Thursday, May 27, 2010

Moscow’s opportunism in the Middle East

 

by  Tony Badran

After a deliberately much-trumpeted visit by its president to Syria last week, Russia has been heralded, for the umpteenth time in recent years, as making a Middle Eastern comeback through Damascus. However, it would be more accurate to say that Russia sees Syria for what it is, a chip with which the Kremlin can play a game it masters with bigger players: perpetually leveraging arms sales to rogue regimes to extort never-ending concessions and to maximize its advantage at a time when the US, under the Obama administration, is entirely missing in action.
 
The fact that every so often we revisit this narrative of Syrian triumphalism on the back of a Russian regional resurgence ought to be enough to show that this isn't about Syria or tilting the regional balance of power to its advantage. Rather, this is about Russian leverage against the US and Israel, and opportunism at a moment of American fecklessness. Arms sales are Russia's instrument of influence in the region, not Syria.

Moscow sees a weak US administration in retreat from the region and is stepping into the void to see what it can claim for itself. Russian diplomacy has so far managed to balance the US, Israel and Iran, while safeguarding its commercial interests, which in turn allows it to continue extorting all three states in the future.

In return for effectively meaningless sanctions on Iran, the Obama administration lifted sanctions on four Russian companies, including state arms trader Rosoboronexport, which had been sanctioned for arms sales to Iran and Syria. Russia continues to string along the Iranians over the delivery of the S-300 air defense system, which Israel does not want to see in Tehran's hands.

And the Israelis have something the Kremlin wants: airspace technology – specifically in developing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Moscow has purchased 15 Israeli drones for testing, and last month, state technology corporation Rostekhnologii expressed interest in possibly establishing a joint venture with Israel Airspace Industry to produce UAVs. According to media reports, Russia had invested $172 million in developing a drone project of its own that was a bust.

In fact, Russian avionics are inferior and their products suffer from poor quality control. Russia has teamed up with India to manufacture a fifth-generation stealth fighter jet. Part of the avionics is sourced from Israel, which is also one of India's top defense suppliers. The final product could rival the US-made F-35 fighter jet, which Israel has sought to buy. But it also wishes to update it with Israeli avionics, which has caused some complications (reportedly now resolved). So, Israel has been involved in a delicate dance between its traditional ally, the US, and a potential future partner: Russia.

Which brings us back to Syria. The Assad regime is clearly nowhere near this league. For one, Syria is broke. Besides, Bashar al-Assad had tried to enter this level of play in 2008 in the aftermath of the Georgia crisis with Russia. He transparently urged the Russians to station Iskander-E batteries on Syrian soil and was curtly turned down. Two years later, the type of weaponry discussed with Syria remains the same: the Pantsyr-S1 air defense system, anti-tank weapons and MiG-29 fighter jets, of which Syria already has 50. The unreliability of the MiG-29 is causing nations to refuse or retire them, and last year Russia had to ground them due to crashes. Syria wants but cannot afford upgrades, nor do Syrian pilots stand a chance against the Israel Air Force anyway, and so in many respects, this is a sucker deal.

As for the Pantsyr, it would be a nuisance especially if transferred to Hezbollah (assuming they don't have them already), but it would not seemingly be a game changer.

This is the Russian game of leveraging arms sales for concessions that David Samuels described so well last year. The fanfare of President Medvedev's visit to Syria could be in part Russia's way of signaling displeasure or impatience with Israel over avionics cooperation and drone technology.

A possible hint of this dynamic came in a report in As-Sharq al-Awsat. The paper's correspondent in Tel Aviv related disagreements between the Israeli Foreign and Defense ministries over Russia's move with Syria. The Foreign Ministry, according to the report, blames Defense Minister Ehud Barak and his aides, "for they have rejected proper military cooperation with the Russians, and refused to modernize old Russian fighter jets, and refused to buy anything for the Israeli Army from Russia." 

The Defense Ministry insists that since none of the weapons Russia promised to Syria were game changers, there was little to worry about. It's also arguable that such a decision by Israel, if true, was a concession to the Pentagon.

If this is indeed the game being played, then it would be another instance of Russian opportunism at its finest. Russia cannot rebuild its old empire any more than it can bury the US. However, it sees local actors like Turkey and Iran asserting themselves, while the US flounders and hemorrhages influence. So it moves in to secure a cut for itself, gathering bargaining chips that, depending on how the regional scenario plays out, it will cash with the US and Israel.

Last year, Asia Times columnist Spengler summarized this dynamic as follows: "The game now is in the hands of the spoilers … and first among them is Russia." The Obama administration's policy, Spengler wrote, is allowing "the unimaginable to occur": Russia's influence in the Middle East rivaling that of the US.

This is what a world without American power looks like. Regional middle powers trying to act like super powers, while opportunists move in like hyenas over the carcass of the American order.

 

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

No comments:

Post a Comment