Monday, April 13, 2015

Ground Obstacles: New Technologies & Tactics unlike those of the Past - Atai Shelah



by Atai Shelah

One of the primary characteristics of this new type of confrontation is that the terrorist organizations do not have clearly-defined borders to defend. What they do have is scattered assets and focal points. Moreover, those organizations are always inferior to the states attacking them, so in order to gain a relative advantage and compensate for their inferiority opposite the superior capabilities of the state, they enter the built-up area and avoid, to the maximum extent possible, combat encounters in open terrain, where the state opponent is not hindered by the problem of collateral damage

Obstacles were present on the battlefield since the first human conflict and the first war to these days. Obstacles are intended to disrupt the ground moves of the opponent and deny him his objective of capturing and dominating the defender's territory. I will not wear out the reader with elaborate descriptions of the various types of obstacles and their functions. I will only state, generally, that all obstacles are generally classified into natural obstacles (utilization of natural features) and man-made obstacles. The latter classification includes the significant, primary category of explosive obstacles (explosive charges, mines, booby-traps, explosive pits, et al.), which is a highly significant element in combination with the former obstacle categories.

One example of an interesting combination of natural elements with man-made and explosive elements is the case of the "nature reserves", where localities are excavated in a natural area, fortified strongholds are erected and additionally, in accordance with a structured operational concept, explosive charges and mines are laid and integrated. The "nature reserves", just like the rural and urban areas, are characteristics that reflect the transition from linear obstacle systems to obstacle focal points that defend specific assets and areas.

In the not-too-distant past, most obstacles were built to defend the national borders of states, when those states were concerned about the possible invasion by the military forces of other states. The nature and characteristics of the obstacle systems were, therefore, determined by the need to defend states against other states. In line with this principle, obstacle systems were built in Europe before, during and after the First World War and the Second World War, and complete obstacle systems were erected in the subsequent decades.

Similarly, the State of Israel erected its obstacle systems along the borders surrounding it in accordance with the opponents it faced and the threat of invasion by Arab countries into its territory. It was evident, through the years, that Israel's borders were fortified and protected by obstacle systems of varying intensity and depth, according to different priorities. These obstacle systems were arranged in structured lines facing the border, while the areas behind the obstacle systems, into the depth of the national territory, remained almost totally free of any obstacles.

The old, linear obstacle systems were made up of lines of minefields (containing a combination of anti-personnel and antitank mines), antitank ditches, fence systems of various types and other obstacles, intended to channel the opponent into points and bottlenecks dominated by observation and fire. These obstacle systems were built with the direction from which the opponent will arrive anticipated and the opponent's routes of advance well known.

In the last few decades, and most intensively over the last two decades, confrontations between states have disappeared completely, and the confrontations that do take place involve states on one side and non-state organizations on the other side: Hezbollah inside the State of Lebanon, Taliban inside the State of Afghanistan or, naturally, Hamas inside the Palestinian territory of the Gaza Strip. Terrorist organizations have recently sprouted inside non-governed areas along the western border of Syria (the north-eastern border of the State of Israel), in the Sinai Peninsula and in many other areas around the world.

One of the primary characteristics of this new type of confrontation is that the terrorist organizations do not have clearly-defined borders to defend. What they do have is scattered assets and focal points. Moreover, those organizations are always inferior to the states attacking them, so in order to gain a relative advantage and compensate for their inferiority opposite the superior capabilities of the state, they enter the built-up area and avoid, to the maximum extent possible, combat encounters in open terrain, where the state opponent is not hindered by the problem of collateral damage (casualties and property damage inflicted on uninvolved parties).

One of the most significant phenomena that evolved in the last few decades, which many refer to as asymmetrical warfare, is also reflected in the context of the various ground obstacles and their characteristics.

So what happened to the obstacles? What are the actual implications? Where did the changes occur and where are the primary challenges?

Well, the primary change is the fact that there are no longer structured, "classic" obstacle systems, which means that there are no longer any "school solutions", as many of us have been taught in the context of the "breakthrough and obstacle breaching battle". This means that we must improvise, as the opponent draws us in that direction. This also means that the "toolbox" we "assembled" in the past in accordance with certain standards, is no longer relevant in its present format. For example, the IDF and Israeli defense establishment have endeavored, for many years, to find solutions for breaching obstacle systems made up of linear minefields whose specifications and boundaries were more or less known in advance. Today, these solutions are no longer relevant as there are no linear obstacle systems – only scattered focal points, heavily fortified localities and decentralized areas that should be approached from different directions, with the obstacle systems surrounding them often resembling a "sphere" – a 360-degree, all-around defensive system that includes obstacles above and below the objective.

An interesting paradox is at work here, which calls for some fresh thinking. On the one hand, technologically, military organizations (including IDF) have developed impressively in the last few decades, and a major share of their investment in technology was devoted to the task of overcoming obstacles in the context of the ground maneuver. Now, when there are hardly any linear obstacle systems any more, the opponent improvises and comes up with obstacle solutions of different types, thereby rendering the "cutting edge of military technology" useless. On the one hand you will find technological masterpieces, and on the other hand, in many cases, you will encounter primitive but highly effective obstacles. The mixed urban arena, including the rural areas and the areas in between, has produced a different "playground" or obstacle ground that is often amorphous, which compels us to switch to s different thought pattern. This new thought pattern should be reflected in two primary elements: a suitable combat doctrine and suitable weapon systems.

Concept-wise, the supreme command is the need to cope with a mobile, decentralized, constantly-changing obstacle system that is not always frontal and where the structures of two different localities are never identical. For example, as far as the force build-up aspects are concerned, there is no point investing in training activities of breaching through frontal obstacle systems, as was the case until recently. The reason may be found in actual examples all around us: the disintegration of Syria ("the collapse of the last frontal obstacle system"), and on the other hand, in a significant number of confrontations/operations conducted between 2006 and today, in which the IDF had to cope, in Lebanon and in the Gaza Strip, with scattered obstacle systems possessing different characteristics. In order to successfully cope with these situations, there is no choice, with regard to the force build-up, the doctrine and the training activities, but to ensure that the various combat engineering units, including the assault demolition units of the infantry formations, are always within reach, to enable the ground maneuver to advance while overcoming obstacles, as even a booby-trapped door at the entrance to a building is an obstacle – not only a cluster of landmines and/or a complex explosive charge assemblage.

The rural-urban area and its margins provide the opponent with countless opportunities to saturate the area being defended with many hundreds of obstacles, booby-traps and tactical surprises. The same applies to the dense, fortified areas in Lebanon, referred to as "nature reserves". In the latter case the terrain is admittedly open, but it was intended to enable the terrorist organization to control its activity, to defend its assets and to enable the launching of rockets into Israeli territory when necessary. 

The other element of the solution includes the various technologies that we should continue to develop in order to provide the forces operating in such "playgrounds" with a complete, diversified and relevant "toolbox". I do not wish to elaborate needlessly with regard to this particular issue – just present one or two examples to illustrate the idea. IDF has invested substantially over the years in the development and acquisition of "hurled" breaching systems designed to clear a path through frontal minefields. These systems are mostly statistical and have a robust effect – but they are not very accurate. At this time there is a need for hurled systems that are less energetic and much more accurate in order to deal effectively with the obstacle systems deployed in the various areas I outlined above. 

In conclusion: in the past, the combat engineering units, in accordance with the force build-up and employment principles, adhered to the rationale of providing a solution to broad frontal obstacle systems whose structure and logic were well known. The combat doctrine and operational concept were normally developed in accordance with that need. This is no longer the case. Today, the combat zone must be saturated with numerous combat engineering forces – smaller but better equipped detachments, capable of providing solutions to the challenges they face. I believe that this phenomenon will only expand, as that is where the world of terrorist organizations is heading. They will take advantage of the area available to them to their own benefit; they will exploit the local population in that area as well as the fact that their opponents are regular military forces, operating according to structured commands in the full sense of the word. This paradigm must be smashed in the positive sense of the word. We must "change phases", revise our thought patterns and operating procedures and adapt the force structure and employment to the new reality, and even more importantly – to the reality that evolves all the time right in front of us. ž


Colonel (res.) Atai Shelach is a former senior officer in the IDF Combat Engineering Corps. Among other positions, he served as the commander of the YAHALOM Unit, as the commander of the IDF Dignitary Protection Unit and as the commander of the IDF CBRN Warfare Center. Today, he is the CEO of the Engineering Solutions Group (ESG).

Source: http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/ground-obstacles-new-technologies-tactics-unlike-those-past

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

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