by Ehud Eilam
The primary challenge IDF will face in the coming years will consist of hybrid opponents, namely – non-state organizations that had developed military strength combining guerrilla tactics and regular armed forces, notably Hamas and Hezbollah
Palestinian Hamas security forces (Photo: AP)
The
familiar defense challenges Israel faced until the last few years were
conventional military confrontations against the armed forces of such
Arab countries as Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, but the likelihood of
such confrontations has been drastically reduced pursuant to the
signature of the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the
disintegration of Iraq and the civil war raging in Syria since 2011,
which has severely weakened the Syrian Army.
In the last decade, Iran has evolved into the most
substantial threat facing Israel, mainly if it ever succeeds in
manufacturing nuclear weapons. As long as this option remains
unfeasible, the primary challenge facing IDF will involve hybrid
opponents, namely – non-state organizations that had developed military
strength combining guerrilla tactics and regular armed forces, notably
Hamas and Hezbollah.
The Rocket Rage
Hezbollah is kept busy by the fighting in Syria and is not
currently interested in a confrontation with Israel, but a flare-up
between this organization and the State of Israel might develop
nevertheless, for example – if an incident along the Israeli-Lebanese
border or the Israeli-Syrian border got out of hand, particularly if one
of the parties involved had sustained heavy casualties and responded
aggressively.
Hezbollah is regarded as the hybrid organization that is
the most dangerous for Israel as it has in its possession some 150,000
rockets and missiles. This arsenal practically covers every point within
Israel's territory and has the potential of inflicting substantial
damage. This applies in particular to high precision missiles and/or
missiles fitted with substantial warheads. During the next war, up to
1,500 rockets might be launched into Israel every day. Hezbollah can hit
and even paralyze vital infrastructures like Ben-Gurion airport. In
view of this threat, the State of Israel should consider a preemptive
strike. On the other hand, Israel had dealt with more serious opponents
than Hezbollah in the past, and some of those opponents have faded away
while Israel was spared the cost of a war, as was the case with Syria.
A future confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah could
evolve into a massive operation, extending from the Beqaa Valley and
Beirut in Lebanon all the way to the Negev. In response to massive
rocket fire against military and civilian targets inside Israel, IDF
will stage a large-scale offensive into Lebanon, on land, in the air and
at sea. Battles will be conducted in open terrain, in cleft areas and
in some cases in densely foliated areas, and mainly in urban areas,
where Hezbollah had deployed their rockets.
The "IDF Strategy" document published by IDF in August 2015
states that the objective will be "To deny the enemy the will and
ability to continue fighting and operate against our own forces." Israel
cannot annihilate Hezbollah as this organization would always be able
to continue fighting using guerrilla tactics and terrorism, even if IDF
dominated considerable parts of Lebanon as was the case in the past.
From the outset, Israel will have no intention of remaining in Lebanon
again, certainly not longer than a few weeks, so as not to sink into the
Lebanese mire once again, as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s.
Consequently, IDF will stage a major raid-like operation whose strategic
objective would be to deliver a heavy blow to Hezbollah, namely – to
inflict maximum damage and casualties to this organization, thereby
punishing, weakening and deterring it and deferring the next round as
much as possible.
At the operational level, Israel will strive to destroy as
many rockets as possible, in particular the more effective and lethal
ones, before they are launched into Israeli territory. Accordingly, IDF
will focus on some 200 villages and towns in southern Lebanon, where the
rockets are deployed. IDF will rely on high-precision fire, mainly from
the air, along with a ground maneuver. An offensive move incorporating a
ground maneuver that may penetrate deep into Lebanese territory cannot
be ruled out. Such a move may be required in order to deliver a decisive
operational blow to Hezbollah, namely – to directly threaten the
organization's centers of gravity, in order to convince its leaders to
accept a ceasefire subject to terms that are as favorable to Israel as
possible.
Israel will have to minimize the losses and damage
inflicted on it by Hezbollah fire using such active defense measures as
the Iron Dome system along with passive defense, while relying on the
IDF Home Front Command and effective coordination between the various
local and government authorities. This cooperation has been tested
through a series of training exercises conducted since the last
confrontation in 2006, like the last national home front training
exercise conducted in mid-September 2016. In June 2016, an exercise
involving the massive evacuation of civilians was conducted in four
settlements along the border with Lebanon. In the event of a war, 14
settlements located close to the border with Lebanon could be evacuated,
owing to concerns regarding enemy fire and a possible raid by Hezbollah
into Israeli territory.
Better the Enemy You Know
On the other side of the map, Hamas in the Gaza Strip is
locked between Israel and Egypt. Both countries are hostile to it, which
hinders its aspirations to grow stronger. At the same time, Hamas
invests in its military power, especially in the manufacture of rockets
and the excavation of underground tunnels. Compared to Hezbollah, Hamas
is less dangerous as it possesses fewer rockets – only a few thousands,
and the range and warhead size of those rockets are inferior to those of
the Hezbollah rockets. Additionally, Hamas, despite its aspirations to
agitate the Judea and Samaria district, is not currently interested in a
confrontation in the Gaza Strip. This trend may change, however, and in
any case, an incident in the Gaza Strip that gets out of hand could
drag both sides into a confrontation.
The Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip can be toppled within
weeks or even days by capturing the Gaza Strip. However, a confrontation
with Hamas could drag on and exact a costly toll on Israel on several
levels, in the form of casualties, economic costs, international
criticism, deterioration of relations with Arab countries, et al. Israel
prefers to have the Palestinian Authority regain control over the Gaza
Strip, but the PA is unwilling and/or incapable of accomplishing it. The
Palestinian Authority has a very difficult time, despite massive
assistance from Israel, preventing Hamas from dominating the Judea and
Samaria district. Israel could capture the Gaza Strip and then withdraw,
but ironically, after such a confrontation Hamas may prove to be too
weak to once again enforce its authority over the Gaza Strip. Some parts
of the Gaza Strip, if not all of it, could evolve into a no-man's land
and even worse as far as Israel is concerned – into a staging area for
Islamic organizations more radical than Hamas, like those identified
with al-Qaeda or ISIS. As far as Israel is concerned, Hamas is "the
devil you know", namely – a hostile Arab regime, but one with which
understandings may be reached, albeit unofficially, as Israel has done
in the past and could do again in the future on other fronts as well.
During a confrontation between Israel and Hamas, Turkey
could aspire to prove that it is on the side of Hamas, which could
undermine the fragile reconciliation agreement concluded recently
between Israel and Turkey. Turkey could also act as mediator between
Israel and Hamas, assuming that both Israel and Hamas trust it. Iran, on
the one hand, will aspire to support Hamas against Israel, but on the
other hand, an on-going conflict has clouded the relations between Hamas
and Iran for some time, pursuant to Hamas' refusal to align with Iran's
Syrian ally, Assad. Even if Iran wanted to support Hamas, the isolation
of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the blocking of the tunnels leading from
the Sinai into the Gaza Strip will make it extremely difficult for Iran
to deliver supplies to Hamas.
The Preparations of the IDF
On January 18, 2016, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi
Eizenkot defined Hezbollah as "The primary enemy facing IDF". IDF have
been preparing for confrontations on other fronts as well, notably the
Gaza Strip front. There is also the possibility of simultaneous fighting
on more than one front. In mid-September 2016, IDF conducted a
large-scale general staff exercise that examined a scenario of
escalation in the Judea and Samaria district that leads to a war against
both Hamas and Hezbollah, namely – a confrontation on three fronts
simultaneously.
The IDF manpower is based on reservists. At the same time,
especially in the event of a small scale operation on a single front,
IDF may rely on their regular units, for a number of reasons. Firstly,
as these units are readily available year-round, they are easier to
train. Additionally, if a heated dispute develops within the Israeli
public regarding the operation, then, unlike the regular (compulsory
service) troopers, the reservists may prove to be more critical, which
may include criticism voiced in public, and IDF strive to avoid such
situations. Relying on the regular forces will be a calculated risk,
assuming the operation does not erode those units excessively,
especially if there are no indications of another front opening during
the war or immediately thereafter. Deploying worn and exhausted regular
units to another front before they had a chance to recover could result
in the mission not being accomplished and in heavy casualties among the
IDF troopers.
The motivation of the troops will, as always, be of the
utmost importance. Enemy fire sustained by the Israeli rear area will
make the importance of the mission abundantly clear to every trooper.
Nevertheless, morale may develop some cracks, for example among those
who believe that Israel used excessive force or that the objectives of
the operation are overly ambitious in the event that Israel aspired to
annihilate Hezbollah and/or to knock down Hamas, which would require an
extensive and prolonged operation in Lebanon/the Gaza Strip. Conversely,
if the operation ends with Hamas/Hezbollah still undefeated, many
troopers may feel frustrated and disappointed, in view of the risks they
had taken and the price paid in human lives.
The Israeli Air Force will enjoy total air superiority.
Hamas and Hezbollah have no aircraft generally and interceptors in
particular – only anti-aircraft missile systems (especially Hezbollah).
The latter organization might shoot down one or more Israeli aircraft.
Israel must do everything to prevent the enemy from gaining such a
propaganda victory, namely – not to emphasize the loss of an aircraft,
as it is a part of the normal cost of the operation. Fighter aircraft
and attack helicopters will attack various enemy objectives while
supporting the ground forces. Coordination between those two arms has
improved in the last few years. Naturally, safety rules would have to be
observed, like keeping a safe distance between the target and the
nearest friendly ground force, although in some cases they may have to
be overlooked, for example – when a ground force has to be extricated.
In March 2016, IAF conducted a highly intensive training
activity intended to test its forces in a situation of a massive rocket
fire attack against Israel. The IAF squadrons practiced an extensive
range of scenarios at the tactical level, with the intention of
generating the highest strike mission output. In late June 2016, an IDF
General Staff exercise was conducted to test the three arms in the
context of different scenarios, with the emphasis placed on the northern
front. IAF, for example, practiced air strikes. The IDF Navy practiced
attacks against coastal targets and support for the ground forces. In
any future confrontation, the IDF artillery will be a part of the fire
support effort, with the emphasis placed on the use of precision-guided
munitions against targets in built-up areas, to avoid unnecessary deaths
among Arab civilians.
The spearhead of the IDF ground forces will consist of
armored elements employing Merkava Mark-IV tanks fitted with the Trophy
system that provides protection against enemy antitank weapons. The IDF
401st Armored Brigade, for example, operates such tanks. Namer APCs will
be essential to provide effective protection to the IDF infantry. The
combat engineering forces will clear paths through the battlefield by
neutralizing various types of EODs, IEODs, mines and so forth. Combat
engagement inside the underground tunnels will constitute a particularly
complex challenge. IDF will have to avoid such engagements to the
maximum extent possible, and focus on protecting the troopers on the
ground, as inside the tunnels IDF will lose their advantages –
outnumbering the terrorists and possessing superior firepower.
In conclusion, a future confrontation with Hezbollah or
Hamas will not threaten the State of Israel like past wars against a
coalition of Arab countries had done. Nevertheless a war, especially
against Hezbollah, will be a major challenge. IDF will not be able to
accomplish total overbalance over the enemy, but intelligent
preparations will enable Israel to deliver a painful blow while
sustaining minimum casualties and damage. Such preparations necessitate a
sober definition of the objectives of the future war while preparing
IDF to accomplish those objectives and always retaining the necessary
flexibility that may be required during the actual operation.
Ehud Eilam
Source: http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/27682
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