by Yoav Limor
Israel's immediate security situation isn't bad, but the potential for unrest is disturbing, and perhaps more so than at any other point in our history. As Israel turns 65, an in-depth look at the threats it faces on its borders.
An IDF tank near the
Lebanese border.
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Photo credit: Ziv Koren  |
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The Syrian-Israeli border. A
deceptive calm.
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Photo credit: Ziv Koren 
Qasr al-Yahud, on the
Israeli-Jordanian border.
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Photo credit: Ziv Koren 
IDF troops near the Gaza Strip.
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Photo credit: Ziv Koren 
The newly built fence along
the Egyptian border.
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Photo credit: Ziv Koren 
Israel's maritime assets,
such as its gas drilling rigs, require around-the-clock protection.
Pictured above: an Israel Navy boat on a routine mission.
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Photo credit: Ziv Koren 
Take stock of this paradox: On the one hand,
our immediate security situation is not bad at all. There is no army in
this region capable of threatening us. Conflicts on the scale of the Yom
Kippur War are not just unlikely, but they are for all intents and
purposes permanently a thing of the past. The annual casualty count has,
thank Heavens, seen its lowest total in the country's history.
On the other hand, the potential for unrest is
quite disturbing, perhaps more so than at any other point in our
history. The Iranian nuclear program is growing more menacing than ever,
neighboring countries are on shaky ground, the borders have become
fertile breeding grounds for terrorist organizations, and the threats to
the home front offer stark reminders of 1948.
To get to the bottom of this paradox, we
decided to tour Israel's borders to catch an unvarnished glimpse of what
the reality looks like along the border fence, where we are just a
stone's throw away from friend and foe alike. In recent weeks, we
visited the frontiers adjacent to seven different points on the map —
the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, Jordan, Syria,
Lebanon, and at out sea. None of these fronts resembles anything in the
past. It is, if you wish, a situational assessment of Israel's security
on its 65th birthday.
The south: Vacation's over
We began in the south, specifically along the
section of the border with Egypt that remains porous. This area, on the
outskirts of Eilat, was completely vulnerable until two years ago, when a
Herculean feat of engineering was required to seal 240 kilometers
(about 150 miles) of frontier.
A year ago, over 5,000 infiltrators had
crossed the boundary. This year just five managed to take advantage of a
small breach and crawl underneath the fence. From a technical
standpoint, this is a major success. The flow of refugees has stopped
completely, while the potential for weapons smuggling and the danger of
terrorist activity has waned considerably.
Still, when peering over the fence to our
neighbor to the southwest, the refugee problem pales in comparison to
other concerns. The Israeli-Egyptian border is apparently the only place
in the world where the soldiers on patrol are not on alert for moves by
the external enemy but are in fact closely monitoring what is taking
place within their own borders.
Egyptian soldiers cast their watchful gaze
inward at the Sinai hinterland, fully aware that any bad news emanating
from there, like the Highway 12 terrorist attack in August 2011, or last
year's incident at Kerem Shalom. The shaky central government in Cairo
understands that it has a serious problem exercising control over the
peninsula. When considering the litany of dilemmas facing the Egyptian
regime, Sinai is a relatively minor one.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sinai has
become a theatre of hostile activity. The IDF division in the area,
which was until recently a destination for officers collecting their
pensions and reservists looking to pass the time with an easy
assignment, has suddenly become a vigilant fighting force, reflected in
the division's equipment, budgets, and manpower that have been
allocated.
Paradoxically, the Sinai border is the only
front in which female soldiers perform combat duty against a hostile
force. Caracal, where men and women serve together, was dispatched to
the Egyptian border by the army high command purposely because it was a
quiet front. The professionalism displayed by the outfit earned it an
opportunity to remain in its current deployment even after the frontier
began heating up.
We wondered what would happen if a female
soldier should ever, God forbid, be killed in combat or kidnapped. The
response we received was, "The same thing that happens to a male
soldier."
The threats of terrorist attacks and
kidnapping are small on the border. The focal point is Eilat, a city
with tens of thousands of residents and tourists that make attractive,
convenient targets. It was just last week when we heard the news that
the Iron Dome was deployed in the city for fear of imminent rocket
attacks from the Sinai. During our visit, we also learned that the fear
of terrorist infiltration from the sea is back in vogue.
Some of the terrorism has its roots in Gaza,
some in Sinai. At times, the perpetrators are Palestinians. At other
times, they are Bedouin. Recently, Sinai has become a favored
destination for Muslim fighters who participated in combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Now they are looking for action, and they have the
battlefield experience necessary to contribute their share of mayhem.
Indeed, these elements pose a formidable headache for the entire sector,
which not only include routine operational activity but also a desire
to keep highways, roadways, and hiking trails open for use.
With a nearly limitless reservoir of armaments
in the possession of a highly motivated enemy, it is difficult to see
how the southern border will remain quiet. Under these circumstances,
the challenge that must be met is not just simply preventing terrorism,
but preventing terrorism without adversely impacting the peace treaty
with Egypt. The way to solve this conundrum is to thwart (intelligence
is the name of the game), coordinate positions (depending on how willing
and able the Egyptians are), and hope for a little luck.
The Gaza border: a tense quiet
If we were to have written this article at the
time of our visit to the Gaza frontier three weeks ago, it would've
been likely opened thus: "To our surprise, Operation Pillar of Defense
brought an extended period of complete quiet to the south, an
unprecedented achievement, after 12 years of continuous rocket fire."
In recent days, however, there has been a
disconcerting erosion of the understandings that were reached in
November. Qassam rockets have been fired at Ashkelon and Sderot, while
mortars have exploded throughout communities in the Negev. In a
chillingly symbolic development, the Code Red siren was triggered during
a Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony in one of the towns near the Gaza
frontier.
Nonetheless, it is still too soon to eulogize
Israeli deterrence. Pillar of Defense left behind far worse scars than
appearances would indicate. Hamas lost its top military commander, Ahmed
Jabari, and many of its assets, including some of its arsenal of
long-range rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles. Its senior echelon is
once again on the run.
The agreement that was reached to end the
skirmish — whose most important clause called for an international
enforcement mechanism manned by Egyptian and American personnel whose
job is to prevent weapons smuggling — has proven to be more efficient
and sturdy than originally thought, much to the chagrin of Hamas.
The Egyptians have already stopped a number of
weapons convoys. Last week, they commandeered a ship full of arms.
Their motive has less to do with Zionist fervor and more to do with a
desire to exert their control over Hamas and prevent Gaza's chaos from
seeping into their domain. They are especially keen to prevent the
possibility that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict disintegrates to the
point where it would transform into an Israeli-Egyptian conflict.
Egypt's motivation took Hamas by surprise.
Faced with little choice, the Palestinian Islamist group has once again
sought the financial and military assistance of Iran. In the short-term,
Hamas is restrained, but in the long run, it will have to pay a price
in blood. This will happen when the organization completes its
replenishment of the weapons stockpiles that were left barren following
Pillar of Defense, and when it feels it has sufficiently recovered its
strength (or, conversely, when Israel is perceived as too weak).
It will start with a trickle of rocket attacks
over the border fence (which is in fact what has been happening) by
wayward rejectionist groups. Then it will continue with actions that are
carried out with the active participation and encouragement of Hamas.
Finally, it will conclude with yet another military operation. The only
question is when.
From their standpoint, the next round will
begin where the previous one ended: rocket fire on Tel Aviv. The
protagonists in Gaza City will aim to generate enough firepower so as to
inflict more substantial damage to the center of the country. If
possible, they will also seek to employ advanced weaponry against
Israeli aircraft. These are areas which the Palestinians have devoted
extensive time and efforts developing, with financial help from outside.
The main problem confronting officials on both
sides of the border is not military calculations or balance of power
considerations, but the endurance displayed by the civilian population.
Gaza is a broken, poverty-ridden enclave ridden with religious
extremism, so much so that it presents quite a challenge for the Hamas
government.
In Israel, efforts are geared toward
rehabilitating the south, which has been battered for years by
relentless rocket fire. Israeli officials have expressed doubt regarding
the truce's staying power. Talk of abandoning frontier towns has died
down, but they could easily be revived upon resumption of hostilities.
The way to prevent such a scenario is to bolster these areas
economically while maintaining diplomatic and military vigilance to
thwart a further deterioration in the south. A short trip along the Gaza
border leads us to the grim, expected conclusion that the local
residents and soldiers nearby believe that the chances this will happen
are nil.
Jordan: a convergence of interests
The simmering tensions along the border with
Egypt and the unrest in Syria have left the Jordanian border as the only
truly peaceful boundary. Despite the diplomatic rows and anger,
security and defense ties are as close as ever. The explanation for this
is quite simple: Israel's enemies are the Hashemite Kingdom's enemies,
and the Hashemite Kingdom's enemies are Israel's enemies. The same
Islamist elements and terrorist groups that indirectly threaten the
kingdom also threaten Israel. Whoever wants to stop terrorism here needs
to prevent the regime's downfall there. Today Amman, tomorrow
Jerusalem.
This convergence of interests guarantees a
great deal along the border. While there's no fence along the boundary
in the Arava and the Jordan Valley, a very efficient system of security
cooperation has been put in place. To this point, it has succeeded
(knock on wood) in thwarting any infiltration attempts.
The border crossings are also smoothly
operated, while life along the border is tranquil. With blossoming
settlement, agriculture, and tourism, everyone is enjoying the fruits of
this serenity. The only problems are economic ones, though they have
nothing to do with security considerations.
Here, too, however, the quiet is misleading,
just like in the south. It is difficult to predict how long the
Hashemite kingdom will continue to hold onto power, particularly with
Jordanian citizens demanding change. The Jordanian economy is rickety,
the public is clamoring for reforms, the demographic element is
worrying, the war in Iraq has saddled Jordan with a few hundred thousand
Shiite refugees, and the war in Syria has brought an additional
hundreds of thousands of Sunni refugees.
Together, these elements are only intensifying
the pressure cooker atmosphere with which the regime must cope.
Jordanian authorities are preoccupied with fending off attempts by Iran
as well as extremist terrorists inspired by al-Qaida's ideology to
topple the monarchy and turn Israel's neighbor to the east into an
Islamist-dominated domain.
Like the U.S. and the Gulf States, Israel is
actively participating in all efforts to prevent Jordan from becoming an
enemy entity, though that doesn't mean it should not prepare for
doomsday scenarios. Quietly, planners have already begun sketching the
rough outlines of a border fence that will run along the lengthy
frontier, similar to that which is in place along the borders with Egypt
and Syria.
The official explanation is a desire to keep
out African refugees, who, having been denied entry through the
traditional route over Sinai will look for alternate points of entry
into the country from the east, particularly the hundreds of kilometers
of unfenced territory that stretches from Eilat to the Dead Sea. The
unofficial explanation can be found in the government's fear of
terrorism as well as the concern that a destabilization in Jordan could
compel the kingdom's Palestinians to seek refuge in the West Bank.
Despite these concerns, the eastern border is
an island of sanity. The Allenby Bridge crossing runs like clockwork,
and tourists continue to pass through the crossings in Eilat and the
Jordan River. It is as if business were continuing as usual. Then again,
we thought, "as if"? The peace with Jordan is real, and it's here.
Judea and Samaria: the illusion of quiet
Last month, the Israel Security Service (Shin
Bet) uncovered a terror cell in northern Samaria that sought to kidnap
Israelis, preferably soldiers. For two days, members of the cell
wandered around Israel, looking for their prey. They were aided by Arabs
with blue Israeli identity cards who helped them to enter the country.
Fortunately, they failed in their mission and were apprehended. This
episode serves as yet another painful reminder to those whom were
counting on continued quiet in Judea and Samaria.
When looking in from the separation fence, the
West Bank looks quiet. In recent years, very few terrorists have
managed to sneak across the Green Line. Even the number of illegal
aliens who were here searching for work has been reduced dramatically.
For those who take a closer look, however, there are more worrying signs
of unrest bubbling beneath the surface.
In recent months, there has been much
speculation about an imminent third intifada. As of this writing,
intelligence officials were unanimous in their assessments that there is
no sign of this on the ground at the moment. Still, the variables are
disconcerting. The number of disturbances has risen dramatically, as has
the number of stone-throwing and firebombing incidents. When you add
diplomatic stalemate and dissatisfaction between the leaderships to this
equation, as well as the successful Palestinian campaign to
delegitimize Israel in the international community, you can understand
which way the wind is blowing.
From an operational standpoint, the immediate
ramification of this is an intense, daily effort to reduce friction. The
idea is to allow the Palestinian security forces to operate there,
while Israeli troops and the police act here. That means entering their
territory only when absolutely necessary, namely when action needs to be
taken against terrorist targets. Even when that happens, there is a
concerted effort to avoid contact and, by extension, harm of civilians
and anything that could ignite the street.
Some Israeli army officers say that the IDF is
barely maintaining control on the ground by their fingernails. Now it
is the diplomatic echelon's turn to exploit this convenient platform and
engage the other side in peace talks.
Given these sentiments, it is hardly
surprising that the Israel Defense Forces is the most ardent proponent
of gestures toward the Palestinians. That entails the release of
Palestinian prisoners, bolstering Palestinian security forces (including
allowing the import of weapons shipments comprised of armored vehicles
that remain on hold in Jordan), boosting imports and exports to and from
the territories, and a clear, unequivocal, uncompromising policy of
combating any signs of illegal settler activity ranging from building
violations to harm done to Palestinian life and property. The potential
inherent in these steps is particularly explosive and destructive for
internal Israeli considerations.
As if these issues weren't sensitive enough,
there are also the domestic troubles of the Palestinian Authority. The
intensifying economic woes, civic unrest and dissatisfaction over the
inability to create jobs and raise the standard of living, and
frustration over the diplomatic situation — particularly in light of
Hamas' success in freeing prisoners as part of the Gilad Schalit swap
and its ability to inflict damage on Israel during Pillar of Defense —
conspire to boost the sense that after a number of particularly quiet
years, the West Bank is once again about to erupt.
Fortunately for us (or not), PA President
Mahmoud Abbas also knows that the only alternative to his rule is Hamas.
He remembers well what Hamas did to him and his colleagues in Fatah in
the Gaza Strip. That memory is more than enough to quell his appetite
for another popular uprising that is liable to spin out of control. For
Israel, though, this should not be seen as a saving grace. Even if
another intifada is not in the offing, the Palestinian problem remains
at our doorstep, and it will force us to deal with adversity — either
political, diplomatic, or military in nature.
Syria: the day after
When we arrived at the Quneitra crossing on
the Golan Heights, we thought for a minute that we took a wrong turn.
Trucks filled with apples were making their way to and fro. They were
unloading their wares on the Israeli side, and they were loaded on the
Syrian side. If one were to close their eyes and forget for a moment
everything that was happening here, one would think that this was a sane
border. But a closer look reveals the sad truth. Through the
smokescreen emerges a complex, problematic security situation that hugs
our border.
One could see evidence of this by virtue of
the heavy security that was present at the crossing itself. Inspections
were beefed up here recently for fear that the limited trade that does
go on here could be exploited to carry out a terrorist attack. Aside
from this, there is also the growing number of violent incidents taking
place between Syrian troops stationed nearby and armed rebels. Indeed,
some of the fighting has occasionally spilled into Israeli territory.
Two mortar shells that were errantly fired
into Israel landed near Ramat Magshimim, the Israeli town just meters
from the border with Syria. As luck would have it, no damage was done to
houses.
The Israeli response to such incidents can be
summed up for now as "sending signals," which entails the launching of
missiles or mortars at positions from which the errant fire emanates.
The goal is to deter such incidents from taking place in the future.
While this painkiller may temporarily relieve symptoms, it doesn't get
to the root of the illness — the Syrian army's weakening grip over the
territory and the declining sense of stability which has kept the Golan
border quiet over the last 40 years.
As of today, whoever claims that they know
what Syria will look like — and what contours its borders will assume —
after Bashar al-Assad's departure is either a prophet or a scoundrel.
The number of possible scenarios is endless. Nonetheless, as long as
Assad remains in power and the fighting remains limited to within Syria,
Israel is relatively safe. The only concern is over the transfer of
advanced weaponry to Hezbollah or the rebels.
In the post-Assad period, anything is
possible. There could be one unified Syrian state under Sunni rule, with
a government that is either religious or secular in nature; there could
be a disintegration of Syria into sub-states, with the Alawites
clustered along the coast, the Kurds retaining control in the north, the
Druze in the mountainous, elevated areas, and the Sunnis ruling over
most of the territory. There could be a long, drawn out civil war.
Perhaps an iron-fisted dictatorship takes over.
Nobody has any idea who will rule Syria after
Assad, nor do they know if they will be an enemy or an ally. But the
main, immediate worry is what happens on the border. On the positive
side, the Syrians as presently constituted will not be huddled along the
frontier. There is a good chance we will no longer see tanks on the
Golan and artillery units aiming at Israeli towns.
Still, there is a much grimmer side to all
this. In recent months, hundreds of al-Qaida fighters have made their
way from Iraq to Syria. Now they are busying themselves fighting Assad
and his army. Once they are through with this task, they could easily
aim their fire at us, something they have already indicated that they
will do. That means we could be faced with terrorism on the Golan.
Indirectly, it could raise the specter that these elements may gain
control of problematic weapons — namely rockets and missiles — that can
be launched at the heart of the country.
In order to preempt any of these unsavory
scenarios, the Israeli government has expedited the construction of a
new fence along the Golan boundary. The first parts of the project were
built two years ago in the wake up the Nakba and Naksa Day incidents, in
which hundreds of Palestinians broke through the original fence into
Israeli territory. The project continues in earnest.
The new fence follows the "southern" model. It
is seven meters high, and it is designed to repel any attempt to
infiltrate from the north. The fence will also be outfitted with
sophisticated electronics and surveillance equipment.
Now the question is what comes first: a terror
attack or the completed fence? According to current plans, over 60
kilometers (about 40 miles) of fence is scheduled to be built by August.
The rest, which covers the area adjacent to Hamat Gader and Mt. Hermon,
will be finished afterward. One should hope that Assad cooperates and
that the terrorist stand idly by. Taking no chances, the IDF has
deployed its best units to the Golan border region, which are ready to
spring into immediate action if called upon.
As in Sinai, here, too, the reservists must
take a back seat to the elite commando outfits that perform daring raids
and ambushes. This alternate universe could only find a home on the
Golan, an area with thriving tourism and a bustling economy, yet one
that is in the shadows of threatening storm clouds gathering at
extraordinary speed.
The Lebanon border: deterrence
The Good Fence is long defunct, but the border
on which we can get the closest glimpse of the other side is the
Lebanese boundary. On one side, you have an Israeli roadway that serves
IDF troops on patrol, while on the Lebanese side you have Lebanese army
soldiers. Just 10 meters (and a fence) separate them. That, and an ocean
of enmity and deterrence.
It is remarkable to think how of all of
Israel's frontiers, it was this border, which has presented the largest
headache for Israel since the 1970s, that has stood stone silent since
the conclusion of the Second Lebanon War. The blood-drenched experiences
of the security zone, where on average 25 Israeli troops died every
year, and the first years following the withdrawal, which were replete
with numerous attempted terrorist attacks and kidnappings, are a distant
memory. The Lebanese border that we saw is a quiet, inviting one, but
also highly misleading. On other side sits the most formidable challenge
that Israel expects to face.
The threat posed to Israel by Hezbollah is
clear and unequivocal. The head of Military Intelligence estimates that
the Shiite organization possesses close to 100,000 rockets and missiles,
but the precise number doesn't really matter. Hezbollah is capable of
hitting any point within Israel. It also has the wherewithal to make
good on its plans and bombard the country with thousands of rockets per
day in any conflict.
Alongside this impressive capability (made
possible thanks to its arsenal of Scud missiles whose range puts Dimona
and Eilat within reach), Hezbollah has instituted massive fortifications
of the southern villages, effectively turning them into a booby trap
for IDF troops in the event of a ground offensive. The objective is
clear: to deter Israel from thinking about war. If war does break out,
it would exact a heavy price from Israel in terms of casualties. The
price would be so extreme both in terms of military and civilian losses
that it would dampen the Israeli spirit and reduce its motivation to
continue fighting. It would also send a clear message to all in the
region that Hezbollah once again stood up to the mighty IDF and
prevailed.
Yet even Hezbollah knows that in order to
successfully carry out its deterrence policy, it needs a few more
elements that are mainly strategic in nature. It needs to develop a
substantial anti-aircraft capability as well as a naval deterrent. It
has recently stepped up efforts to acquire advanced anti-aircraft
weaponry from Syria, and it was required to swallow hard and restrain
itself when a battery of 17SA anti-aircraft missiles stationed near
Damascus was destroyed. The big question revolves around whether or not
it wants to obtain chemical weapons. While it would certainly give it
significant deterrent power, it would also place Hezbollah on an
international blacklist, further complicating its political standing in
the region and within Lebanon itself.
There is another side to this equation — the
Israeli one. Hezbollah knows that in any war, Israel will look to impose
a new paradigm created after 2006 by completing the job in a manner
that would leave no doubt as to who was the winner and who was the
loser. One needed to hear the public pronouncements of IDF generals in
order to understand just how serious the army is about this. It is
training and preparing for such a campaign, a significant factor that
has compelled Hezbollah to maintain complete restraint along the border,
even in the face of major blows that it has absorbed in recent years,
like the destruction of its arsenal of surface-to-air missiles and the
elimination of its military chief, Imad Mughniyeh, an act that the
foreign press, and Hezbollah, attributes to Israel.
While at a disadvantage, Hezbollah has devoted
significant efforts at targeting Israelis abroad in order to keep the
flame of conflict burning. It is carrying out attacks, but keeping a low
profile so as to cover its tracks lest their actions set off another
war in the north.
What restrains Hezbollah today is less a
matter of Israeli deterrence and more a matter of the situation in
Syria. The destabilization of the Assad regime, which has been a key
ally long critical to Hezbollah's weapons supply, has completely altered
the organization's thinking and conduct. In an attempt to assist its
Syrian friend, Hezbollah has found itself sucked into the Syrian
conflict. It has been forced to exhaust some of its most prized and
skilled soldiers, who are physically engaged in combat against the
rebels and are helping Assad by guarding his most prized strategic
assets.
It is highly doubtful whether this Lebanese
assistance will save Assad and his government. On the day of his
downfall, it is likely that he and his supporters will link up with
Hezbollah and create a joint, state-like entity that stretches from
north Lebanon down the coast. Think of it as a Shiite-Alawite province
that enjoys the protections and sponsorship of Iran.
This prospect is quite a disturbing one to the
other ethnic groups in Lebanon, and it is also creating problems for
Hezbollah, which is trying to demonstrate to its domestic audience that
it is a responsible political player defending Lebanese interests, and
not one that is trying to take over Lebanon. In an interview with Israel
Hayom just before the Passover holiday, GOC Northern Command, Yair
Golan, predicted that the Shiite minority will eventually take Lebanon
over by force in order to prevent the influx of Sunni refugees into the
country from Syria. For all intents and purposes, according to the
general, Lebanon would become a Hezbollah state.
What does this mean for us? Not much, at the
moment. The Lebanese border is quiet, and the north is blossoming and
awash with tourists. If and when the next conflagration comes, it will
not just be an inconvenience for the residents of Misgav Am or Maalot,
but for all of us.
Water water everywhere
As we were driving down the coastal highway on
our way back from the north, our photographer, Ziv Koren, suggested
that we mention the maritime border. Indeed, Israel's eyes turn 360
degrees, and the sea is indeed a significant front. While it has not
provided any real challenges in combat since the 1980s, the potential is
there. It has less to do with the danger of terror infiltrations and
more to do with strategic threats.
The main headache is defending Israel's
strategic economic interests at sea, namely the oil and gas reservoirs
that are not just due to infuse the country with much-needed energy but
also bring major financial windfalls. Hezbollah has been desperately
trying to arm itself with Russian-manufactured Yakhont naval missiles
which are already in the possession of the Syrian military. These
missiles have a range of 300 kilometers (about 190 miles), which in
effect places all of Israel within reach. Not only are the natural gas
installations vulnerable, but so are the ports and every vessel in its
waters.
Israel has invested much effort from both an
operational and an intelligence standpoint to prevent Hezbollah from
obtaining these arms, but it is also preparing for the day that the
Lebanese group succeeds in gaining them. The solution is to bolster
defenses on these installations and to strengthen deterrence. The rules
in the Lebanese arena are no different than the rules that apply to the
entire region. The adversary's fear of an Israel response alone is
supposed to compel it to stand down. This is true with all of the
relevant actors — the Palestinians, the Syrians, and even Hezbollah.
This doesn't apply as well to terrorist groups, particularly the more
extremist ones, which in turn renders the borders in Sinai and the Golan
Heights particularly flammable.
It is hard to say that we came away from this
trip with clear answers. The immediate security situation really is
relatively good on all fronts. It is perhaps the best that we have
experienced in 65 years of existence. But the potential is worrisome and
it lurks beneath the surface. When one adds the Iranian nuclear threat
and the cyber-warfare threat as well as the steep cut likely to be
applied to the defense budget, then the challenge on our hands is bigger
than ever.
Yoav Limor
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=8633
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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