by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Only a profound misunderstanding of the nature of the Iranian regime could lead anyone to believe any deal will satisfy Tehran's nuclear ambitions • The truth is the U.S. can bring Iran's nuclear program to a halt -- it simply chooses not to do so.
U.S. Secretary of State John
Kerry, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and EU foreign
policy chief Federica Mogherini in Lausanne
|
Photo credit: AP  |
The nuclear framework agreement signed between
Iran and world powers, namely the United States, Russia, China,
Britain, France and Germany, on April 2, was defined by U.S. President
Barack Obama as a "historic understanding," while Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu defined the deal as "bad."
I believe both leaders are right: The deal has
radically changed Iran's position in the global theater, in exchange
for it temporarily slowing down its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and in
this respect it is indeed historic. The agreement affords Iran the
status of a regional power and legitimizes it as a nuclear threshold
state. However, it is up to Iran to decide when to cross this threshold,
and in this respect it is a bad deal.
The U.S. changed its policy mid-negotiations,
going from demanding that Iran be stripped of its nuclear weapons
production capabilities, to discussing the nature of the limitations and
supervision placed on these capabilities.
The framework deal clearly indicates that the
U.S. has come to accept that Iran will one day possess military nuclear
capabilities, and that at the end of the supervision period there would
be nothing stopping the Islamic republic from realizing this potential.
Obama
told the American people as much in a radio interview, before his
spokesmen rushed to say he was misunderstood. But even if that was the
case, Obama's statements reflected the reality which may arise from any
final agreement with Iran.
This
reality entails three scenarios. The first may see the Iranians
relinquish their nuclear efforts, willingly or otherwise. Some in the
U.S. administration believe this is a viable option, and that bolstering
the moderate forces within Iran will eventually effect change.
The second scenario may see the Iranians
diligently follow the agreement, while stabilizing their economy,
reinforcing their regional status, strengthening their allies such as
Hezbollah, and enhancing their nuclear expertise. Then, once the
agreement's sunset clause comes into effect, the Iranians will resume
the military aspects of their program with renewed zeal.
Throughout the negotiations, that U.S. has
attempted to prolong the period during which Iran would be unable to
pursue nuclear capabilities, saying that if Tehran complies with the
agreement, it would buy the West more time, at least a decade. The
administration's excuse was that a deferral of the matter was preferable
to the alternative, a military operation, which may not buy the West
the same amount of time, making the deal a better option.
The third scenario may see the Iranians bide
their time and wait for the right moment to violate the deal. This will
probably happen only after all the sanctions are lifted, and after
enough countries have vested financial interests in Iran, which would
deter them from targeting its economy.
The U.S., for its part, has pledged to put in
place rigorous inspection practices, which would guarantee the West at
least a year to detect any violation of the agreement.
A new, violent Middle East
Would such an agreement guarantee, to any
extent, a change in Iran's nuclear aspirations? It seems the opposite is
true. In the near future, the agreement will only fuel Iran's desire to
realize the potential outlined and legitimized by the deal. The hope
that the agreement will somehow breed a positive process in Iran has no
hold in reality.
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani appears eager
for his country to obtain nuclear weapons. In fact, there is no debate
within the Iranian leadership on whether or not such capabilities are
necessary, only about the best way to go about achieving them.
Only a profound misunderstanding of the nature
of the Iranian regime could lead anyone to believe that any deal will
somehow satisfy the ayatollahs' nuclear ambitions, to the point of
becoming a game changer.
Is there really no military alternative that
could result in a longer setback to Tehran's nuclear program, one that
could outweigh the delay outlined in the current deal?
After all, it was under orders from Obama that
the U.S. developed a weapon that could seriously compromise Iran's
nuclear facilities. The argument that any military strike would result
in only a short-term setback in Iran's nuclear endeavors is wrong,
because the seemingly professional American calculation on the matter is
purely technical.
This calculation is flawed because it fails to
account for the effect a successful strike would have on Tehran's
willingness to invest in rehabilitating a program that could be
destroyed in a matter of several nights, which is how long the U.S. said
it would take to strike all of Iran's nuclear facilities.
I believe that Iran, subject to crippling
sanctions, would not rush to resuscitate its nuclear program in the
event it was destroyed by the U.S. It also stands to reason that Iran's
actual ability to retaliate over such a strike, other than by putting
Hezbollah in play, would be limited.
An American strike could buy the West more
than just a few years, but its reluctance to assume the risks involved
in a military operation is understandable. In any case, the truth must
be told: The U.S. can forcibly bring the Iranian nuclear program to a
halt, it simply chooses not to do so.
The argument that the framework agreement would afford the West sufficient time to detect any violation is also unfounded.
The Iranians are not stupid. They have no
intention of blatantly violating major understandings, and their pursuit
of a nuclear weapon will simply slow to a somewhat vague crawl.
Post-deal intelligence on the Iranian program
will not be as accurate, as the U.S. stands to impose restrictions on
intelligence gathering across the Islamic republic, which will no longer
be an enemy state, but rather a nation with which Washington seeks to
improve relations.
When ambiguous intelligence eventually does
surface, no one will rush to declare the deal has failed. On the
contrary, until such time as clear-cut intelligence mandates an American
response, the majority of the year-long retaliation window will have
elapsed. Reinstating international sanctions at that time would be
nearly impossible, becoming all the more reason to avoid a military
strike.
The goals set by the U.S. for that year-long
window -- detecting any violations and retaliating, either via sanctions
or a military strike -- will fail the test of reality. The Iranians are
too smart to make a mistake of that caliber.
Iran has been fooling the world for 20 years,
and the deal will make it that much easier, as it would be easier for
the West to believe Tehran's lies than to admit it made a historic
mistake and mount a military operation.
Furthermore, the agreement stands to have
serious geopolitical repercussions. The deal with Iran is likely to lead
to a nuclear arms race in the Sunni Middle East, as well as to
increased belligerency from Iran and its allies, such as Hezbollah, the
Houthis, Syrian President Bashar Assad and Hamas.
In the long run, the deal could potentially
compromise what little stability is left in the region, which in turn
would lend the Shiite-Sunni struggle new and terrifying dimensions,
making an already violent theater even more volatile.
Iran will try to capitalize on the regional
superiority the U.S. has afforded it the first chance it gets, knowing
American statements suggesting all options on the table are nothing but
hollow rhetoric.
A tough call
The most important American achievement in the
framework deal was Iran's agreement to remove all the enriched material
it currently has, or plans to produce, excluding a symbolic amount of
enriched uranium.
It is important to ascertain this commitment
and to see it through. According to the American concept, the difference
between Iran's considerable enrichment capabilities, which will remain
intact, and the amount of enriched material it actually retains is a key
factor in the agreement.
However, in the long run, it is the number of
operational centrifuges that matters -- not the amount of enriched
material removed from Iran. Given the deal's sunset clause, Iran's
centrifuges would allow it to resume rapid enrichment activities as soon
as it seeks them.
The fact that Iran has agreed to cease
plutonium enrichment is trivial. The Arak reactor is not fully
operational, so it was easy for the Iranians to relinquish something
they never had.
The concept of time is a fundamental bone of
contention between the U.S. and Israel and other countries in the
region. A decade may seem like a long time for leaders who are elected
for a limited period of time, but for leaders with historical
perspectives of national security, 10 years is no time at all.
The final deal brewing between the Islamic
republic and the West will afford Iran the conveniences of honing its
nuclear expertise, giving it the ability to produce weapons within a
decade.
The Iranians understand this deal will buy
them time, and their price is future recognition of Iran as a nuclear
power. That is an impossible price for Israel and other nations in the
Middle East to pay.
I believe the best alternative should have
been to continue imposing and aggravating the sanctions, while making it
clear to Iran that any nuclear endeavor on its part would be limited by
clear, bold red lines, and if any of them are ever crossed, the U.S.
will react forcefully.
Exhausted by current sanctions, Tehran would
be wary of violating the deal. This could have made Iran relinquish its
nuclear program, especially faced with a viable military threat, but
given the American policy, which no longer seems to want to strip Iran
of its nuclear capabilities, other concepts must be introduced.
Should the outline of the framework agreement mature
into a final deal, Israel will be faced with only a handful of options:
making do with the deal, meaning preparing for the day when Iran becomes
nuclear while trying to generate deterrence, or trying to forcibly stop
Tehran, contrary to world powers' wishes. Neither option is a good one,
making for a very tough call.
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=24897
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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