by Emil Avdaliani
Though Russia has been gradually increasing its economic and military influence in Lebanon, it is unlikely that Moscow is prepared to irreparably compromise its relations with Israel.
Saad Hariri and Vladimir Putin, photo via Office of the President of Russia
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 778, March 23, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Though Russia has been
gradually increasing its economic and military influence in Lebanon, it
is unlikely that Moscow is prepared to irreparably compromise its
relations with Israel. Russia faces competition from other actors in
Syria, and good relations with Israel can serve its interests there.
The Russian entrance into the Syrian battlefield
in 2015 propped up the Assad regime. Moscow has continued to build up
its military presence in the country: it has strengthened its bases on
the Mediterranean shore, and recently received 49-year leases on Syrian
airbase and port facilities. A Russian presence in Syria is thus
projected well into the years to come, and by way of securing its
long-term position there Moscow has carried out a string of active
diplomatic moves in the neighboring countries, first and foremost
Lebanon.
The Russian media has hinted at Moscow’s growing
interest in this Mediterranean state by reporting on visits of Russian
ships to Lebanese ports and disseminating rumors that Moscow will soon
establish a military presence there. These leaks were partially
corroborated when, on February 3, the Kremlin directed the Ministry of
Defense to enter into an agreement with Beirut on increased military
cooperation, including the use of Lebanese facilities by the Russian
military. The two sides also agreed on a broader exchange of military
information and intensive bilateral cooperation against terrorism.
The draft agreement is quite extensive. It
involves joint training of troops, information and engineering support,
military education and medicine, military topography, and hydrography.
The agreement (which has yet to be signed) will be for a period of five
years with automatic extensions for subsequent five-year periods.
A Russo-Lebanese military agreement would be a
significant event. It would signal a major shift on Lebanon’s part, as
its military has traditionally been oriented towards the West.
Russo-Lebanese military contacts have been
somewhat mixed in the past. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) possess
Russian weapons, such as tanks and rifles, but in 2008 the LAF rejected
Moscow’s offer of ten free MiG-29 fighters. So far, the LAF’s equipment
is mostly American and European, including M60 and M48 tanks, M113
armored personnel carriers, and TOW antitank missiles. Under the last
two US administrations, according to various estimates, $357 million in
arms were sent to Lebanon.
For Russia, Lebanon’s geographical position on the
Mediterranean – with its potential military facilities as well as
proximity to war-torn Syria – makes it an attractive location from which
to project influence. For Lebanon, Russia has turned into a potential
guarantor of peace in Syria. Following the proposed bilateral agreement
between Moscow and Beirut, Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese
parliament, called upon Russia to resolve the Syrian crisis: “I want to
turn to Russia, which, along with the United States, is a great power;
we cannot ask for this from the United States, but we ask Russia to help
achieve a political settlement in Syria, which will be a major step
toward the return of the Syrians to their homeland.”
Beyond the military significance, there is also an
economic angle to greater Lebanese-Russian cooperation. Lebanon
recently decided to begin exploiting its offshore Mediterranean natural
gas reserves and offered exploration tenders to its seabed. Russian
state companies, including Novatek, have expressed interest in tapping
into Lebanon’s raw material resources, with the first exploratory to be
drilled in 2019. This maritime resource exploration by Lebanon has
reignited disputes with Israel over their maritime frontiers.
Lebanese-Russian cooperation will affect Israel as
it is developing concurrently with an increase in Russia-Israel
tensions following the February 11 Israeli airstrikes on Syrian-Iranian
targets in Syria. These tensions could upset the status quo in which the
Kremlin tolerates Israel’s preventive strikes on Syrian soil.
However, from a Russian geopolitical perspective,
it would be unwise to risk a deterioration of relations with Israel at
this moment because Russo-Israeli tensions in Beirut could negatively
affect Russo-Israeli contacts in Syria. Such tensions could prompt
Israel to be more open to a future military engagement in Syria, a
scenario that could spiral entirely out of Russian control. Moscow does
not need that complication as its efforts to maintain a dominant posture
on the Syrian battlefield have already been shaken.
The Turkish operation in Afrin, in northern Syria,
made clear that Moscow is unable to forestall the growth of Ankara’s
influence. Iranian proxy forces are now close to the Israeli border, and
Russia failed to accomplish anything significant on this matter at the
Sochi Conference in late January. Moreover, according to some reports,
Russian mercenaries were killed by the hundreds by US forces,
diminishing Russian prestige in and around Syria.
Thus, while Russia and Lebanon are experiencing an
uptick in economic and military relations, this development could
endanger Moscow’s relations with Jerusalem. Russia does not wish to
completely alienate Israel at a time when the Kremlin’s position in
Syria remains vulnerable. The last thing Moscow wants is a more robust
Israeli engagement in Syria.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/russia-lebanon-alliance/
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Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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