Seizing the Lebanese state

 

by Hanin Ghaddar

 

A new campaign against Lebanese state institutions is underway. This time the target is Finance Minister Raya al-Hassan's proposed budget for 2010. The cabinet met last week to discuss the 2010 draft budget, but as expected, it was not adopted, with March 8 and opposition media calling it "unconstitutional," "amputated" and "full of childish games." There are now fears that the budget will be used as another stalling vehicle. The budget itself is not the issue; rather it is a peg upon which to hang a paralyzed cabinet that cannot make any real decisions while it still wears the mantle of "national-unity government." This is all Hezbollah and its sponsors need.
 
It is a strategy that has prevailed since the Doha Accord was signed in the wake of the May 2008 violence that attempted to bring down the government of Fouad Siniora and brought about an interim "unity" cabinet. Under the same threat of arms, a similar government was railroaded through in 2009. The result is that, without a shot being fired or an ideology imposed, Hezbollah has de facto control of Lebanon. It hides behind the facade of state institutions, but in reality is a state-within-the-state.

There is, however, a fly in Hezbollah's ointment: Trends in the recent municipal elections in South Lebanon have shown that, while Hezbollah may have achieved political control, its influence within inter-family dynamics is marginal. 

But first, what does Hezbollah want from Lebanon? The Party of God does not want an Islamic state. That would make it an easy target. Instead, it is easier for Hezbollah to whip up the masses by pointing to the poor performance of the Hariri government while not having to offer solutions or alternatives to the country's social and economic problems.

This is because its agenda is strictly political. After the Syrian army's withdrawal in 2005, Hezbollah stepped in and rallied the pro-Syrian camp against a March 14 movement that threatened to revive state institutions and ensure genuine national sovereignty.

Now that this has been achieved, Hezbollah still needs to take care of a few other items of business. First, it must overturn UN Security Council resolutions 1701 and 1559, two decisions that were designed to safeguard Lebanon's long-term sovereignty. Second, it must stamp out the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), the court established to bring to justice the killers of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and dozens of other victims of political violence.

Has Hezbollah, in the meantime, seized control of national decision making?

The trouble with Hezbollah is that while it criticizes the budget and other governmental policies adopted between 2005 and 2008 that were designed to take Lebanon forward into something approaching full-fledged statedom, Hezbollah cannot really offer alternatives.

Economically, the party's model follows that of distribution rather than production. The process is simple: Hezbollah spreads funds that come from Iran among its supporters or its charitable institutions. This creates a state of dependency rather than self sufficiency, a situation not helped by the specter of war. This is hardly a catalyst for real investment, be it commercial, educational or cultural, and arguably a motive for emigration.

On a security level, in 2006 Hezbollah effectively transformed the country into a stretch of the Israel-Iran frontline, where Lebanon no longer matters. In fact, in a televised speech broadcast during the 2006 war, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah stated, "Whether the Lebanese liked it or not, Lebanon and the Resistance are waging a fight on behalf of the Muslim Umma (Nation)."

All this is not good news for the Lebanese, including the Shia, who, despite being so closely associated with Hezbollah, are the first to pay for the party's reckless policies. Hezbollah's wars destroy their towns and villages. Investors will never put their money in the South, while Shia youth leave in droves in search of work and security abroad.

So back to the municipal elections: Hezbollah may have created a culture of resistance, but the Shia community has maintained its social dynamic. Look, for example, at the current municipal elections, when Hezbollah and the Amal Movement could not, as they had planned, impose consensus lists in all villages in South Lebanon. In short, family proved to be stronger than party and showed that the Shia's social and cultural fabric has not been totally absorbed by Hezbollah or, to a lesser extent, Amal. 

There is no doubt that Hezbollah enjoys the political support of the Shia community, mainly because it was the banner of the Resistance that liberated the occupied South in 2000 and achieved a dubious "victory" against Israel in 2006. However, those who support Hezbollah "ideologically" are much fewer than those who back the Resistance because they believe it has created a "balance of fear."
 
 A new war, however, would shake the belief in this idea, and the majority of the Shia will surely, once and for all, lose faith in a party that has delivered nothing except death, destruction, conflict and misery.

A friend from the South once told me: "I support Hezbollah because in 2000, they promised us peace of mind. In 2006, they delivered a 'divine victory' and dignity to the community. Now they should let us live."

Hezbollah knows it cannot afford a war now, but paralyzing the state institutions makes it clear to the Lebanese, including the Shia, that it has little else to offer. 

 

Hanin Ghaddar is managing editor of NOW Lebanon

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.