by A. Savyon and Y. Carmon
Introduction
The
nuclear talks with Iran, which are set to resume in Geneva on November 7, 2013,
have turned into talks on two separate yet parallel tracks. One track is Iran's
talks with the 5+1 group, while the main thrust of the other, which bypasses the
5+1, is direct U.S.-Iran talks under the auspices of the 5+1 talks. This bilateral
track may also include secret contacts. But the official contacts are under the
auspices of the 5+1 talks because Iran will not agree to official direct
contact without maximal incentive to do so.[1]
Why Are Iran And The U.S. Bypassing The 5+1 Countries?
Iran
and the U.S. are bypassing the 5+1 because they are both interested in doing
so. First, the U.S. is interested because the Obama administration is alone in
its flexible stance vis-à-vis Iran, and it is trying to reach understandings
with it directly; it will then present these understandings to the 5+1 forum in
an attempt to force it to accept them and thus turn them into a matter of
international consensus. It was reported only recently that as part of the
E.U.'s new approach in reinforcing its Iran sanctions regime, it is planning to
revoke exemptions granted in recent months to several companies.[2] This
runs counter to the American administration's efforts to prevent Congress from
imposing additional sanctions.
Attempting to conceal the gaps between its position and
Europe’s, the U.S. is demanding that the 5+1-Iran track be conducted in secret.
In contrast, the Iranians are demanding that the 5+1 talks be open and
transparent, so that they are not accused at home of selling out the country's
nuclear interest.[3]
It should be emphasized that the Obama administration is considering
unfreezing tens of billions of dollars' worth of Iranian assets, a move that
would likely be accompanied by an Iranian announcement that it is reducing the
level to which it is enriching uranium. By doing this, the Obama administration
would be circumventing both Congressional sanctions and the 5+1's consensus
that sanctions on Iran not be lifted unless Iran takes a very significant
preliminary measure.[4]
Iran is interested in direct talks with the U.S. because the
consensus in the 5+1 – that is, the international community's position –
remains unchanged: fundamental opposition to Iran's becoming a nuclear state;
fundamental rejection of its demand to enrich uranium to any level on its soil
and a demand that it cease and desist from doing so immediately in accordance
with the UN Security Council resolutions; harsh criticism of Iran's refusal to
cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and of its
continued lack of transparency towards it and towards the international
community; and harboring suspicions that it is conducting military nuclear
activity.
In contrast to the 5+1's position, the U.S. has in recent
months been hinting that it would be willing to recognize an Iran that is
nuclear for civilian purposes and under strict oversight, and that it would consider
Iran's cessation of enriching uranium to 20% as a positive move.[5] (It
should be noted that in light of the American administration's efforts at
rapprochement with Tehran, and its hints that it may recognize Iran's right to
low-level uranium enrichment, Russia too has been attempting to strengthen its
ties with Iran with a proposal of concessions that offers no less than the
Americans are offering.)[6]
Each Side's Aim In Bypassing The 5+1 Talks
Iran needs to talk directly with
the U.S.in order to achieve its goal – recognition as a nuclear state, a status
which follows from recognition of its right to enrich uranium on its soil. The
U.S. is bypassing the 5+1 and talking directly with Iran in order to achieve its
own goal – it seeks an historic reconciliation with Iran, or at the very least
direct talks on a permanent basis. It should be emphasized that the American
administration's goal, as indicated by its conduct in the negotiations, is not
to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state, but to limit its status as a
nuclear power to the civilian domain, under strict international supervision,
in order to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons.
At present, it
is unclear whether the U.S. administration is dangling the option of
recognizing Iran's right to enrich uranium at low levels as bait and will
ultimately oppose it – or whether it is actually willing to allow it. A
decision by the Obama administration to pay for the longed-for historic
reconciliation by recognizing a nuclear Iran that has no bomb – at least, not
yet – will have far-reaching regional and international implications.
The Implications Of Possible U.S. Recognition Of A Nuclear Iran Entitled To Low-Level Uranium Enrichment
On the international level, U.S.
recognition of a nuclear Iran that includes the latter's right to enrich
uranium to low levels on its soil could destabilize the global nuclear order
that has been more or less maintained for decades by all countries, with the
exception of a few that are not signatory to the NPT. If the U.S. makes such a
move, many other countries would move to pursue their own independent nuclear ambitions.
On the regional level:
- The nuclearization of the Middle East, and the
possibility of a nuclear arms race: The American administration's
recognition of a nuclear Iran would necessarily lead to a nuclearization of the
leading Sunni and other countries in the Middle East that have no faith in an
American nuclear umbrella against Iran (see MEMRI reports on Egypt and Saudi Arabia
on this topic).[7]
- The strengthening of the resistance axis – Iran, Syria, and Hizbullah – under Iran's leadership: This will come at the expense of former U.S. allies – the axis of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. U.S. recognition of a nuclear Iran would significantly reinforce the Shi'ite foci in the Middle East that fight Sunnis, for example Lebanon (Hizbullah), Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain.
* A. Savyon is Director of the Iranian Media Project; Y. Carmon is President of MEMRI.
[1]
Evidence of the bilateral U.S.-Iran track can be seen in the following
statements: Abbas Araqchi, head of the Iranian delegation to
Geneva, said: "The aim of the bilateral talks [with the American
delegation head Wendy Sherman] was to advance the negotiations. We wanted to
examine issues that came up in [the 5+1] negotiations in bilateral talks that
were more in-depth, detailed, and serious. If we feel that we must hold
bilateral talks [with the Americans] in order to facilitate the negotiation track
and to consult [with the Americans], then we will hold such talks, as we have
in the past..." Al-Alam, October 20, 2013. The conservative Iranian daily Jaam-e
Jam stated on October 17, 2013: "Obama must prevent the warmongers
[i.e. Israel and his opponents in Congress] from spoiling the positive
atmosphere that was achieved [during the meetings]."
[2] Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2013.
[3]
Iranian Interior Minister Rahmani-Fazli said
that it is the West that is demanding that the nuclear talks be secret, and
that their content not be leaked. IRNA, Iran, October 21, 2013. The Iranian
daily Jomhouri-ye Eslami, which is identified with Hashemi Rafsanjani,
stated on October 21, 2013 that "the Iranian people are entitled to
receive clear information regarding these talks, and to know the aim of the
track that has been set and what price [Iran] must pay for it." The same
day, Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari, who is identified with the
opposite camp of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, wrote to Iranian
President Hassan Rohani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who are conducting
the negotiations, "Pardon me, gentlemen, you are making a great mistake by maintaining the secrecy of
the negotiations... The content of the Geneva talks cannot be the kind of thing
[that remains secret] because the Geneva talks are held with the participation
of the negotiating teams of the 5+1 countries, that is, the ones from whose
eyes any secret matter must be kept... The explanation that 'the secrecy of the
negotiations is a sign of their seriousness' sounds more like a joke than like
a reasonable theory." Kayhan (Iran), October 21, 2013.
[4] Jomhouri-ye Eslami
stated: "The [Western] media has reported recently that President Obama
can overrule some of the sanctions, such as those concerning medical equipment,
food, and inter-bank trade without Congressional approval... What is said in
the U.S. on the unfreezing of frozen Iranian assets angers the Zionists. The
unfreezing of these assets can be an effective step [because] it is considered
one of the ways of removing the economic distress until the sanctions are
lifted..." Jomhouri-ye Eslami (Iran), October 21, 2013. Iranian
Vice President Eshak Jahangiri said that billions of dollars of Iranian assets
that are frozen in dozens of countries will be unfrozen soon and will serve as
collateral to extend credit to the private sector. Ettela'at
(Iran), October 21, 2013.
[5] In
a September 29 interview with CBS's 60 Minutes, U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry set out steps that the Iranians could take to prove to the world
that their nuclear program is peaceful: "They could offer to cease
voluntarily to take enrichment above a certain level, keep it at a very low
level because there's no need to have it at a higher level for a peaceful
program." By this, he implied that a voluntary
Iranian halt to enriching uranium to 20% while continuing its enrichment of
uranium up to 5% would be viewed by the U.S. as a positive step. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/ watch/?id=50156089n,
September 9, 2013. For transcript see: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301- 18560_162-57604897/kerry-deal- possible-quickly-if-iran- forthcoming/.
[6] See Iranian reports on the
Russian initiative: Jomhouri-ye Eslami, Etemad (Iran), October 29, 2013.
[7] MEMRI Special Dispatch No.
5477, Egypt
Renews Nuclear Program, October 11, 2013; MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 5502, Former Saudi
Ambassador To Washington Turki Al-Faisal: If Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons, The
GCC Should Consider Acquiring A 'Nuclear Deterrent' Of Its Own; 'The Shameful
Way That The World Community Accepts The Impunity Of The Butcher Of Syria Is A
Blot On The Conscience Of The World', October 28, 2013.
A. Savyon and Y. Carmon
Source: www.http://memri.org
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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