by Emil Avdaliani
The question of how Russia will evolve over the next few decades is one of the most perplexing and at the same time most central questions in modern geopolitics.
Retreat of the Russian Army after the Battle of Mukden, Russo-Japanese War, 1905,
photo in the public domain via Wikimedia CC
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,002, November 11, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Russia has been
subjected to numerous economic sanctions from Western countries that
have tried to compel it to abandon its interventions across the former
Soviet space. Although sanctions harm Russia’s economy and raise
discontent among the population, they are unlikely to change Moscow’s
behavior. Russia’s history shows that it is only military pressure that
influences it to change.
The question of how Russia will evolve over the
next few decades is one of the most perplexing and at the same time most
central questions in modern geopolitics.
Russia has undergone fundamental changes since the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. They range from demographic
shifts to foreign policy changes to rising domestic discontent to a
troublesome economic situation.
The ongoing decline of Russia as a power contains
several interconnecting trends. Demographic trajectories indicate that
the Russian population, which has been decreasing, is set to decline
even further in the coming decades. In 2012, the Kremlin estimated that
Russia’s population will diminish from over 144 million people to 107
million by 2045-2050.
This demographic decline reflects several factors,
such as a low birth rate and the HIV crisis. Moreover, the number of
ethnic Russians is in decline relative to the size of the Muslim
population.
The Russian decline is also characterized by
technological underdevelopment, a process that began in the last decades
of the Soviet Union and accelerated in the 1990s.
The situation within the country seems quiet, but
it is tense in the outer regions. Ethnic minorities might begin to raise
their voices once the center – Moscow – starts to experience deep
economic troubles.
From a wider historical perspective, Russia has
always been technologically and economically backward. Even after the
first two Five-Year plans under Josef Stalin in the 1930s, when the
country experienced a near-doubling of industrial output in comparison
with previous years, Soviet Russia still lagged far behind the European
states. Farther back, in the Romanov era, Russia was backward in terms
of economics and other crucial components of state development.
There are many other components to the modern
“decline of Russia” model. Inter-elite fighting in the Kremlin has an
effect, as do the huge expenditures on special security agencies and the
state army.
However, while these trends are important, they
are simplistic and don’t take sufficient account of the Russian mindset.
If political sovereignty in the West emanates from below, in Russia the
government relies on coercive measures to control the vast country. Not
only is this state of affairs not anathema to most Russians, but they
expect their leaders to be tough-minded and heavy-handed. Hence the
Kremlin’s lack of concern over the current anti-government
demonstrations which, in contrast to their over-dramatization by the
Western media, reflect the views of only a small fraction of the Russian
population.
Respect for and obedience to authority are a key
part of the sociopolitical ethos of Russian society, which is neither
overly democratic nor fully European nor despotically Asian.
However, it should be noted that while Russia has
been always backward in comparison to Europe and has experienced
consistent varieties of internal problems over centuries, it is foreign
policy that tends to disrupt the politics of Russia and weaken the
country.
War with Japan in 1904-05 ushered in the 1905
Revolution, at which time deep internal problems arose. People were
revolting, workers’ soviets (councils) were created, and Russia’s
foreign policy decision-making process was affected. Twelve years later,
defeats during WWI and subsequent economic troubles brought about the
1917 February and October Revolutions. Russia experienced a dramatic
change in which imperial leadership was replaced by a nominal workers’
government. During the period of the Soviet Union, the war in
Afghanistan was a defining moment in the decline of the Communist state
and a major cause of its eventual disintegration.
It is true that in all the above cases, Russia’s
internal economic and social troubles played an important role – but it
was direct foreign military pressure that was instrumental in causing
reverberations inside Russia. Although this kind of pattern might apply
to most big geopolitical players, the Russian case is different.
Throughout their history, Russians have tended to be loyal to their
rulers. This is part of the Russian mindset.
This brings to mind current geopolitical
conditions in and around Russia. The prevailing crisis between Russia
and the West, which is the product of many fundamental geopolitical
differences both within the former Soviet space and outside it, will not
abate for the time being. Moreover, the successful western expansion
into what Moscow always considered the “Russian backyard” halted its
projection of power and diminished its reach into northern Eurasia
(fast-developing China, Japan, other Asian countries, and the
technologically modern European landmass).
However, this might not be enough to dramatically
influence Russia’s state development. Direct military involvement in
foreign countries is what Russians fear most. Westerners hoped that
Russian troops would be bogged down in Syria, but this did not happen.
Similarly, many thought Ukraine might turn into a major battleground,
but this too has not transpired. NATO’s expansion might seem to Moscow
to be a fundamental threat, but it is unlikely that a major military
confrontation will break out between the two.
Over the past several decades, Russia lost a great
deal across the former Soviet space, and it continues to lag behind the
West. But internal problems alone do not produce radical changes in
Russia. Russian history shows that foreign military pressure is the
fundamental source of change, and that is exactly what Russia is not
facing at the moment.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles on military and political developments across the former Soviet space.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/russia-military-pressure/
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