by Herb Keinon
The choices – diplomacy or waging war against Hezbollah, Lebanon, or Iran – are not mutually exclusive.
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The Falaq-1 rocket that killed 12 children and injured dozens in Majdal Shams on Saturday was made in Iran and fired by Hezbollah from Lebanese territory.
There are, therefore, three legitimate targets for Israel to retaliate against: Iran, Hezbollah, and Lebanon.
The question before Israel’s decision-makers is which is the better
option? Which has the better chance of ensuring that this is something
that does not happen again?Some will argue that there is a fourth option: diplomacy.
That resolution put an end to the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and, among its numerous clauses, called for a demilitarized zone from Israel’s border to the Litani River, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and the prevention of shipping arms into Lebanon except with the Lebanese government’s consent.
Is this a long shot? Extremely so. Yet, it is not one that Israel has totally abandoned. Indeed, the Foreign Ministry released a statement on Sunday indicating that it still holds out some slight hope that this might transpire.
“The only way that the world can prevent a full-scale war, which would be devastating, also to Lebanon, is by forcing Hezbollah to implement Security Council Resolution 1701. Now is the very last minute to do so diplomatically,” the statement read.
That the Foreign Ministry released this statement even as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was rushing home from the United States to convene a Security Cabinet meeting on the matter, and as Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi were threatening, once again, to pound Hezbollah, indicating that despite what happened in Majdal Shams on Saturday, the idea that the untenable situation in the North can be solved without a full-out war was still an option. A very slim option, but one nonetheless: Take advantage of the world’s concern about a massive Israeli response to get the world to take action to disarm and remove Hezbollah from Israel’s northern border.
In the strong likelihood that this does not happen, then the question arises: Whom should Israel go to war against?
Who should Israel go to war against?
The most obvious option is Hezbollah.
Hezbollah is firing missiles and rockets at Israel and has been doing so incessantly since October 8. Israel’s response has been to go after the sources of the fire and more – including pinpoint hits on some of the organization’s top leaders. It has killed at least 381 Hezbollah terrorists – at least that is how many Hezbollah admits have been killed – and nearly 70 terrorists from other organizations, including Hamas.
Israel has also attacked Hezbollah’s infrastructure in southern Lebanon, something that has emptied many of the villages of their residents.
Yet Hezbollah has not been deterred and continues to fire into Israel. Israel can strike a much harder blow against the organization, including in Beirut. But Hezbollah would still be able to replenish its lost manpower from its strongholds in Lebanon and replenish its arms from Iran.
Furthermore, Hezbollah, like Hamas, uses human shields without compunction. This means that the international legitimacy that Israel now has for striking at Hezbollah as a result of the Majdal Shams atrocity would likely evaporate as soon as the television cameras begin broadcasting images of Lebanese civilians killed by Israel in the crossfire.
In addition, with a missile arsenal that would make a small NATO nation proud, Hezbollah would undoubtedly respond by attacking Israeli infrastructure and the home front. A war with Hezbollah would likely not be conclusive and end up in another ceasefire, which the organization would – as it did the last time – undoubtedly violate.The second option is to fight Lebanon, not Hezbollah, meaning destroying the country’s infrastructure.
Hezbollah operates from Lebanese territory and is a part of the Lebanese government. Some argue that it makes no sense only to target Hezbollah and let Lebanon off scot-free. Hezbollah has justified its presence in Lebanon for years as being the country’s protector, but if – instead of protecting the country – the Lebanese themselves see it as the cause of the country’s destruction, then the terrorist organization might very well lose the legitimacy and support inside Lebanon that ultimately enables it to operate.
According to this argument, Hezbollah cares about its standing among the Lebanese population, so if Israel badly hits Lebanese infrastructure – and if large swaths of Beirut are destroyed – then the wrath in Lebanon will be turned on Hezbollah. While Hezbollah might be willing to sacrifice Lebanon to its Iranian paymasters, the Lebanese themselves are apparently less enamored of that notion.
The Iranian foreign ministry, on Sunday, warned Israel against any military “adventures” in Lebanon, saying this could lead to “the broadening of the scope of instability, insecurity, and war in the region.
”In other words, Iran was warning Israel that if the Jewish state takes strong action, then Iran will get involved. If that is the case, why not take the fight to Iran itself – the third option?
Hezbollah is a wholly run subsidiary of Iran and does its bidding. As then-education minister Naftali Bennett articulated already in 2017, the Iranians have developed a brilliant game plan whereby they can use their proxies to attack Israel – Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias – yet remain immune themselves. When Hamas strikes, Israel goes after Hamas. Last Saturday, Israel showed that when the Houthis hit long enough and kill someone in Tel Aviv, Israel will lash out at the Houthis. And when Hezbollah hits, Israel strikes back at Hezbollah.It doesn’t, except in rare instances, strike back against Iran. Or, as Bennett put it, Iran has immunity. In his words, Iran is the head of the octopus that has its tentacles surrounding Israel; and Israel fights the tentacles but – for the most part – leaves the head alone. The third option about whom to hit in response to the Majdal Shams massacre is to strike Iran.
If Iran’s foreign ministry hints that Israel will face action by the Islamic Republic if it retaliates forcefully against Hezbollah, then why not strike directly at Iran – if they are going to hit Israel anyway if strong action is taken against Hezbollah – and forego the middleman?
The reason not to do so is to avoid a wider Middle East war. But such a war – given Iran’s genocidal designs – may be inevitable. Perhaps the only way to prevent it is to already make it clear to Iran that it is very much not worth its while.
The choices – diplomacy or waging war against Hezbollah, Lebanon, or Iran – are not mutually exclusive. For example, while holding out the hope for a diplomatic solution, Israel could demonstrate its resolve by taking some action against all three – hit various Hezbollah positions, a few strategic Lebanese infrastructure facilities, and a target in Iran – to indicate that it is serious about not tolerating the situation in the North any longer, and that if the world does not insist on changes in Lebanon, then the wider Mideast regional war that everyone dreads may be unavoidable.
Herb Keinon
Source: https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-812261
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