by Zvi Magen , Olena Bagno-Moldavsky
Throughout Operation Protective Edge, Russia, in an unusual display of restraint, barely related to the conflict. Moscow’s few comments were carefully weighed, creating the impression that Russia embarked on a mission to promote its image as an unbiased mediator. At the same time, Russia tried cautiously to offer its services to both sides, publicly as well as in private conversations with Israeli and Hamas representatives. Against the background of Russia’s efforts during the Gaza campaign to maintain its image as an impartial player, Russia’s approach to Israel stands out: Russia has maintained a low profile toward Israel.
Throughout
Operation Protective Edge, Russia, in an unusual display of restraint,
barely related to the conflict. Moscow’s few comments were carefully
weighed, creating the impression that Russia embarked on a mission to
promote its image as an unbiased mediator. At the same time, Russia
tried, albeit clandestinely, to offer its services to both sides,
publicly as well as in private conversations with Israeli and Hamas
representatives. To this extent, President Vladimir Putin spoke with
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on July 23, 2014, while on July 29,
2014, Hamas, via its high rank official Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzouk,
appealed to Russia, asking that it assume an active mediating role in
the ceasefire negotiations. This was hardly unprecedented, as in recent
years Hamas has approached the Moscow leadership on various occasions.
To the best of our knowledge, this particular request did not have any
effect on the ground, and it seems it was, from Hamas’ perspective,
mainly intended as propaganda, challenging the West and in particular
the United States. For Russia, which is fighting radical Islam in the
North Caucasus, Hamas remains a less promising partner than Fatah and
its leader Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, who is
regularly received with great respect in Russia (Abbas last visited
Russia on June 25, 2014).
Prime Minister Netanyahu and
President Putin at the Kremlin,
November 20, 2103, AFP/Getty Images
Russia, which maintains positive relations with
Hamas and Hizbollah as well as other non-state actors in the region,
gained positive political standing following Hamas’ appeal, at the very
least strengthening its image as a “light heavyweight” regional actor.
This is in line with Russia’s decade-long policy of restoring its stance
in the Middle East as a power equal in standing to the West, although
the upheavals of the Arab Spring damaged what Russia had previously
achieved.
In light of Russia’s efforts during
the Gaza campaign to maintain its image as an impartial player as well
as the exchanges of ideas regarding its practical integration into the
negotiations, Russia’s approach to Israel stands out: Russia has
maintained a low profile toward Israel. The President’s official website
states that all conversations between President Putin and Prime
Minister Netanyahu – with the exception of Putin’s call on January 13,
2014 – were initiated by Israel. Russia’s new policy is atypically
restrained, diverging from its usual practice in dealing with Middle
East issues and in particular the manner in which Moscow positions
itself vis-à-vis Israel (the tone most often taken, even when
objectivity is attempted, leaves little doubt that Israel is perceived
as the problems’ underlying cause). Under these circumstances and given
past experience, Russia’s conduct cannot be construed as anything but
supportive of Israel, even if this support is of a very cautious nature,
given the sensitivity of relations that Russia has developed with its
current and prospective partners in the region. These relations are
influenced by Russia’s perceived global contest with the West, as well
as by operational considerations that include lowering Hamas’ profile,
since the latter acts a destabilizing element in Egypt – Russia’s recently reestablished economic and strategic partner.
Thus, the main question refers to
Russia’s motives behind the change in tone. Israeli-Russian bilateral
relations have been good and stable for years, and although there is
always room for improvement, this cannot be taken as a sufficient
rationale for change. One possible explanation is Israel’s stance on the
Ukrainian crisis. Israel was careful not to criticize Russia during the
crisis and has maintained this policy despite fairly heavy-handed
pressure from the West. It is not at all unreasonable to assume that
Russia is returning the favor, reinforcing Israel’s determination to
maintain neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine confrontation.
Recently, Russia has found itself in
the center of an international crisis over Ukraine, as fighting between
Russia-supported proponents of “Novorossia” and Ukrainian security
forces alongside local militias are resulting in growing number of
civilian and military casualties. In addition, there is growing concern
that Russia is massively expanding its involvement in the conflict,
although to date, its involvement has been mostly covert. Consequently,
Russia is subject to significant Western pressure, despite the official
denial of its being a part of the crises (including the downing of the
Malaysian aircraft in July 17). The pressure includes increased economic
sanctions and a growing diplomatic isolation of its leadership.
Though Western democracies are not
unanimous when it comes to economic sanctions, especially within the
European Union, the West’s official position regarding the crisis is
generally negative; first, the crisis is viewed as grave and potentially
dangerous for European collective security. The United States and
Europe are engaged in efforts to halt Russia’s support of separatists in
eastern Ukraine and stabilize the deteriorating situation. In addition
to political pressure, the West provides humanitarian aid, military
consultants as well as some intelligence support, and – according to
sources in Russia – even a covert military presence. Among these
possible steps, economic sanctions remain a major leverage over Russia,
having the potential to undermine Russia’s economy, inevitably weakening
its political system and society. Some believe that this is precisely
the US administration’s objective.
Russia’s political doctrine views
Eastern Europe and the Middle East as related regions. This logic
results in a necessary shift in the international community’s focus,
turning it away from the Ukraine to other regions, especially the Middle
East. The current crisis in Gaza provided a good opportunity for
reframing international public attention. However, this time the United
States along with its Western and Asian partners showed no intention to
shift their focus from the Ukraine to the Middle East and to Russia’s
attempts to expand its presence in the area. Moreover, the United States
seems determined to maintain its role in handling the
Israeli-Palestinian crisis, while also retaining its stance in other
parts of the region.
These various considerations guided
the Russian position with regard to the operation in Gaza, with the
underlying rationale remaining steadfast: Moscow’s attempt to become a
significant player in the Middle East is part of its global competition
with the West. As such, Israel’s stance on Ukraine is crucial to Russia,
as it eases some of the pressures on the Kremlin from the West over the
issue. In addition, being a sympathetic party is likely to make it
easier for Russia to realize its potential as a regional player. It
seems that Operation Protective Edge is perceived as the next
opportunity to promote these objectives.
In light of the challenging reality
developing in the international arena, one should view Russia’s
sympathetic trend as an Israeli political advantage.
Zvi Magen , Olena Bagno-Moldavsky
Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7504
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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