by Yaakov Lappin
Sinwar’s strategic goal is to pressure the Israeli government into agreeing to demands to ease security restrictions around Gaza--. This, Sinwar appears to believe, will prevent an economic-humanitarian meltdown in Gaza that would threaten the viability of his regime.
Yahya Sinwar, Palestinian terrorist released in Shalit deal, now head of Hamas, photo via Israellycool
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 947, September 14, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The prospect of a
long-term truce between Israel and Hamas brings with it both risks and
opportunities. While it remains far from clear that such an arrangement
is even feasible, Israel is giving Egyptian mediation efforts a chance.
At present, the Israel-Hamas truce is based on the
minimal formula of ‘quiet for quiet.’ Many obstacles stand in the way
of efforts to broaden this arrangement.
As time passes, this minimalist formula, in place
since the end of Operation Protective Edge in 2014, faces a growing risk
of collapsing into a new war.
The truce has already been punctured by five major
escalation rounds since May of this year alone, in which Hamas and
other armed radical forces in Gaza terrorized southern Israeli areas by
firing over 600 rockets and mortars.
The Israel Air Force responded by launching
extensive waves of air strikes, hitting hundreds of high-value Hamas
military assets in Gaza. Targets included Hamas naval attack tunnels,
rocket manufacturing factories, battalion headquarters, command posts,
urban warfare training camps, and other enemy assets that Hamas invested
considerable time and money into creating.
These rounds of fighting appear to be the result
of a calculated campaign by Hamas leader Yihya Sinwar to escalate the
situation to the brink of war, but to hold back from tumbling into the
abyss.
Sinwar’s campaign of calculated brinksmanship
began in March with a series of mass infiltration efforts and border
rioting incidents, and continued into armed exchanges with Israel in
recent months.
Sinwar’s strategic goal is to pressure the Israeli
government into agreeing to demands to ease security restrictions
around Gaza by widening the ceasefire understandings. This, Sinwar
appears to believe, will prevent an economic-humanitarian meltdown in
Gaza that would threaten the viability of his regime.
A broader ceasefire, Hamas hopes, would allow
international investment to pour into Gaza, as well as lead to the
opening of border crossings, economic and infrastructure projects, the
construction of a seaport, and the improvement of purchasing power for
Gazans.
Hamas prioritizes the needs of its armed wing over
that of its civilian population, and cynically diverts funds and
materials towards its military force build-up program. But it is highly
concerned about the prospect of an economic crash that could lead to a
popular uprising against it by Gazans. Hence, it is looking for a way to
end its regional isolation so that outside elements can come in and
rescue the faltering Gazan economy.
As part of this same effort, Sinwar tried to reach
a reconciliation with his internal Palestinian foe, the Palestinian
Authority (PA), by offering it a deal by which the PA would rule Gaza
politically and act as a conduit for international funds, while Hamas
would maintain its military wing and enjoy a monopoly of arms.
The offer was rejected out of hand by PA President
Mahmoud Abbas, who described it as “the Hezbollah model.” Abbas also
insists that Hamas disband its military wing if internal Palestinian
reconciliation is ever to occur.
The Ramallah-Gaza impasse, and the PA’s own
sanctions against Gaza, in place to punish Hamas for splitting away from
Ramallah’s rule, is one of the main reasons that all efforts to expand
the Israel-Hamas ceasefire have failed so far.
With the PA avenue blocked, Hamas turned to the riskier tactic of controlled escalation against Israel.
Hamas’s negotiation tactics have alternated
between talks and mortar shells, but its short-term goal remains the
same: to open up Gaza to the world while holding onto the terrorist army
it has built.
The intended audience for Hamas’s moves is not
only Israel and the PA, but also Egypt. Cairo holds the keys to the
Rafah crossing between Gaza and Sinai, a crossing Hamas would like to
see opened for good. Egypt, for its part, does not wish to see a new
armed conflict erupt in Gaza, a development Cairo would view as a
destabilizing and destructive regional event, despite Egypt’s inherent
hostility towards Hamas.
Hamas, aware that all the regional actors would
prefer to see war avoided, has been signaling to Israel, Egypt, and the
PA that it is prepared to go to war, if necessary, to avoid the scenario
of a domestic uprising due to an economic crash.
Hamas’s regional isolation is not a new problem
for it. It became acute when Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood government, a
natural ideological ally of Hamas, and which Hamas had hoped would
become its regional power sponsor, was replaced by the anti-Hamas
administration of Egyptian President Al-Sisi in 2013. While Iran has
offered some assistance, this is a far cry from the kind of outside
support Hamas had hoped to enjoy, and Hamas’s willingness to collaborate
with Tehran has earned it the ire of Sunni powers.
Hamas’s efforts to break its isolation was a major
factor behind the outbreak of the 2014 conflict with Israel. Today, the
very same factor could spur a new war.
Raising the stakes further, Hamas has in recent
months introduced a new ‘tit-for-tat’ principle, obligating it to fire
projectiles at Israel every time the IDF operates against terrorist
activity in Gaza. This principle is designed to protect Hamas’s public
image and defend it against accusations by other armed Gazan
organizations who have suggested that Hamas has become a pushover in its
dealings with Israel.
These factors have all combined to place Hamas and
Israel on the verge of a new war. Yet despite Hamas’s radical Islamist
ideology, its leadership is keen to preserve its rule in Gaza, and it is
aware that a new war with Israel would jeopardize that.
Sinwar seems to recognize the futility of any new
war with Israel at this juncture, particularly in light of the
effectiveness of Israel’s Iron Dome air defenses and new anti-tunnel
technology. The new counter-measures are supposed to entirely eliminate
the threat of cross-border tunnels by the end of this year.
At the same time, Hamas’s rocket and mortar shell
production efforts have been intensifying over the past year. Gaza is
crisscrossed with a maze of internal combat tunnels, and Hamas’s
battalions are well equipped for intensive asymmetrical urban warfare.
Hamas is also working on new attack capabilities, likely in the form of
drones, and new sea-based attack cells. This means that Hamas’s force
build-up program is changing direction, but not stopping. Hamas has
become adept at domestically producing its own arms due to its
difficulties in smuggling in weapons from Sinai.
Israel too has its reasons for wishing to avoid a
major Gaza conflict at this stage. One reason is that a full-scale
conflict would mean fewer resources would be at Israel’s disposal
against the bigger and significantly more dangerous threats that are
developing in other arenas.
The Gaza Strip is the least stable arena in
Israel’s environment, but it is only one of five active arenas, and it
is not the most threatening. The Lebanese and Syrian arenas to the north
constitute significantly higher threat levels. Lebanon is run by
Hezbollah, the most powerful enemy actor in Israel’s environment.
Hezbollah’s firepower capabilities exceed those of most state armies in
the world.
In Syria, Iran has been pursuing major efforts to
set up attack bases against Israel and flood the country with Shiite
militias under Tehran’s command.
According to international reports, Israel
regularly deploys precise air power and high-quality intelligence to
stall Iran’s takeover of Syria, but the situation remains explosive and
unpredictable.
While the IDF was designed to fight on multiple
fronts simultaneously and emerge with clear victories, it seems fair to
assume that the Israeli defense establishment would prefer to focus its
resources on the more dangerous northern fronts, and prioritize those
over Gaza if possible.
Stopping Iran’s takeover of Syria is Israel’s
foremost immediate goal, and a Gaza conflict now would serve as a
distraction from the more dangerous threat developing to the north.
In addition, it seems unlikely that Israel would
be able to find viable substitute rulers to replace Hamas in Gaza. That
means that containing and deterring Hamas, so long as this is possible,
is preferable to any full-scale conflict involving ground forces moving
into one of the world’s most heavily armed and dense urban warfare
environments. Such a conflict would only become absolutely necessary if
Sinwar chooses the option of war.
Thus, while the IDF is now fully prepared to
decisively defeat Hamas, Israel has chosen the option of containment and
deterrence instead.
As a result of these factors, Egypt’s active mediation efforts in Gaza serve Israel’s interests.
The chances of a broad truce arrangement remain
low, but a limited ceasefire that is still firmer than the current
unstable set-up might be within reach.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/hamas-long-term-truce/
Follow Middle East and Terrorism on Twitter
No comments:
Post a Comment