by Fars News Agency
The factsheet -- stresses the necessity for respecting the redlines and guidelines specified by -- Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, making Iran's decisions and undertakings reversible to enable the country to resume its nuclear operations in case of the other side's non-commitment to its undertakings, and immediate termination of all sanctions in a single step and on the first day of the implementation of the final agreement.
TEHRAN (FNA)- The Iranian parliament's Nuclear
Committee on Wednesday released a factsheet to declare the revisions
needed to be made in the Lausanne statement that was issued by Tehran
and the world powers as a framework understanding at the end of their
nuclear talks in Switzerland earlier this month.
The
factsheet which was presented by Head of the Nuclear Committee Ebrahim
Karkhaneyee on Wednesday stresses the necessity for respecting the
redlines and guidelines specified by Supreme Leader of the Islamic
Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, making Iran's decisions and undertakings reversible to enable the country to resume its nuclear operations in case of the other side's non-commitment to its undertakings, and immediate termination of all sanctions in a single step and on the first day of the implementation of the final agreement.
The factsheet also necessitates commitment of both
sides to their undertakings based on the Geneva agreement, a fair and
reasonable balance between the gives and takes, taking good care not to
impair the country's security and military boundaries and national
interests, providing 190,000 SWUs (Separative Work Units) of nuclear
fuel enrichment capability needed by Iran to produce fuel for the
Bushehr nuclear power plant immediately after the end of contract with
Russia, safeguarding the nuclear achievements, actual operation of all
nuclear facilities of Iran not in words, but in action, continued
Research and Development (R&D) works and scientific and
technological progress in Iran and immediate application of R&D
findings in the country's industrial-scale uranium enrichment cycle.
The factsheet urges operation of
10,000 centrifuge machines at Natanz and Fordo, a maximum 5-year-long
duration for the deal and for Iran's nuclear limitations, replacement of
the current centrifuges with the latest generation of home-made
centrifuge machines at the end of the five-year period.
Enrichment Program:
The period for the Join Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) should be limited to five years, in which about 10,000
active centrifuges operating at Natanz and Fordo now will continue
nuclear fuel production by enriching uranium below the 5% grade.
The UF6 enriched reserves which are under the
supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be
kept at Fordo nuclear plant and will be turned into nuclear fuel complex
based on the existing capabilities.
During the five-year period, the Islamic Republic
of Iran will continue to keep the excess centrifuges installed at Natanz
and Fordo or will gradually dismantle them, and at the end of the
5-year period, it will replace all the existing centrifuges, including
the active or inactive ones, with the new generation of (IR-N)
centrifuge machines with the help of the new spaces and infrastructures
which will have been already prepared and will use them without any
limitation.
Justification:
Based on the Geneva agreement, the period for the
final step should merely include a single period which has been
considered as to be five years in the present factsheet. But in the
Lausanne statement, different periods of 10, 20, 25 years and higher
have been considered.
Given the Geneva agreement, the amount of
enrichment should be specified based on the country's practical needs
and the number of 10,000 centrifuges has also been specified on this
basis.
The 5-year period in this factsheet has been has
been specified with respect to the date when Iran's nuclear fuel
contract with Russia for the Bushehr nuclear power plant will end;
hence, the rules and limitations for the components of the enrichment
cycle should be set in such a way that the Islamic Republic of Iran will
be able to supply the fuel needed for the power plant after the end of
the contract with Russia.
Operation of 10,000 centrifuges and developing and
having a 10-ton enriched uranium stockpile will enable the Islamic
Republic of Iran to supply the fuel needed for the Bushehr power plant
in the year when the fuel supply contract with Russia (28-30 tons) ends.
Fordo installations:
Fordo nuclear facility will remain an enrichment
and nuclear Research and Development (R&D) center. 4 enrichment
cascades with 656 centrifuges will continue operation and production of
fuel for purity levels lower than 5% by maintaining the current chain
arrangements.
If the country would need 20%-degree
(enriched) uranium, the nuclear fuel production line for purity levels
lower than 5% will be altered to enrich uranium to the 20%-grade after
connecting the centrifuge cascades to each other again.
Justification:
Based on the above, Fordo will remain an actual
and active center, and the Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain its
capability to reverse its decision and restore the 20%-grade enrichment.
Research and Development (R&D):
In a bid to use R&D findings in the country's
industrial-scale enrichment chain, R&D should be planned in a way
that the necessary possibilities and infrastructures will be provided
for replacing the first generation of centrifuges with the latest
generation of centrifuge machines (IR-N) when the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action comes to an end after 5 years.
The R&D program should undergo no limitation before it comes into use for industrial-scale operation.
Justification:
Accordingly, the advanced centrifuges will enter
the chain of nuclear fuel production without any restriction at the end
of the 5-year deal.
Arak Heavy Water Reactor:
Given the Group 5+1 countries' mere concern about
the plutonium existing in the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of the Arak 40-MW
heavy water reactor, the fuel used by the reactor will be sent abroad.
The G5+1 states will be committed to cooperate and
take the necessary measures for relevant international licensing and
permissions.
Justification:
Given the SNF export abroad, the insistence of the
G5+1, specially the US, on redesigning the said reactor is merely a
pretext and doesn’t have any scientific rationale.
What is more important than the heavy water nature
of Arak reactor is the core of the reactor which is due to be taken out
and then be redesigned and renovated. Such a move is irreversible in
nature, and thus means crossing the specified redlines.
Supervision and Inspection:
Supervision and inspections of the Islamic
Republic of Iran's nuclear program should be carried out within the
framework of the the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards
agreements.
Justification:
Once done, the principle stated by the Supreme
Leader of the Islamic Revolution - that security and military sanctities
and boundaries shouldn’t be violated and that the inspections should be
carried out at conventional levels similar to all other countries -
will be respected and materialized. Given the Islamic Republic of Iran's
opposition to the world arrogance, endorsing and implementing the
Additional Protocol will provide the world arrogance (a term normally
used for the US and its western allies) with legal grounds to stage
their preplanned plots against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Sanctions:
Concurrently with the start of the JCPOA, all the
US and EU sanctions will be terminated and Iran will start fulfilling
its undertakings based on the verification of the IAEA.
The UN Security Council sanctions resolution
against Iran will be annulled and all nuclear-related sanctions will be
terminated and the Islamic Republic of Iran's case will be normalized.
The G5+1 countries, the EU and the UNSC will avoid imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.
Justification:
By terminating all sanctions in a single step
right at the start of the implementation of the final comprehensive
agreement, the Supreme Leader's statement that termination of sanctions
is part of the agreement and not its result will be materialized.
Based on the Geneva agreement, after the
implementation of the JCPOA, all UNSC, US and EU sanctions should be
terminated and no new (UNSC) resolution would be needed in this regard;
Hence, terminating the UNSC sanctions will close the case and no new
resolution which would pave the ground for new plots will be issued.
International cooperation:
The Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear cooperation
with the world states, including the G5+1 members, in areas of building
nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel production,
nuclear safety medicine and nuclear agriculture, etc. will be possible
and will improve. Based on the JCPOA, Iran will be provided with access
to the global market, trade and finance and technical know-how and
energy.
Reversibility:
In case of the two sides' non-commitment to their undertakings, there will be a possibility for reversing all measures.
Justification:
Based on the aforementioned proposal, the Islamic
Republic of Iran will be provided with reversible measures at the lowest
level of damage and, therefore, the G5+1's commitment to its
undertakings will be in fair balance (with those of Iran).
Duration of the JCPOA:
After the end of the five-year period and the
JCPOA exercise, all restrictions will be lifted and based on the Geneva
agreement, the case with the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program
will be similar to that of the other NPT member states.
The Iranian Parliament factsheet for a revision to
the Lausanne agreement came after the US released a factsheet different
from the joint statement issued by Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad
Javad Zarif and Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the
European Union for Foreign Affairs and head of the G5+1 in nuclear talks
with Iran, at the end of the latest round of Iran-world powers nuclear
talks in Switzerland on April 2, known as the Lausanne statement.
The US factsheet that was released only a few
hours after the Lausanne framework understanding caused fury in Iran,
encouraging many to raise deep doubt about the results of the talks and
US accountability and trustworthiness.
In only a few weeks, a bipartisan bill was also
presented to the Congress for vote that would give the US legislature
oversight of a final deal, a move seen by many across the globe,
including both Iran and the US, as furthering impediments to the
endorsement of a final deal between Iran and the sextet.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Senator Bob Corker, who wrote the bill, said the White House had agreed
to go along with the bill only after it was clear there was strong
Democratic support. The legislation was passed unanimously by the
committee and is expected to pass the full Senate and then the House of
Representatives.
"That change occurred only when they saw how many senators were going to vote for this," Corker said.
Bipartisan support for the bill had grown in
recent weeks to near the 67 votes needed to override any presidential
veto. But senators from Obama's Democratic Party did succeed in adding
amendments to water down the bill, making it more palatable to the White
House.
Fars News Agency
Source: http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940126001122
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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