by Barry Rubin
The United States now estimates it will take one year for Iran to get nuclear weapons; Israel says some months.
“One of the great unresolved questions of Barack Obama’s presidency,” says Time Magazine, ”is whether he can peacefully resolve America’s conflict with Iran over its nuclear weapons’ program.“
Ridiculously wrong.
One of the great unresolved questions of Barack Obama’s presidency is whether he can successfully resolve America’s conflict with Iran over its nuclear weapons’ program.
Time continues that the Obama-Rouhani handshake ”would be the most important…handshake since the historic grip between Rabin and Arafat….”"
Also wrong. Remember that while it has still not been admitted by
the United States, that event 20! years later was a failure costly in
lives. Israel must satisfy seemingly monthly American demands by
releasing terrorists who murdered Israelis.
The handshakes of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain with Hitler
(the Munich agreement) and of the Nazi foreign minister and Stalin (the
Nazi-Soviet pact) were also a historic grip, at the time peaceful but
not ultimately successful.
Time continues, “It
would only be a symbolic act, to be sure. But when it comes to
international diplomacy, symbolism can go a long way.”
But it is not a mere symbolic act but the start of a foolish deal that Iran will break.
So is Iran a lunatic state or a rational actor? A hell of a lot
more rational than U.S. foreign policy is today, as apparently has been
the Muslim Brotherhood’s policy and trickery. After all, the UN just
elected Iran as Rapporteur for the General Assembly’s main committee on
Disarmament & International Security without Tehran having to do anything. And Obama will blame Congress for diplomatic failure if it increases sanctions. In fact diplomats doubt Iran will actually do anything anyway.
More politely, Iran is a rational actor in terms of its own
objectives. The issue is to understand what Iran wants. Policy is always
best served by truth, and the truth is best told whether or not people
like it. Iran is an aggressive, rational actor.
Remember: The problem is not that Iran is eager to use nuclear
weapons but that the Obama Administration is not going to apply
containment properly and credibly. And that encourages Iran’s
non-nuclear aggression and terrorism.
The hysteria over Iran, however, had also better get under control,
even as the real, very threatening situation should be understood.
Armchair theorists from far away may want to provoke a U.S.-Iran war.
This is a bad idea.
The fact is that the history of the Iranian Islamic regime does not
show suicidal recklessness. A key reason for this is that the leaders
of Iran know they can be reckless without risking suicide. In other
words, Iran did not face threats from the West commensurate with what
Tehran was doing. Therefore, the risks it took were not suicidal. If
apparently suicidal rhetoric does not produce suicide but serves a very
specific purpose, that rhetoric is not in fact suicidal.
What, then, did Iran want?
Its basic goal was to be as powerful a regional hegemon as
possible–including control over Syria and Lebanon. It would like to take
leadership of all Muslims in the area. Today, however, it is clear that
the Sunni Arabs reject Tehran’s leadership and will fight against it.
In other words, the ultimate extent of Iran’s zone of influence
could only include part of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, southwest Afghanistan,
Bahrain, and the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. That is the maximum,
and Iran is far from achieving that goal. And it will probably never
achieve it.
Iran’s influence is limited by the location of Shia Muslims. Not
all Shia Muslims favor Iran, and pretty much all Sunni Muslims oppose
it. Therefore, whatever the outcome is in Syria–in other words if the
regime wins–Iran will at most keep its current levels of influence. But
if the regime wins, the Sunnis will hate Iran even more and will fight
against it harder.
So Iran still wants to get the most power without fearing reprisal.
Nuclear weapons are a defensive shield to carry out conventional aggression.
As I’ve insisted for many years, it is increasingly clear that Iran
will get nuclear weapons. We should start discussions in that
framework. The recent brilliant decision of the Iranian elite–who is not
only more ruthless but strategically smarter than Western leadership–to
pick a national security insider, who is at best a slightly moderate
extremist, as president guarantees it.
The question is only: when will Iran get nuclear weapons? The
evidence seems to show that this is several years away. (It would be
interesting if that development was too late to affect Syria’s civil
war, and such will probably happen.)
Why will Iran certainly get nukes?
First, the West isn’t going to take strong enough action to stop it
because the alternatives are deemed–perhaps accurately so–too risky. No
surgical Israeli strike is going to stop it, and Obama will never
support such a strike. Of course, there is a great deal of indifference
about the potential victims and lots of greed about the money to be made
from Iran. The sanctions may seem tough, but there are more holes than
cheese. U.S. companies sensing profits as sanctions hopefully fall are chomping at the bit.
After Ahmadinejad, though, there is perhaps a better money-making
climate. His successor will further soothe Western willingness to battle
on this nuclear issue.
And of course they just don’t care that much about potential genocide in Israel.
Second, with international support at a low point, the logistical
difficulties, and a U.S. president who is incredibly reluctant, Israel
is not going to attack Iran to stop it from getting nuclear weapons.
What Israel should and will do is to make clear it will attack Iran if
there is any reason to believe that Tehran might launch nuclear weapons.
It will build up a multilayer defensive and offensive system.
This is not mere passive containment but would mean assured massive retaliation.
Note that there is more than one potential victim of Iran’s nuclear
weapons. People, including the Israelis, talk a lot about Israel. Yet
the Sunni Arab states are increasingly involved in shooting situations
with Iranian proxies. Unlike Israel, they won’t do anything and perhaps
can’t, except to beg the United States to take strong action. But the
U.S. won’t do so.
And of course everyone can just hope everything will turn out all right.
A rare piece of good news, however, is that before the “Arab
Spring,” it was conceivable that Iran might become leader or hegemon of
the Arabic-speaking world. Israel-bashing was an important tool to do
so. Now the Sunni Muslims have their own successful–even
U.S.-backed!–Muslim Brotherhood movement. They not only don’t need Iran
any more, they fight against Tehran.
Pushed on the defensive with more limited prospects–and knowing the
Israel card won’t work–Tehran has lots less incentive to stake its
survival on that issue. The nuclear weapons arsenal isn’t intended for a
big bang to get revenge on Israel, it’s intended to keep the current
regime in power against a growing number of enemies.
Put bluntly, Iran won’t waste its nuclear weapons on Israel or, as
they might put it in Tehran, to give Israel an “excuse” to attack Iran.
No pile of quotes from Iranian leaders to the contrary changes anything.
The key factor is not an appeal to the “international community” to
protect Israel. Israel’s power rests precisely in old-fashioned
credibility and deterrence:
Only Israel can credibly destroy the Islamic regime. And the Islamic regime in Iran knows that.
Israel was so important in Iranian verbal declarations precisely
because Israel could at one time be turned into a card that strengthened
Iran’s appeal with the Arabs and the Sunni. Iran certainly had very few
other cards. But the Sunni and Arabs don’t care about this, given the
big change of the last two years. The Israel card–as shown by the Syrian
regime’s failure with it–is worthless.
Note that while Iran has been the leading sponsor of international
terrorism and poured invective out against Israel, Iran did not notably
take any material action against Israel beyond terror attacks and its
sponsorship of Hizballah, Hamas, and Syria–which were its allies at the
time. Compared to Arab efforts in the second half of the twentieth
century, this was not very much.
In other words, against Israel, the Tehran regime talked a big game but did relatively little.
On other issues, too, Iran did not act like a country bent on
suicide. Against its Arab enemies, it did not take considerable risks.
Iran could wage a proxy war against America in Iraq, because the United
States didn’t do very much about it.
All of the above in no way discounts an Iranian threat. Yes, of
course, Iran sponsored terrorism and sought to gain influence and to
spread revolution. Yet it did not attack a single country in open terms
of warfare. Remember, Iran was invaded by Iraq. And when Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini himself was persuaded that the United States was
entering the war against him, he quickly ended it, though he said that
doing so was like eating snakes and scorpions; but that was necessary to
preserve the regime.
Iran is the kind of aggressor who was once described by Winston
Churchill as a thief who went down the street rattling doors to find one
that was open.
Second, Iran sought to defend itself by threatening antagonists
with total destruction and by obtaining the ultimate deterrence, nuclear
weapons. This does not mean one should sympathize with Tehran since,
after all, it sought nuclear weapons to ensure its defense while it
continued aggressive policies.
Iran can also complain about American encirclement. Of course, if
it did not follow the policies that were being practiced, there wouldn’t
be a U.S. motive for any such efforts. The point, however, is that the
claim that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons so it could destroy itself by
attacking Israel is just not demonstrated.
Thus, Iran is not a demonic, crazed, kamikaze country. It is simply
a typical aggressor who wants to have insurance against having to pay
the price of such continued activity. North Korea and Pakistan sought
nuclear weapons for the same reason, and it is working for them.
Let’s approach the issue in another way. Suppose Iran helped the
Syrian regime win the civil war. Would the danger to Israel be
increased? No, certainly it would not be from a nuclear
standpoint. Assad would reestablish control over a wrecked and tottering
country where the damage would take years to rebuild. But the problem
is that Iran will be more secure in defending itself which means it will
be more aggressive, but now with nuclear weapons.
The use of nuclear weapons loses whatever the possession of nuclear weapons gains.
Iran would be relieved at the Syrian regime’s survival but would
not be better able to carry on a (nuclear) war against Israel. The
Sunnis would be prepared to cooperate with the United States against
Iran and even, covertly, with Israel up to a point. Indeed, the ability
of Sunni Islamists to attack Israel would be reduced because of their
obsession with the principal danger.
Again, I don’t want Assad to win in Syria. I believe that Iran is a
threat. I think Iran will succeed in getting nuclear weapons. I don’t
think the Tehran regime consists of lunatics who cannot wait to immolate
themselves in a fiery funeral pyre. They want to stay in power for a
long time. Israel has an alternative of preemption if necessary. But the
United States will never help stop Iran’s getting of nukes.
This analysis should be conducted in a sober fashion. I believe,
indeed I see clearly, that Israeli policymakers understand these issues.
We should remember that Iran is not an insane state and that there are
threats other than Iran in the Middle East.
The problem is not that Iran is eager to use nuclear weapons but
that the Obama Administration is unlikely to apply containment properly
and credibly. And then its version of containment might fail.
Barry Rubin
Source: http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/10/is-iran-a-lunatic-state-or-a-rational-actor/
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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