The overriding danger to Israel of Palestinian demilitarization is more practical than legal. In the final analysis, this Oslo/road map-driven pattern of intermittent territorial surrender, and also the freeing of terrorists, stems from a very deep misunderstanding of Palestinian goals.

While Israeli supporters of Oslo or the road map continue to believe in a "two-state solution" (now also a mantra in Obama's Washington), the Palestinian Authority has other ideas.

For the PA, as for most of the rest of the Arab/Iranian world, Palestine includes the entire State of Israel. For them, there can only be a "one-state solution." This annihilatory remedy is effectively the same as a final solution.

Mr. Netanyahu, Palestinian demilitarization wouldn't make a Palestinian state any less dangerous. If you plan to oppose Palestinian statehood, as indeed you should, "Palestine" should be rejected in any and all of its potential forms.

 

Louis René Beres