by Ze'ev Begin
Despite all indications on the ground, the assumption that this unique conflict can end with a formal peace agreement between the PLO and Israel continues to run around in our backyard like a headless chicken – thought has vanished; only reflexes are at work.
Can the "deal of the century" be brokered between Israel and the PLO? Some people think it is within reach. Shaul Arieli,[1] who was involved in previous rounds of peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO, recently proposed a recipe: "a compromise that fits the essential interests of the parties, based on the parameters that dictated the negotiations in Annapolis in 2008." And so, despite all indications on the ground, the assumption that this unique conflict can end with a formal peace agreement between the PLO and Israel continues to run around in our backyard like a headless chicken – thought has vanished; only reflexes are at work.
But let us remember
that, back in 2008, the PLO leadership rejected the "parameters" three
times: In mid-September 'Abbas refrained from responding to then-prime
minister Olmert's generous proposal; in November 'Abbas rejected the
request of former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to inform her that
he had accepted Olmert's proposal; and in December, when President
George Bush beseeched 'Abbas to tell him, in the privacy of the Oval
Office, that he had accepted it, 'Abbas refused again. In her memoirs (No Higher Honor, 2011) Rice wrote: "The Palestinian stood firm, and the idea died."
Last year, adhering
to the infamous PLO Charter, PLO Chairman 'Abbas stated at the UN
General Assembly (September 21, 2016): "The notorious Balfour
Declaration in which Britain, without any right, authority or consent
from anyone, gave the land of Palestine to another people. This paved
the road to the Nakba of the Palestinian people and their dispossession
and displacement from their land."[2]
The political
significance of this statement is clear: Palestine was plundered from
its sole legitimate owners, the Palestinian Arabs. In other words, the
PLO cleaves to its fundamental ideological claim that the Palestinian
Arabs enjoy the exclusive right to sovereignty in the whole of
Palestine. Political recognition of Israel, such as in the Oslo Accords,
or even declaring the acceptance of its "right to exist," (but not as
the nation state of the Jewish people,as categorically
reaffirmed by Fatah's Seventh Congress in 2016) do not contradict this
ideology as long as this claim is being kept alive. Therefore, the PLO
is unable – and indeed has refused – to sign a peace treaty with Israel
that includes the essential "end of claims" declaration as long as a
sovereign Jewish entity exists in Palestine.
This position is
diplomatically awkward, so the PLO masks it by stressing another issue,
that of the Palestinian Arab refugees. Some Israeli politicians and
scholars amuse themselves by speculating on how many refugees would have
to be admitted into the State of Israel as part of a peace agreement
that would satisfy the PLO and allow it to declare "an end to all
claims." In 2008 Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proposed to accept several
thousand refugees, but the PLO rejected this. Dr. Shaul Arieli[3]
claimed that there is "an official Palestinian position, according to
which the number of Palestinian refugees who would return to Israel –
with Israel's consent – would be between 50,000 and 100,000." Professor
Moshe Ma'oz claimed[4] that in 2008 'Abbas gave Olmert the figure of 150,000; Israeli peace activist Uri Avneri suggested[5] that the magic number that would satisfy the PLO would be 250,000 refugees.
This argument about
the numbers is futile, because one essential preliminary condition
cannot be met. Arieli asserted in his article that "there is need for a
joint [Israel-PLO] formula concerning the narrative of the refugee
issue." This need has never been met. Despite all the intensive efforts,
the elusive "joint formula" has not been found. Following many
discussions with PLO leaders over the years, Avneri recently described
the required formula:[6]
"The principle [of the right of return to Israel] cannot be rejected.
It belongs to the individual refugee. It is anchored in international
law. It is sacred. Any future peace agreement between the State of
Israel and the Palestinian State will have to include a clause
confirming that Israel accepts, in principle, the right of return of all
Palestinian refugees and their descendants. No Palestinian leader will
be able to sign a treaty that does not include such a clause." This is
correct, but it is equally true that no Israeli leader will be able to
sign a treaty that does include such a clause.
Recently, 'Abbas was
explicit and clear when he wrote: "We also reiterate that, in order to
end claims with Israel, there must be a just solution for the seven
million Palestinian refugees[7] based on the choice of every refugee."[8]
More than a million Arab refugees live in western Palestine, a short
distance from the villages in which they lived in the past. Like 'Abbas,
they hold that the only possible "solution" involves the realization of
their personal right to choose between returning to their original
homes and receiving financial compensation. This belief is well
exemplified by the entrance to the Al-Aida refugee camp in Bethlehem,
whose name means "the one who returns." The entrance is spanned by an
arch bearing a large key, the symbol of return. It is the long-term PLO
position that, since the application of the "right of return" is "based
on the choice of every refugee," the PLO is not authorized to sign, on
behalf of the refugees, any agreement that curtails this right.
This principle was vividly described by 'Abbas few days after the collapse of the 2000 Camp David negotiations:[9]
"The Palestinian delegation refused to specify the number of
Palestinians that would be allowed to return. Even if they had offered
us [to allow the return of] three million refugees, [we would have
refused], as we told them. This is because we wanted them to accept the
principle, and then we would have reached an agreement concerning the
return of the refugees or compensation for those who did not wish to
return." Evidently, nothing has changed since then and the PLO still
maintains that no quota of "returning" refugees is acceptable. Hence,
the refugees issue cannot be disentangled and the road to a final peace
agreement is blocked.
The special
circumstances of this unique conflict lead to a unique political
conclusion: A peace agreement between Israel and the PLO is out of
reach, whatever the composition of the Israeli government. And what
about the future? A partial answer can be found in schoolbooks published
in 2016 by the Palestinian Authority. For example, here is what the
pupils are taught in the eleventh grade: "The Green Line: an imaginary
line that appeared in green on maps after the 1967 war in order to
separate the Palestinian territory that Israel conquered in 1948 from
the territory it conquered in 1967." And this is what they learn in the
third grade: "Let us sing and learn by heart: I swear, I shall
sacrifice my blood in order to water the land of the noble ones, and I
shall remove the usurper from my land, and shall exterminate the
scattered remnants of the foreigners. O Land of the Al-Aqsa [Mosque] and
the Holy Site, o cradle of pride and nobility, patience, patience,
because victory is ours, and dawn will shine out of the darkness."[10]
Admittedly,
agreements between enemies that did include an explicit end-of-claims
clause have been breached in the past, but no responsible person would
consider signing a peace treaty that does not include one. This clause
is essential, for it expresses the distinction between a permanent peace
agreement and an interim agreement – such as the 1949 armistice
agreements or the Oslo Accords – that still allows the parties to
entertain their plans and hopes. This is not a petty game of formalities
– this small clause indicates the readiness of the other side to
declare – first and foremost to its own people – that it accepts a
compromise as the final settlement. In the absence of such readiness,
one must conclude that the other party is not ripe for true peace, and
that it will seek to find an opportunity to renew the war.
No Israeli
government, no matter what its political composition, can sign a "peace
treaty" with the PLO that does not contain an explicit clause declaring
an end to all mutual claims. Yet we saw above why the PLO cannot include
such declaration in an agreement with Israel. All the President's
horses and all the President's men cannot bridge this gap.
The picture is now
clear. The PLO, with or without its Hamas partners, cannot sign a peace
treaty with any Israeli government. This conclusion is the sole basis
for a realistic policy by Israel and its allies.
* This article was written following a discussion that took place last month in the Israeli daily Haaretz, on the chances of a permanent Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement.
[1] Haaretz (Israel), October 4, 2017.
[2] Maannews.com, September 23, 2016.
[3] Haaretz (Israel), October 4, 2017.
[4] Haaretz (Israel), October 17, 2017.
[5] Haaretz (Israel), October 17, 2017.
[6] Haaretz (Israel), October 13, 2017.
[7] In his September 2016 UNGA speech, 'Abbas gave the number of Palestinian refugees as six million.
[8] Thecairoreview.com, Nov 2, 2017. See MEMRI Special Dispatch No.7169, In
Article On Occasion Of Balfour Declaration Centenary, Palestinian
Authority President ''Abbas Says Any Final Resolution Of
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Must Include Implementation Of UN
Resolution 194 'To Restore Palestine Refugees To Their Homes,' November 8, 2017.
[9] Al-Ayyam (PA), July 30, 2000.
[10] Center for Near East Policy Research (cfnepr.com),
Ze'ev Begin
Source: https://www.memri.org/reports/impossible-deal-century
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Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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