by Avi Dichter
By the time the Shin
Bet security agency began training its sights on Hamas military wing
commander Mohammed Deif, he had already orchestrated deadly attacks
against Israelis. Most attacks involved suicide bombers who blew
themselves up on Israeli buses -- a modus operandi that was still in its
infancy at the time.
Deif's right-hand man
was Yihye Ayash, who was dubbed "the engineer" by Israel. He was based
in Samaria. This deadly duo -- where Gaza meets Judea and Samaria --
managed to kill and maim hundreds of Israelis over a short period of
time.
In 1995, Ayash had the
feeling that he was being watched and fled to the Gaza Strip, where Deif
provided him with safe haven. Eight months later, Ayash was
assassinated. A cellphone he was using had been rigged with explosives
and detonated in the midst of a conversation with his father.
Deif was in Israeli
crosshairs several hours later, but the government said, "eliminating
one terrorist leader is enough, let's call it a day."
The mission was a
no-go. Had the security forces gotten the green light, he would have
been taken out well before he could climb up the rungs of leadership.
If our lives were a
Western, they would smack of "The Good, the Bad and the Ugly," except
that in Gazan theaters this would be adapted into "The Bad, the Terrible
and the Brutal."
The "Bad" is on full
display when Hamas fires rockets -- thousands have already hit Israeli
towns and cities. The "Brutal" part is evident in the way they kill
those who allegedly collaborate with Israel. Such individuals include
those who helped place the explosives in the Ayash's "cellbomb" or those
who allegedly tipped Israelis off on the whereabouts of Hamas founder
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin before his assassination in January 2004. Yassin
tried to cast himself as a Mother Teresa on a wheelchair even as he
relayed orders instructing Deif and his fellow terrorists Salah Shehade
and Ahmed Jabari to kill many Jews and quite a few Palestinians.
The assassinations were a major security breach for Hamas' internal security apparatus. They must be very antsy now.
The attack on Deif,
followed by the elimination of Hamas' top operatives in southern Gaza
Mohammed Abu Shamaleh, Mohammed Barhoum and Raed al-Attar, show that the
Shin Bet had managed to follow their every move and keep track of what
they were doing. The Israeli Air Force, acting on intelligence from the
IDF and the Shin Bet, tied up the remaining loose ends.
Having said all that,
Israelis should be aware of the fact that targeted killings are just one
means of achieving deterrence. They are not supposed to make or break a
campaign. Yes, they hurt Hamas by depriving it of the stamina it needs
to fight us. They may peel off some bark, but that is not enough to cut
down the tree. If Israel wants to deny Hamas its capacity to perpetrate
terrorism, it must destroy its military infrastructure. Once that has
been taken care of, the task of demilitarizing Gaza would become a whole
lot easier.
The legitimacy lent to the
Israeli operation in Gaza over the past six weeks has been sky high. We
must seize the moment, we do not need more Israeli fatalities as a
pretext for a Gaza invasion to root out terrorism. It is time for the
Gaza sequel to Operation Defensive Shield.
Avi Dichter
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=9721
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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