Cease-Fire, with Whom?

 

by Raphael Israeli

 

Until recently, armies used to launch wars from territories of states, to conquer lands or lose them, to gain dominance or to yield it, and finally to lead negotiations which settle the conflict until the next one erupts, via peace treaties or cease-fires, border agreements and spheres of influence, prisoner exchange, imposition of duties and granting of rights.

 

That was, for centuries, the accepted pattern of conduct in international relations. But since the Muslim world has launched its war of terror against the West, new rules have been drafted, for it is no longer clear who fights against whom and in whose name. Non-state groups initiate acts of hostility against individuals, groups and states, kidnap hostages and dictate terms for their release, forcing the termination of the conflict under the conditions of the terrorists. And since these belligerents are intermingled with the civilian population and shielded by it, it has become near impossible to defend oneself efficiently against them without raising the wrath of the entire world.

 

             However, the focus of the problem here is not the conflict itself, but the exit map from it. Between states there are treaties, alliances, agreements for peace, cease fire or truce, which put an end to conflict. But terrorist groups have been imposing their own terminology and vocabulary, and the rest of the world has capitulated and adopted them, though they are foreign to the accepted international terms. Hamas and Hizbullah have invoked the hudna, a well-defined Islamic term which has antecedents and set rules in Islamic shari’a law. Israel and the rest of the world, have accepted it and forfeited the international rules of discourse, like cease-fire, truce and armistice, which apply to the entire world, save the Muslim terrorist groups. Lately, since even the hudna has seemed too institutionalized to the Hamas, for fear that it might imply, Allah Forbid, an indirect  recognition of Israel, they invented a new concept, the tahdi’a, some sort of amorphous, non-binding and temporary truce, and coerced Israel to consider that terminology as a basis for negotiation. And lest anyone miscomprehend the message, they insist that it cannot last more than a year, or one year and a half at the most. And then what? A return to square one? A short respite until they have had the chance to regroup their forces, to absorb new weaponry and then resume their bombardment of border towns in Israel? In other words, while for Israel a cease-fire would serve as a stepping stone for peace and quiet, for the Palestinians it becomes a price to pay, pending a better preparation of the launching pad for the next assault.

 

            It is clear why the Hamas is using this terminology, which is not a semantic game, but is pregnant with long-term repercussions. It is less clear why Israel, and others, should feel obliged by it and educate the Israeli public to believe that international relations are being conducted on that basis. Israel and the world should entirely reject this Islamic vocabulary and insist on the use of the accepted terms which conform to international law and usage, and have meaning, validity and exit stations. When anyone urges Israel to accept a hudna or a tahdi’a, it should ask for an internationally accepted interpretation of those terms. When the US alliance fights in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, it insists on defeating the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, just as in WW II the Allies refused to negotiate any cease-fire with the Axis, short or a total capitulation. Now Israel is asked not only to renounce the total surrender of Hamas, but to accept its alien terminology for negotiations. This is an exaggeration that the terrorists did not imagine they could achieve, even in their wildest dreams.

            And worse still. Does anyone envisage parallel negotiations with any government and the opposition to it at the same time? Israel is obligated by its agreements with the Palestinian Authority, and those understandings include neither a hudna nor a tahd’ia. So, either the PA does not represent the Palestinians, and Israel should arrive to arrangements with the Hamas, or it should persist in its commitment to the Authority and reject any dealings with the Hamas, directly or via Egypt. Mubarak would have refused to talk with Israel if at the same time it conducted negotiations with the Muslim Brothers who oppose his rule. Neither would any negotiator, like the US,  negotiate with terrorist groups in  Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, while it recognizes  and supports the legitimate governments of those countries. Israel cannot implement the Oslo Accords with the PA, whatever their worth, and at the same time negotiate a hudna with another part of the same Palestinian people. Israel has never declared that it recognized two separate Palestinian entities.

            The conclusion is that Israel must put an end to this confusion, decide whom it recognizes and with whom it concludes agreements. It must revert to the agreed international terminology which alone possesses accepted interpretations and recognized institutions of enforcement when needed.

Lending legitimacy to two separate Palestinian entities, in addition to Jordan and  the separate Palestinian identity which has been cultivated among Israeli Arabs, can only generate instability, conflict and chaos.

A Palestinian state, yes, by all means; but three and a half Palestinian states?!

 

 

Raphael Israeli is a Professor of Islam at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.