by Dmeetry Raizman
When members of the British cabinet offered to drop bombs on German phosphorus forests, the Secretary of State for Air responded: "Come on, it is possible but if you want to damage private property, maybe we will bomb the Ruhr mining region?" Before his death in 1943 he had the chance to see for himself German bombs falling on
The debilitating "peace process" which hastened
France's Military Might pre-World War II
70 years have passed since the "Phoney War". Why would we recall this almost forgotten event nowadays? In these days, filled as they are with the reprecussions of the Goldstone report, with recent discoveries of scandalous anti-Israeli activities by the New Israel Fund, with days of appeasement, with days of doubts of Israeli right to fight against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, with days dithering about withdrawal from the Golan Heights — is there anything to be learned from events far away in the stale pages of history The events in France in 1939-1940? Are they relevant?
Well, in early October 1939,
On September 27, 1939, a few days before the disengagement, Hitler called a secret meeting of the General Staff and the commanders of the German military and declared: "We must immediately start preparing an attack on the West. The goal is to defeat the French." The history of the subsequent German operation Fall Gelb ("Case yellow") is remembered primarily because of its consequences. The received wisdom is that the German army was strong, equipped with modern weapons and well-skilled while the French army was weak, armed with obsolete weapons, and untrained. If that were indeed the case, there would be no need to be a military expert to understand the reasons for
Without taking a comprehensive tally of
French armored corps included 430 fast and strong Somua S35 Tanks and 403 armored Char B1 and Char B1-bis tanks, which, at that time, were considered the best tanks in
Toward the end of 30s, the French modernized the cavalry into motorized divisions that consisted of motorcycles, small vehicles, Kegresse half-tracks and Citroen-Panhard AMD trucks. French divisions against German Cavalry were also equipped with tanks: 100 Somua S35 tanks, about 100 Hotchkiss H39 and 70 AMR35 Renaults. The French artillery had always been considered a huge steel force. German General Erich Ludendorff expressed its strength, saying, "How I hate the French guns!" This force numbered 409 battalions equipped with approximately eleven thousand artillery pieces.
At the individual armament level, French infantrymen carried automatic weapons equipped with an excellent Chatellerault FM, a semi-automatic rifle and a modern design of the MAS36, a Berthier which, although older, was improved in 1936.
In 1939, European military experts had a great appreciation for
Concept spawns Strategy
A "Peace process" penetrated all aspects of French military doctrine: it paralyzed the strategic thinking of senior command and dictated all aspects of preparing the military-force structure, training, and the operational programs of the Joint Chiefs.
A debilitating "peace process" influenced the majority. However, some individuals understood where France's choice of peace would lead, including General Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne, a French armored soldier who tried to promote the idea of putting a center tank formation as an offensive rather than defensive force. After the idea was rejected, young lieutenant colonel Charles de Gaulle tried to place a similar idea on the agenda. The French government, however, rejected his plan as "contrary to the global French strategy" of defense for peace. French General Staff operational plans for 1940 said: "avoid at all costs significant operations on the German front."
The alternative raised by France and her allies was a strategy of economic sanctions meant to deter
Consequences of the Peace Process
The "peace process" gained momentum. In early October 1939, after the disengagement from Saarland, a journalist visited the French military on the front and wrote: "Wonderful peace and quiet prevail here — our artillery is located on the banks of the Rhine, nonchalantly looks over animated German trains and ammunition shells, all within range of our guns. Pilots hover over our enemies' factories without dropping bombs." The main task of the French General Staff was not to harass the Germans, "not to be dragged into provocations."
Enemies?
Did the Allies understand the absurdity and the danger in a French-German "peace process"? When a member of the Conservative Party British Cabinet, F. C. Amery, proposed to drop bombs on German phosphorus forests, Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, answered him: "Come on, it is possible, but if you want to damage private property, maybe we will bomb the Ruhr mining region?" Before his death in 1943, Sir Kingsley Wood saw bombs falling on
The "Phoney War" led to despair and took away the French military's morale. French troops did not understand why they did not fight if they declared war? Gradually they lost the desire to serve and saw their presence on the front line as counterproductive and pointless. When the morale worsened, the French command was forced to turn to the government, on November 21, 1939, to get a ministerial decision regarding the establishment of an "entertainment force." On November 30 the French Parliament discussed increasing the alcohol ration to soldiers, and in February 1940 the Prime Minister signed an order canceling a tax on gambling in the army. Additionally, the government decided to purchase ten thousand soccer balls to keep the army on the front pacified.
Not only the soldiers at the front, but also the citizens at home stopped understanding what was happening, why there were soldiers in the army, and what was the government's policy.
Well, was army Secretary Pétain really the "destroyer" of
Although the French left sought peace, it was not the architect of the "peace process" in Europe on the eve of the German invasion of
France fell victim to two parallel processes: an ideological sabotage by the extreme left-wing minority in France that was organized, guided, and funded by hostile interested parties abroad, and a consequent "second wave", a much wider process consisting of "striving for peace" and a preference for "minimizing losses" if there is no choice whether to fight.
Was the French leadership completely blind to what was happening? The French government eventually sobered up and realized it was suffering ideological sabotage and subject to extensive hostile action designed to topple the French interior. Indeed, a ban was imposed on the distribution of left-wing newspapers, extreme left organizations were "outlawed," and leftist deputies were removed from all institutions and committees. But the French government's measures were too little, too late. Subsequent events show that the left's ideological sabotage caused
The most powerful army in the region before the war, detachment, a general that is a former national hero and head of a security establishment that avoids fighting and preaches minimizing losses, a defensive line misconception, an extreme left driving the "struggle for peace" under the direction and financing of hostile elements abroad, a broad public drifting into the whirlpool of a "peace process", decadence and despair among soldiers and civilians — are these the indicators of the next Israeli war?
Dmeetry Raizman is a former
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
No comments:
Post a Comment