by Barry Rubin
Around 2007, I gave a lecture at the
Defense Department. One of the attendees presented a scenario suggesting
that the “problem of Islam” was not political but a problem of
verbiage.
There was a secret debate happening in
the Defense Department and the CIA in which some people thought that
all Muslims were a problem, some believed that only al-Qa’ida was a
problem, and still others thought the Muslim Brotherhood was a problem.
The main problem, however, was that
all Islamism was a political threat, but it was the second position that
eventually won over the Obama administration. Take note of this, since
2009, if you wanted to build your career and win policy debates, only
al-Qa’ida was a problem. The Muslim Brotherhood was not a threat; after
all, it did not participate in September 11. This view was well known in
policy circles, but it was easy to mistake this growing hegemony as
temporary.
Actually, it only got worse.
A Muslim Foreign Service officer
recounted how some U.S. officials were trying to persuade the powers
that be that al-Qa’ida was split from the Muslim Brotherhood. Imagine
how horrified he was. Still other officials told me that there was heavy
pressure and there were well-financed lobbyists trying to force
officials into the idea that al-Qa’ida was the only problem. Some
high-ranking defense department officials–for example, one on the
secretary of defense’s level–were pressured to fire anti-Muslim
Brotherhood people. I know of at least five such incidences.
For example, I was asked to
participate in a contract and co-direct a project for the federal
government, and my paper was to be on the idea that all Islamists posed a
threat. To my surprise, I was told that my paper was rejected. Shocked,
I asked to speak to the two co-contractors on the telephone. Isn’t it
true, I said on the phone, that I was to have co-direction of this
project? The response was yes it was, nevertheless, a more junior member
of the press could not prevail. By the way, this co-director, who
likely became interested in the Middle East in large part because of me,
was very rude. I then told him that though the project had originally
been my idea, I was going to walk away from it and not demand
compensation.
In another incident, a high-ranking
CIA official posited a paper that the Muslim Brotherhood was not a
threat, only al-Qa’ida was, and U.S. policy should therefore depend on
the Brotherhood.
In another case, a U.S. official made a
statement at a public function that neither Hizballah nor Hamas posed a
threat to U.S. interests.
By 2013, this sprouted in a few
people’s arguments that Iran could be allowed to develop nuclear
weapons. The theoretical situation to government officials was thus
clear: If you wanted to make some money in Washington, you would have to
toe the line that the Muslim Brotherhood was not a threat. If sanctions
ended against the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamists, including Iran, this
could also lead to trillions of dollars in potential trade deals. Note
that in 2009 and 2010, an attempt was made to build such a model with
Syria, despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of people were being
murdered in a civil war.
But Iran was a far more valuable
state. In fact, Tehran was a far easier target because it had far more
money and could possibly be bought simply by agreeing not to build a
nuclear weapon.
Following is what I predicted in my 1980 book Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran:
United States-Iranian relations could not possibly have been worse in the months following November 4, 1979. From the American point of view, the central problem was obtaining the release of fifty-three American diplomats being held hostage at the American Embassy in Tehran. To the Iranians the capture of the American Embassy and its occupants marked a successful end to one revolution and the opening shots of a second. For Iran, like Russia in 1917, was to undergo both a February and a November revolution–the first a political struggle to unseat the old regime, the second a social, economic, and cultural revolution to build a new Islamic society.
In Iran’s case, it was the fundamentalist mullahs and their Islamic Republican Party who were seeking to achieve what the Bolsheviks had done in Russia–monopolize power. Like Lenin, Khomeini would in time turn against moderate segments of the revolutionary coalition and purge their members from positions of authority; like the Bolsheviks, the fundamentalists, once in power, would refuse to compromise with those ethnic movements that had aided the revolution; and like the Leninists, Khomeini’s supporters would try to create a totalistic structure, subsuming into their ideological framework all aspects of national life, from the courts to the schools, from the military to the conduct of commerce, and even the daily behavior of the citizenry.
Thus, the United States and Iran, two countries whose friendship had begun with such high expectations and whose relations had included fine moments of selfless cooperation as well as many shameful episodes of corruption and insensitivity, were now the bitterest of enemies.
In 2014, I am convinced that the
leadership of the Iranian Islamist regime still feels the same way, just
as American policy makers still don’t understand that nice verbiage has
not changed anything. Note that President Ronald Reagan sending the
Iranians a key-shaped cake–supposedly to symbolize the “opening” of
U.S.-Iranian relations–also demonstrated little understanding of Iranian
extremism.
Barry Rubin
Source: http://www.gloria-center.org/2014/01/you-still-dont-understand-islamism-do-you/
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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