by Jonathan Spyer
Specifically, while the blocs led by Iran and the transnational networks of the Salafi jihadists are certainly observable, it is far more doubtful if anything resembling an alliance of "moderate" states really exists.
Originally published under the title "The Mirage of the Mideast's 'Moderate' Alliance."
Saudi Arabia's King Salman (left) and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo, April 8, 2016.
|
In
recent years, it has become customary in much analysis of the Middle
East emerging from Israel to divide Middle Eastern countries into a
series of alliances or "camps."
These
camps are identified in a variety of ways. But the most usual depiction
notes a tight, hierarchical bloc of states and movements dominated by
the Islamic Republic of Iran. An alliance of "moderate" states opposed
to Iran and including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, United Arab Emirates
and Israel is seen as the principal adversary and barrier to the
hegemonic ambitions of the Iran-led bloc.
Some
depictions also posit the existence of a smaller alliance of states and
entities associated with Muslim Brotherhood-style Sunni political Islam
(Qatar, Turkey, the Hamas enclave in Gaza). The picture is then
completed with the addition of the rival Salafi Islamist regional
networks of al-Qaida and Islamic State.
This
picture, in its coherence and elegant simplicity, is pleasing to the
eye. It posits a powerful regional alliance, of which Israel is seen as a
member. Whether the picture conforms to reality, however, is
questionable.
Specifically,
while the blocs led by Iran and the transnational networks of the
Salafi jihadists are certainly observable, it is far more doubtful if
anything resembling an alliance of "moderate" states really exists.
The so-called 'moderate bloc' consists of countries that disagree bitterly on important issues.
|
Iran
stands at the head of an alliance that has made significant gains
across the region over the last half decade. Its Lebanese client,
Hezbollah, is increasingly absorbing the institutions of the Lebanese
state. Its clients in Yemen (the Ansar Allah movement or Houthis)
control the capital and a large swath of the country.
President
Bashar Assad of Syria is no longer in danger of being overthrown and
now dominates the main cities and coastline of his country, as well as
the majority of its population. In Iraq, the Shi'a militias of the Hashd
al-Shaabi are emerging as a key political and military player.
The
Iranian alliance is characterized by a pyramid-type structure, with
Iran itself at the top. In the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Tehran
has an agency perfectly suited for the management of this bloc. As the
Syrian war has shown, Tehran is able to muster proxies and clients from
across the region and as far afield as Afghanistan and Pakistan, in
order to deploy them in support of a beleaguered member of its team.
This is what an alliance looks like.
By
contrast, the so-called moderate bloc in fact consists of countries
that disagree bitterly on important issues, while agreeing on some
others.
Russia, Syria, and Iran display far more unity of purpose than the Sunni governments opposing them.
|
Observe:
Saudi Arabia was the first country to express support for the military
coup in Egypt on July 3, 2013. The friendship between Cairo and Riyadh
looked set to form a Sunni Arab bulwark against both the Iranian advance
and the ambitions of Sunni radical political Islam. That is not the way
it has turned out. On a number of key regional files, the two are now
on opposite sides.
In
Syria, Saudi Arabia was and remains among the key supporters of the
rebellion. The Assad regime, as a client of Iran, was a natural enemy
for the Saudis. The Egyptians, however, saw and see the Syrian war
entirely differently – as a battle between a strong, military regime
(like themselves) and a rebellion based on Sunni political Islam. In
November 2016, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said that Assad's forces
were "best positioned to combat terrorism and restore stability" in the
country. Sisi identified this stance as part of a broader strategy,
according to which "our priority is to support national armies... and
deal with extremist elements. The same with Syria and Iraq."
This places Egypt and Saudi Arabia, supposedly the twin anchors of the "moderate" bloc, at loggerheads in two key areas.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia are at loggerheads in Syria and Iraq.
|
In
Libya, in line with this orientation, too, Egypt, along with the UAE,
fully supports Gen. Khalifa Haftar and his forces in the east of the
country. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, is largely indifferent to events in
that area.
In Yemen, meanwhile, the Egyptians have offered only halfhearted support to Saudi Arabia's war against the Houthis.
This, in turn, relates to a further key difference between the two – regarding relations with Iran.
While
the Saudis see the Iran-led regional bloc as the key regional threat to
their interests, the Egyptians are drawing closer to Tehran. The two
countries have not had full diplomatic relations since 1980. But the
Iranians acknowledged their common stance on Syria, when Iranian Foreign
Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif specifically requested of John Kerry to
invite Egypt to send a delegation to talks on Syria in the Swiss city of
Lausanne on October 15, 2016. In the same month, to the Saudis' fury,
Cairo voted for a Russian-backed UN Security Council resolution allowing
the continuation of the bombing of rebel-held eastern Aleppo.
In
turn, when Saudi oil giant Aramco announced the cessation of fuel
transfers to Egypt, Sisi declared that "Egypt would not bow to anyone
but God," and the government of Iraq agreed to step in to make good the
shortfall, at the request of Iran and Russia.
So the core Egyptian-Saudi alliance is fraying.
Israel
views its chief concerns as Iranian expansionism and Sunni political
Islam; Egypt is concerned only with the latter of these. Saudi Arabia
meanwhile, is increasingly concerned only with the former.
Representatives of King Salman met late last year with officials of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Istanbul, London and Riyadh. On the agenda was the
possible removal of the Brotherhood – Egypt's key enemy – from Saudi
Arabia's list of terrorist organizations. Salman has taken a view of
Sunni political Islam far more forgiving than that of his predecessor,
King Abdullah. This, in turn, has led to Saudi rapprochement with
Turkey, whose leader despises the Egyptian president for overthrowing
his fellow Muslim Brothers.
Thus,
the three main corners of the "moderate" alliance are drifting in
different directions – Riyadh appears headed toward rapprochement with
political Islam, while maintaining opposition to Iran. Egypt is moving
toward Russia, Syria, Iraq and a stance of support for strong states.
Only Washington can bring the disparate enemies of Iran and Sunni Islamism into a united front.
|
Israel
will seek to maintain good relations with both Saudi Arabia and Egypt
(and with smaller players in the "alliance," such as Jordan and the
UAE), on the basis of areas of shared interest and concern. But any
notion of a united bloc of Western- aligned countries standing as a wall
against Iranian and Sunni Islamist advancement is today little more
than a mirage.
What
might change this would be the return of the superpower that was once
the patron of all three countries – the United States. Alliances work
when they have leaders. Only Washington could refashion the disparate
enemies of Iran and Sunni political Islam once more into a coherent
unit. It remains to be seen whether the Trump administration is
interested in playing this role.
Jonathan
Spyer, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is director of the Rubin
Center for Research in International Affairs and author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).
Source: http://www.meforum.org/6523/the-mirage-of-the-mideast-moderate-alliance
Follow Middle East and Terrorism on Twitter
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
No comments:
Post a Comment