by Yaakov Lappin
Commentators have eulogized the “War Between Wars,” claiming that it cannot withstand Russian pressure and the growing risk of conflict with a reconstituting Syrian state. They are underestimating Israeli resoluteness.
Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, photo via Wikipedia
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,080, February 3, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The “War Between Wars”
is an ongoing Israeli military and intelligence effort to disrupt the
force build-up of the Iranian-Shiite axis throughout the Middle East.
This campaign, which has evolved into an entire force activation
doctrine, has seen the Israeli defense establishment employ an approach
that differentiates between Syria and Lebanon.
Israel’s low-profile military campaign against the
Iranian-Shiite axis in Syria is continuing despite changes in the
geo-strategic environment. But the use of Israeli air power to disrupt
enemy force build-up has yet to cross into Lebanon. It is possible that
this could represent one of the most significant regional escalation
scenarios in the near future.
The “War Between Wars” is an ongoing Israeli
military and intelligence effort to disrupt the force build-up of the
Iranian-Shiite axis throughout the Middle East. This campaign, which has
evolved into an entire force activation doctrine, has seen the Israeli
defense establishment employ an approach that differentiates between
Syria and Lebanon.
In Syria, Israel launches frequent
intelligence-fueled air strikes that target Iranian military build-up
sites. The strikes also destroy Iranian weapon transfers that use Syria
as a transit zone on their way to Hezbollah bases in Lebanon.
The scope of Israel’s preventative air strike
campaign in Syria is enormous, as recently outlined by former IDF Chief
of Staff Lt.-Gen. Gadi Eisenkot. Eisenkot told the New York Times that Israeli jets had fired 2,000 air-to-ground munitions at targets in Syria in 2018 alone.
This has clearly disrupted Iran’s plans to build a
Shiite army in Syria under its command, made up of 100,000 militia
members. Iran was also planning to build missile factories, launch
sites, weapons storage facilities, and a network of cross-border attack
positions along Syria’s border with Israel.
The January 12, 2019 Israeli air strike on Damascus international airport, apparently targeting a depot housing Iranian-made Fajr 5 rockets
and other projectiles, is the latest indication of Jerusalem’s
determination to enforce its red lines in Syria against the entrenchment
of a radical Shiite axis.
Commentators have eulogized the “War Between
Wars,” claiming that it cannot withstand Russian pressure and the
growing risk of conflict with a reconstituting Syrian state. They are
underestimating Israeli resoluteness.
Israel’s military high command and cabinet are
both fully committed to the objective of denying Iran a military
foothold in Syria. According to the logic of that objective, the
long-term cost of allowing Iran the opportunity to build a second war
front on Israel’s border, alongside the Iranian attack base already in
place in Lebanon, would be higher than any fallout from “War Between
Wars” strikes.
In Lebanon, however, Israel employs a very
different approach. Hezbollah, Iran’s primary proxy in the region,
enjoys a monopoly of military and political power in Lebanon, with the
help of the Iranian Quds Force. The Hezbollah-Iran axis has imported
some 130,000 projectiles into Lebanon, turning the country into one big
rocket launching base aimed at Israel. This represents an exponential
jump compared to the 10,000 rockets that were in Hezbollah’s arsenal on
the eve of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
Most of the projectiles in Hezbollah’s inventory
are unguided, and Iran has made a new push in recent months to deliver
guidance systems to the group. These would enable Hezbollah to convert
some of its projectiles into precision-guided missiles, which could be
used to strategically threaten vital Israeli targets like airports,
seaports, power plants, military bases, and high-profile buildings.
Israel’s determination to stop Hezbollah from
upgrading its firepower in this way found expression on September 17,
when Israeli fighter jets struck an Iranian shipment of guidance kit
components near Latakia, on the Syrian coastline. That strike triggered
massive Syrian anti-aircraft fire, bringing down a Russian intelligence
aircraft and killing 15 crew members. The incident sparked a major
Russian-Israeli crisis that has yet to be resolved.
The Iranians then appeared to switch tactics, flying guidance components in cargo flights directly into Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport.
At the end of September last year, PM Netanyahu
and the IDF Spokesman’s Unit exposed the existence of multiple
underground sites for the conversion of unguided rockets into precision
missiles. One of the sites was adjacent to the airport.
“Hezbollah’s senior members took a deliberate
decision to shift the center of gravity of the precision missile
project, which they have been working on for a while, to the civilian
area in the heart of Beirut,” the IDF stated on September 27.
Three months after these warnings, Netanyahu said
at the end of December 2018 that Hezbollah had shut down these
conversion centers, adding that the organization has, “at most, a few
dozen precision-guided missiles” at this time.
Netanyahu said that Israel’s security forces have
stopped Hezbollah from possessing thousands of such missiles. These
developments illustrate the fact that unlike in Syria, Israel is deeply
reluctant to employ air power in Lebanon to enforce its red lines, and
prefers to rely on messaging and deterrence through speeches and the
media as well as through potential alleged activities that are more
discreet than air power.
This is an indication that mutual deterrence
between Israel and Hezbollah remains in effect. An unwritten agreement
between Israel and Hezbollah began to crystallize in 2014, after Israel
allegedly struck a Hezbollah weapons convoy on the Syrian-Lebanese
border and Hezbollah set off border bombs that targeted an IDF convoy
traveling in Har Dov, causing damage but no injuries.
Following the incident, Nasrallah said in an
interview that Israeli attacks in or near Lebanon would draw rapid
retaliation, hinting that this was not the case regarding strikes in
Syria.
This quiet understanding would become irrelevant
if Lebanon becomes the site of precision missile conversion operations.
Israel’s multiple warnings to Nasrallah and his Iranian backers have
delivered that message.
Hezbollah, for its part, felt the need to
replenish its own deterrence against Israel by releasing a video at the
start of December with Google Earth satellite images and coordinates of
sensitive targets across Israel, threatening strikes against them. The
video included a snippet from a speech by Nasrallah in which he warned
that his organization “will respond” if Israel hits targets in Lebanon.
The ability of Israel and Hezbollah to apparently
defuse the “Lebanese [precision] missile crisis” of 2018 without going
to war is no guarantee that they will repeat such a de-escalation this
year.
It seems safe to assume that the newly appointed
IDF Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Aviv Kochavi, who has monitored Hezbollah’s
force build-up both as Northern Command chief and as Military
Intelligence commander, will remain busy with this issue during his
term.
For now, Israel has been able to enforce its red
lines on precision missile production in Lebanon through the use of
deterrence and messaging. It remains unclear whether those same tactics
will be effective the next time the Iranian axis tries to set up
precision missile factories on Lebanese soil.
Yaakov Lappin is a Research Associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He specializes in Israel’s defense establishment, military affairs, and the Middle Eastern strategic environment.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-red-lines-lebanon-syria/
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