by Emil Avdaliani
Is there a "manifest destiny" for China?
Tajikistan-China border, photo via Wikimedia Commons
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,129, April 2, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: It is au courant among analysts and scholars to compare modern-day China to early 20th-century Germany, in that it too is a
rising power that desires a larger role for itself in world affairs.
But a better comparison might be with the United States of the late 19th-early 20th
century. The US of that era presented itself as non-interventionist,
but it also proclaimed a “manifest destiny” to expand its influence.
Western media outlets recently announced that
China has built military facilities on the Tajik side of the
Tajik-Chinese border. This move is significant, as it is the first
confirmation (following earlier unconfirmed reports) of a Chinese
military/semi-military presence in the Central Asia region.
The area where the Chinese facilities are located
is strategically important for two reasons: it overlooks one of the
crucial entry points from China into Central Asia, and it is close to
the vital corridor through which the country connects to the Afghan
heartland. That corridor is essential to China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI).
Put into a wider context, the opening of this new
base might worry Moscow, as Central Asia is perceived by the Russians as
within their sphere of influence. For Moscow, modern-day Central Asia
is especially important as it is the only region where the Kremlin can
still project its influence through military and economic means. Chinese
military/security measures are a challenge to Russian pillars of power
in this region.
It is fashionable among world analysts to argue
that Russia and China would rather cooperate in Central Asia than fight
each other. However, the critical point is that while cooperation might
be in force for years and possibly for decades, the Russians will always
be worried (if they are not already) that as China grows economically,
it will embark on simultaneous military expansion beyond its borders.
Many believe the Chinese do not think about
military expansion across Eurasia. They are correct in noting that
(predictably) no Chinese officials have articulated any military agenda
for the continent.
The point they miss is that China, as a rising
power, relies on global trade routes for internal stability and
enhancement of its world role. It will eventually have to be more active
beyond its borders whether it wants to or not. The new base in
Tajikistan is a good indicator of this evolving Chinese approach to
world security.
Many compare the China of today to Germany in the early 20th
century, as it too was a rising power that wanted a larger role for
itself in world affairs. But there are many problems with that
comparison. It is true that China, like Germany a century ago, aspires
to build a larger military navy and increase its economic potential
abroad. But rather than compare China to Germany, which was defeated in
both world wars, it would perhaps be more expedient to compare modern
China to the United States of the late 19th-early 20th century.
There are many similarities. In some ways, China
is facing a new world and new opportunities that had been closed to it
for centuries. Surrounded by an arc of almost impregnable geographical
barriers, China’s heartland produced enough to sustain a self-sufficient
economy. The 19th century amounted to a national catastrophe as
European powers assailed China for economic gains, while in the early
20th century, Japan’s hegemony undermined all Chinese attempts to revive
the state.
Thus, China has never been a global power. It does
not clearly see what kind of world order it wants to build. Everything
about modern Chinese foreign policy shows that the country is still
developing its “world order ideas.”
Like the US in the early 20th century, today’s
China feels that it must take a more powerful internationalist stance as
its economic appetite makes it unwise to rely on the benevolence of
other powers. At the same time, again like the earlier US, China is
reluctant to go down that road, as it fears that a more “global China”
could ignite suspicions around the world that China is threatening to
dominate.
Modern-day Beijing portrays its policy as one that
benefits not only China but the entire world. At the same time, it sees
that there is a certain necessity to increase China’s military
potential both at sea and on land.
One hundred years ago, the US cast its foreign
policy as peaceful and non-interventionist. However, it was the young US
that proclaimed that it had a “manifest destiny” to expand its
influence into North America and the waters around the continent.
Like modern China, the US of one hundred years ago
did not openly aspire, nor really plan, to achieve global dominance.
American statesmen of the time only gradually started to see that the
country needed to take a more active geopolitical role by influencing
political developments in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.
Modern China also resembles the younger US in that
they both have a view that the world can benefit from them economically
and through the way they plan to (re-)create the world order.
How the US was catapulted from domination of North
America in the early 20th century to global preeminence after 1945
serves as a good explanatory case on the rise and fall of great powers.
China can learn a lot from the American rise, a story of the gradual
build-up of military and economic power coupled with attractive cultural
features.
The rise of new powers does not happen quickly; it
takes decades of meticulous work. That could explain why China’s
comparison with the Germany of the early 20th century is flawed. The
Kaiser’s Germany was powerful, but its human and economic potential
could not match that of the allied powers.
China, on the other hand, possesses a large
population as well as enough economic potential to try to challenge the
existing balance of power.
Though similarities with the US exist, it is not a
foregone conclusion that China will replicate the American rise to
global preeminence.
The US began to dominate the oceans and parts of
Eurasia only after the major geopolitical contenders in Europe had
fought two deadly wars and destroyed the European world order. The US
also acted from a safe geographic position: oceans essentially precluded
the then powers from reaching North America.
China’s geographical position, by contrast, is
continental, surrounded from the east by US-allied Asian countries
nestled on a chain of islands.
That said, historical comparisons show that the
rise of new powers is always followed by conflict, and often one
conflict alone does not suffice to alter the balance of power. Carthage
lost its power after two long wars with Rome, and Europe lost its
grandeur after two world conflicts. Perhaps the same will apply to
China’s rise as well.
Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles on military and political developments across the former Soviet space.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/china-base-tajikistan/
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