by Yaakov Amidror
The growing ties between Israel and the region's Sunni Arab states are a result of a divided Middle East where Islamic State poses the greatest threat • But a peace deal with the Palestinians is a prerequisite to forge formal diplomatic ties.
Many of the world's nations are looking on in
surprise and admiration at the ever-strengthening ties between Israel
and the more important Sunni Arab countries in the region -- the open
relationship with Egypt and Jordan, with which Israel maintains official
diplomatic relations, but also the informal relationships with Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf emirates.
This shift appears to be fueled by three main
factors: First, these Sunni countries fear Iran's growing power over a
Shiite bloc, which threatens the security as well as the unity of the
Sunni states. There is an ancient religious conflict between the Sunni
majority and the Shiite minority, but the minority enjoys the advantage
of a singular leadership that is willing to do anything to change the
status of the Shiites in the Middle East. This leadership, which sits in
Tehran, is spearheading orchestrated and focused efforts to liberate
the Shiites in Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and defend the Shiites
in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The objective is to create an uninterrupted
distribution of Shiites from Tehran through Baghdad to Beirut.
Meanwhile, Iran is trying to undermine the
Sunni dominance on the Arab side of the Gulf between the Saudi Peninsula
and Iran: Saudi Arabia, with its Shiite minority, in the oil-rich
region; Bahrain, which underwent a Shiite coup attempt; and Yemen, where
Saudi Arabia is fighting with the Sunni majority against the
Iranian-backed Houthi minority.
The Sunni-Shiite conflict also has a
nationalist aspect. It is impossible to ignore the fact that Iran is
focusing its efforts exclusively on Arab countries. This nationalist
struggle also manifests itself in inter-Shiite disputes, especially in
Iraq, where the city of Najaf was once considered the most important
Shiite city, but has since been replaced by the Iranian city of Qom.
Keeping the momentum
The second factor fueling the Sunni countries'
concerns is the threat of extreme Salafism led by the Islamic State
group. The group's Arabic acronym, Daesh, stands for "the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria," but today, the organization is active in Sinai and
in Libya as well, and it has active chapters in Africa and in Europe, as
the recent wave of terrorist attacks may indicate. Therefore, the
simple name "Islamic State" may be more apt.
The expansion of the group's activities poses a
threat to the Sunni states, because they represent an enemy of the
highest order. In Egypt, the threat is even more pronounced thanks to IS
deployment in parts of Sinai and its collaboration with Hamas, the
Palestinian chapter of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood -- the mortal
enemies of the current Egyptian leadership. In Jordan and in Saudi
Arabia, Islamic State threatens the regime from within, because in both
countries there is extensive sympathy for the group among various
sectors in the population. Even if the coalition of nations currently
working to combat IS manages to dramatically diminish the areas under
its control in Iraq and Syria, the ideology propagated by the group will
still pose a very palpable threat to the Sunni states. Moreover, the
coalition is currently having trouble maintaining its momentum against
IS, following a string of important victories.
The third factor stems from the general sense
that the U.S. has abandoned its allies in their time of need, intending
to scale back its involvement in the region. In Egypt, this feeling is
founded on America's having abandoned deposed President Hosni Mubarak
and having appeared to support the Muslim Brotherhood. In Saudi Arabia
and in the Persian Gulf, the frustration stems from the fact that they
view the landmark agreement between the West and Iran, spearheaded by
the U.S., as an American capitulation. The countries in the region have
been very disappointed with the U.S.'s conduct toward Mubarak on the one
hand, and toward Syrian President Bashar Assad, who continues to
massacre Sunnis uninhibited, on the other. They realize that not only is
the U.S. no longer on their side in the fight against Iran, the U.S.
expects them to make concessions to Iran. It is clear to the Sunni
states, which once viewed the U.S. as a superpower whose mere existence
was enough to stop any threat they faced, that things have profoundly
changed. Even if the U.S. is still a superpower, it has lost the will to
use its power in the Middle East. Furthermore, when it does exercise
its power, like in leading the anti-IS coalition, action is taken
sparingly and extremely cautiously. And now, the U.S. is compromising
with its adversaries, as indicated by the weak American response to
Russia's increasing involvement in Syria.
The key to enhanced relations
These countries are looking for someone to
help them at this time of need. Israel is the only country in the area
whose stability is not in question. It is a strong country, both
economically and militarily, and it has the ability and willingness to
defend its essential interests. This is the foundation for the
blossoming relationships between Israel and these Sunni countries --
classic status-quo countries in an ever-shifting region looking for an
anchor to stabilize themselves. Israel can serve as this anchor. It is a
marriage of convenience, not of love, but it is one of increasing
importance.
Cooperation is key to truly enhancing these
relationships, as I was told by a Saudi prince who shared a stage with
me at a conference in Washington recently.
"The combination of Israeli money and Arab
talent can have a positive impact on any region," he said jokingly. But
behind this line there was a great truth. Israel can provide these
countries with precisely what they lack: security, technology and
enormous improvements in the areas of water, agriculture and health.
However, a serious collaboration -- a public,
unhindered cooperation -- between Israel and these Arab states requires a
peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Not because this
issue is dear to the hearts of the Sunni leaders, but because without
it, these leaders would lose the support of the street, which is
imperative if the relationship is to go public. But, sadly, the
Palestinians are in no rush to advance a peace agreement and their
relations with Israel; on the contrary, realizing that they are the key
to enhancing Israel's ties with the nations of the region only makes
them think more highly of themselves and prompts them to ratchet up
their demands.
The only way to overcome this hurdle is to
change the order of the steps: First build a relationship that will
serve as an inclusive umbrella for Israelis and Sunni Arabs, and then
lead the Palestinians into it to engage in peace negotiations.
Unlike in the past, at present the enhancement of
relations is no less important to the Sunnis than it is to the Israelis.
But the Palestinian obstacle is in the way. It is not clear whether the
Arab nations will be able to overcome this obstacle, despite their
clear interest. Israel needs to think about ways it can help them
overcome it, seeing that this could be a historical opportunity and it
would be a shame to squander it.
Yaakov Amidror
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=35499
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