Cyprus at a Crossroads. Part II

 

by Mehmet Hasgüler and Murat Tüzünkan

2^nd part of 2

The View from Southern Cyprus

Indifference and ignorance about southern Cyprus reign in Turkey. If reconciliation is to be successful, should Turkey not revise its traditional policy of dividing the island and develop a new way forward?[14] On April 23, 2003, the administration of Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan authorized the opening of the border gates in Cyprus,[15] and the Turkish Cypriot government announced the decision. No one hoped for an immediate peace, but the decision encouraged a new attitude among the two communities. Although the Turkish Cypriot administration formally denounces the existence of Turkish patronage, many speculate that Cyprus-related decisions are either made in Ankara or that Ankara has to approve all decisions made in Turkish Cypriot politics. Either way, it is clear that the Turkish Cypriot administration makes few decisions without either basing them on Turkish National Security Council resolutions or consulting Ankara before making any serious public announcement regarding Cyprus.[16]

Poverty and Turks in northern Cyprus. The process that started when the border gates opened has sparked new debates in Cyprus from the Greek point of view about issues such as poverty in the north and the situation of immigrant Turkish citizens there. As an unrecognized state, northern Cyprus has been under international embargoes, which have caused economic problems. The poverty and economic backwardness in the north are critical issues for a united Cyprus. Before the Annan plan was developed, poverty in the north had been seen by Greek capitalists as a source for cheap labor.[17] Salaries in the north were only half of those in the south. Moreover, consequent financial crises and complete dependence on Turkey for foreign aid and commerce made the Turkish Cypriot economy weak and unreliable. Ironically, salaries in Turkish Cyprus were higher than those in Turkey, and this created a flow of illegal immigrants seeking jobs in the north, creating a series of cultural, social, and economic problems.

Linking the Cyprus problem with EU membership went against Turkish interests at first, but before long it turned against the Greeks as well. Although Turkey plays a proactive role in Cyprus because it wants to ease relations with the EU, the Greek Cypriots have assumed that it would behave in its customary manner, which means it would prove both passive and conservative. This created a serious problem for the Greeks. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the brains behind Turkey's support for the Annan plan, said that Turkey's policy was to pursue a "zero problem" approach, meaning that Ankara would solve any problems it had with its neighbors.[18] Of course, this would mean that any continuation of the Cyprus problem would be entirely the fault of the Greeks.

Hellenic nationalists see themselves as the natural owners of the island. Before Annan, the division of Cyprus served to unify the Greek community. Some Greeks in Cyprus consider the Annan plan a fait-accompli, but they are apprehensive that it will divide the island permanently and will be responsible for an injustice if it gives both Cypriot and EU citizenship to Turks who came to the island in the wake of the 1974 invasion.

There were several unsatisfactory aspects of the Annan plan, particularly for Greek Cypriots. These included the continuation of Turkey's military status; the acceptance of citizenship in a United Cyprus Republic for anyone who had migrated to the north from mainland Turkey after 1974; and, lastly, the fact that not all of the 168,000 Greeks who were forced to migrate from the north to the south in 1974, would be able to return to their homes. This is why the Greek community said no to the Annan plan.[19] The then-Greek Cypriot president Tassos Papadopoulos (d. 2008) said he had taken over a state and could not now accept a community.[20] If being a "community" and not a "minority" is a crucial demand for Turkish Cypriots, "controlling the state" and not being a "community" is essential for Greek Cypriots.[21]

 

Internal Politics

Cyprus has twenty or so political parties. The Greek Cypriot communist party, AKEL, which has always tried to maintain close contact with Turkish Cypriots, worked for postponement. Greek Cypriot communist demands for a U.N. and EU guarantee for the implementation of the plan are significant. Most Greek Cypriots (communists included) were unsure that Turkey would implement the Annan plan.[22] However, a call for a guarantee can be seen as a maneuver for turning public opinion in favor of the plan. In an April 2004 article, Turkish journalist Hasan Cemal accused Greek Cypriot communists of being liars.[23] It seems correct to presume that AKEL's search for a guarantee on behalf of the Greek Cypriots is sincere although it might have been better if they had conveyed this during negotiations. In any case, it is likely that the Turkish Cypriots may themselves demand some guarantees from the U.N. and EU.

The "yes" campaign was initiated in the south one week before the referendum by the leader of the right-of-center Democratic Rally Party (DISI) and the former Greek Cypriot president, Glafkos Clerides. It had some remarkable features. The warning that Cyprus would be divided encouraged Greek Cypriots to vote "yes." On the other hand, communist party willingness to revise its position in favor of postponing the referendum prompted some Greek Cypriots to vote "no."

A general election was held in northern Cyprus on February 20, 2005, less than two years after the December 2003 elections. The formerly leftist but now center-to-left Republican Turkish Party (RTP) and United Forces (CTP-BG) greatly increased their total, receiving nearly 45 percent of the votes. The biggest story of the election was CTP-BG's ability to take advantage of the gap that had been formed on the political Left. Turkish Cypriots were looking for political innovations and freedom, and the Turkish Cypriot Left took advantage of this.[24] Votes for the leftist coalition increased in large measure because of their proposals for reconciliation and European Union support for the party's positions. In the municipal elections in June 2006, the party used the slogan, "It's time to speak a language understood by Europe," but it was unable to explain the meaning of this to the electorate; politically speaking, it has not adopted any different policies. On October 5, 2006, a left-wing coalition formed a pro-settlement new government.[25]

In the post-referendum period, the left-wing parties have come to understand the impasse they came up against, but they have not produced alternative policies. Despite the failure of the Annan plan, the northern Cypriot parties have no choice but to continue their intricate relationship with the West.

 

Conclusion

With respect to the Annan plan, the state parties have consulted nothing but their own interests. They have not paid sufficient attention to the priorities of the two communities in Cyprus. As a result, they have not implemented the plan and now find themselves confronting a serious failure. In addition, those responsible for this failure are looking at events from one angle and are making mistakes when they try to analyze the failure of the Annan plan. Particularly, the sterility of European thinking in regard to the Cyprus problem and the inability of the EU to come up with alternative solutions indicate how difficult it is for Europe to become a powerful actor in international politics. The EU's attitude toward Cyprus has not only been an exercise in passing the buck rather than moving toward a solution, it has also caused a hardening of the existing divisions between the communities. This scenario teaches that in Cyprus, as in so many other conflicts, realistic solutions must arise from the parties themselves, instead of being imposed by foreign powers.

Turkish Cyprus's many socioeconomic and cultural problems cannot be solved only through the government's courting Western powers. Rather, if Western powers establish economic and cultural relations with northern Cyprus, this will help remove the isolation of Turkish Cypriots without formalizing recognition of north Cyprus as a state. In the past, such an alternative was not even considered possible. However, as the Cyprus issue is becoming less of a concern for the international community,[26] establishing economic and cultural relations with northern Cyprus (without recognizing it as an independent state) seems to be a more likely alternative. This, in turn, may help on the way to the "Taiwanization"[27] or even "Kosovoization" of northern Cyprus. Kosovoization here refers to a gradual formalization of independence without full legalization. This was how the veto powers blocked the U.N. in the case of Kosovo, annulling each other's position either to recognize or not recognize its declaration of independence. Certainly, there are a number of U.N. Security Council resolutions against the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. However, Turkish Cypriots may still gain their independence bilaterally, by gaining support from at least some of those countries that are prepared to recognize their state. This could happen if a similar double veto were to create a deadlock in the U.N. after one of the permanent members uses their veto power in favor of the Turkish side. It should be remembered that even Taiwan is recognized by twenty-three states. If that were to happen, the Turkish Cypriot State would be independent, but not a member of the U.N., exactly like Kosovo.

The Greek Cypriot perception of the current situation still underestimates the strength of Turkey. Since 2002, Turkey's new "zero problem" approach has gained momentum while the Greek Cypriot leadership continues to act as if Turkey is still pursuing old policies. In reality, however, Turkey is treating the Cyprus issue as part of its general foreign policy strategy of reducing tensions in its surrounding areas.

Despite this, it is tempting to observe that Cyprus has a model from which to learn. Throughout the thirty years and more of civil strife in northern Ireland, the pro-U.K. Protestants and their paramilitaries doggedly refused overtures from a majority of Irishmen to let their enclave become part of the southern republic. When the unrest began in 1968, the Protestant position seemed not unreasonable. But years later, the republic had moved from its early agriculture and church focus to become one of the strongest economies in the world while the north remained a severely neglected part of the U.K. The secret of the republic's success was its willingness to move wholeheartedly into the EU and to use it as a vantage point from which to obtain massive subsidies and concessions. For Cypriots, EU access holds out similar possibilities. But they must opt to enter the EU wholly independently of what Turkey or Greece does or thinks.

The old Cypriots have thrown their last round of dice. If they win, Cyprus will be united and will enjoy all the advantages of being a member of the EU. However, if the game is lost, it will be time for the old men to leave the coffee house in order to let a new game begin. This time, the end of the negotiations game will not be peaceful unification, but peaceful separation. In either case, a new era for Cyprus will begin.

 

Mehmet Hasgüler is an associate professor of international relations at Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University in Turkey. Murat Tüzünkan is an assistant professor in the department of international relations, Cyprus International University.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Notes.

[1] Zaman (Istanbul), Apr. 22, 2004.
[2] Milliyet (Istanbul), Jan. 30, 2007. Poll conducted by the Cyprus Social and Economic Research Center.
[3] “Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,” Feb. 2003, accessed July 5, 2009.
[4] “A. Foundation Agreement,” Annan Plan, Bürgenstock, Switzerland, Mar. 31, 2004, accessed, July 17, 2009.
[5] “EU Accession Treaty—Protocols on Cyprus,” Cyprus Press and Information Office, accessed July 17, 2009.
[6] Necmiye Uçansoy, “Kıbrıs Dosyasi, Annan Planı,” Sabah (Istanbul), accessed July 17, 2009.
[7] Ulus Baker, “Kıbrıs: Yüzeydeki Çatlak,” Birikim, Sept. 1995, pp. 12-7; Ercüment Yavuzalp, Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), pp. 139.
[8] Özker Özgür, Kıbrısta Demokrasi Bunamımları (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), p. 53; Arif Hasan Tahsin, Geçmişi Bilmeden Geleceğe Bakmak (Lefkoşa: Işık Yayınevi, 1993), p. 68; author interview with Alpay Durduran, former chairperson of the Communal Liberation Party, Aug. 18, 1998.
[9] U.N. Security Council Resolution 541, Nov. 18, 1983; U.N. Security Council Resolution 550, May 11, 1984; United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus: 1960-2006 (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, 2006), pp. 87-8, 90-1; Kudret Özersay, Yeni Uluslar arası Mahkeme Kararları Işığında Kıbrıs’I Yeniden Okumak, (Ankara: Imaj, 2009), pp. 24-35.
[10] Özgür, Kıbrısta Demokrasi Bunalımları, p. 53.
[11] Ahmet An, Küçük Adada Büyük Oyunlar: Kıbrıs’ta Ayrılıkçılık, Federal Çözüm ve AB Üyeliği (Istanbul: N.K. Yayınları, 2004), pp. 127-45.
[12] Hasan Erçakıca, “Türkiye’ye Karşı Kıbrıs’ta Hak Alabilmek Münkün mü?” in Annan’I Anla da Gel- Politik Yorumlar (Girne: Freebirds Yay, 2007), pp. 17-9.
[13] “Cumhurbaşkanı Talat’ın ABD Ziyareti,” Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Information Agency, press summary, Sept. 25, 2005; “Başbakan Talat AB Komisyonu Üyesi Verhaugen ile Görüştü” TRNC Information Agency, press summary, June 11, 2004.
[14] Ferit Murat Özkaleli, “Talking Turkey: Deictic Discourse Analysis of Turkey’s EU-Cyprus Crisis,” presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1, 2005, pp. 2-3, 6-7; Alekos Konstantinidis, Lukas Y. Haralambus, and Reşat Akar, Kıbrıs’ta Bölünmüşlük Sürerken (Nicosia: Cyprus Dialogue, 2006), pp. 154-5, 182-3.
[15] Başaran Düzgün, Bir Tarihin Tanığından: Pilatus’un Gölgesinde (Lefkoşa: Baskı ve Yayımcılık Ltd., 2008), pp. 20-1.
[16] Hasan Erçakıca, “Türkiye ile Kıbrıslı Türkler Dayanışmak Zorundadırlar,” in Annan’I Anla da Gel- Politik Yorumlar (Girne: Freebirds Yay, 2007), pp. 103-5.
[17] Angelos Kalodukas, “Kıbrıs Sorunu: 2. Dünya Savaşı’ndan Annan Planı’na,” in Masis Kürkçügil, ed., Kıbrıs: Dün ve Bugün (Istanbul: Itaki, 2003), pp. 91-5, 110-4, 123-30.
[18] “Dişişleri Bakani Davutoğlu Washington’da Konuştu: ‘Model Ortaklik Tercih Değil Gereklilik,’” Turkish Prime Ministry Press and Publishing Office, Washington, D.C., June 3, 2009.
[19] Kypros Chrysostomides, Kıbrıs-Önümüzdeki Yol (Nicosia: Kıbrıs Siyasal Araştırmalar ve Avrupa Sorunları Enstitusu, 2006), pp. 63-8.
[20] Themos Dimitriu and Sotiris Vlahos, Ihanete Uğramış Ayaklanma (Ankara: Arkadaş, 2009), p. 161.
[21] Kalodukas, “Kıbrıs Sorunu: 2,” pp. 78-9.
[22] Dimitriu and Vlahos, Ihanete Uğramış Ayaklanma, pp. 135-7.
[23] Milliyet, Apr. 19, 2004.
[24] Hakkı Yücel, “KKTC: 20 Subat Seçimlerinin Ardından,” Birikim Review, Mar. 2005, pp. 13-7.
[25] Bülent Fevzioglu, Kıraathane-I Osmani’den Cumhuriyet Meclisi’ne (1886-1996): Olaylar ve Seçimler/Seçilenler (Mağusa: Turkish Grand National Assembly-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Assembly, 1998), pp. 144-56.
[26] AFRIKA (Nicosia), Mar. 1, 2007.
[27] Özdemir Özgür, “The Cyprus Question after the Referenda: Turkish Cypriot Views,” Colloquium on Cyprus Today. After the Annan Plan: Considerations, Views, Thoughts, Reflections, Perspectives and Similar Questions, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foundation for International Legal Studies, Athens, June 3, 2004.

../..