by Prof. Efraim Inbar
Actually, the fall of the Assad regime is nowadays an Israeli interest. The demise of this regime would be a terrible blow to its regional allies -- Iran and Hezbollah. Damascus, an old ally of Tehran, is the linchpin of the Shiite crescent.
As the Assad regime is
losing its grip over the country, Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, both
active defenders of the regime, are gaining greater freedom of action
and trying to change the status quo along Israel's northern border. Both
are ideologically committed to the destruction of Israel and are trying
to establish a new operations stage against Israel on the Syrian side
of the Golan Heights -- something that Assad has resisted for years.
Hezbollah seeks an
additional arena from where it can harm Israel because conducting
operations against the Jewish state from Lebanon is problematic, due to
domestic political constraints (primarily fear of escalation and
spillover effects on the Lebanese economy). Iran has a perennial
interest in bleeding Israel. Creating a new threat from Syria serves
this purpose. A new front in Syria will also to enhance its ability to
deter an Israeli attack on its nuclear installations.
The helicopter attack
in Syria on senior commanders of Hezbollah and Iran, just beyond the
border with Israel, seems to signal that Jerusalem will not tolerate the
opening of a new front. It is not clear that the Israeli-enunciated red
line will be effective. Hezbollah's response -- attacking an Israeli
military convoy in the border area between the Golan Heights and Lebanon
-- was measured, but indicated a tit for tat modus operandi.
Israel's
counter-response was also measured, showing that the government was
reluctant to escalate intentionally and preferred to contain the
violence. This is also what transpires from Israel's behavior in its war
against Hamas during the summer of 2014. While Israel's cautious
response is laudable in many respects, the limited Israeli military
response to Hezbollah's attack does not enhance deterrence.
Deterrence can be
enhanced, however, if Israel makes preparations for a large-scale
operation against Hezbollah. This means building the necessary ground
forces and training for Lebanese scenarios.
Such a build-up process is
not clearly evident so far, and Hezbollah might deduce that its huge
arsenal (over 100,000 missiles) creates an effective deterrent. As the
number of attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon increased in recent
months, the long period of quiet since 2006 seems more fragile. Perhaps
Hezbollah is less afraid to hit Israeli targets. Deterrence against
highly motivated rivals such as Hezbollah is always temporary and wears
off with time. Israeli restraint is not conducive to restoration of
deterrence. Therefore, the capability to destroy the Hezbollah missile
threat is needed for deterring this radical organization, but also in
case Israel finds it necessary to address such a threat before it
attacks the Iranian nuclear infrastructure.
The attempts to change
the security equation in the north call for a reassessment of Israel's
policies toward Assad. If he is no longer able to resist the desire of
Iran and Hezbollah to perpetrate terrorist acts against Israel from
beyond the Golan Heights, his usefulness for Israel becomes limited. It
is true that the civil war in Syria, where bad guys fight bad guys, is a
convenient strategic development. Moreover, Israel (among other actors)
has very limited influence on the outcome of the bloody struggle, but
the survival of the Assad regime should no longer be a factor in
Israel's strategic calculations.
Actually, the fall of
the Assad regime is nowadays an Israeli interest. The demise of this
regime would be a terrible blow to its regional allies -- Iran and
Hezbollah. Damascus, an old ally of Tehran, is the linchpin of the
Shiite crescent. And Iran is the most dangerous enemy of Israel and the
main source for regional instability. The fall of Assad would also
weaken Hezbollah considerably. It would reduce Hezbollah-Iranian
influence in Lebanon and make the Hezbollah military build-up a more
complicated enterprise. A Hezbollah without Iranian control of Damascus
might spare Israel the need to intervene militarily in Lebanon in order
to deal with the missile threat.
If Assad falls, it is
not clear what will happen in Syria, but it is certain that Sunni
radical groups will be more influential and the struggle over
controlling parts of the country will continue. Yet, substate groups are
generally less of a security threat than states. Assad-led Syria still
has a chemical weapons arsenal and there are reports that it is trying
to revive its nuclear weapon program.
An Israeli
predisposition to discard Assad is also useful in Jerusalem's relations
with Saudi Arabia, which loathes the Assad regime and understands that
its fall will curtail the growing Iranian influence in the Middle East.
It is the Iranian threat that constitutes the strategic glue between the
two states.
Of course, the Obama
administration does not grasp the Iranian threat and continues its
ill-advised attempts to reach an agreement with Iran, which allows
Tehran to keep its option to build nuclear weapons. It tries to
strengthen the Shiite control of Baghdad, seems to cooperate with Assad
against ISIS, which turned out to be a mere strategic distraction, and
accepts the Shiite Houthis' takeover of Yemen. Therefore, the
Syrian-Lebanese nexus could become another issue of divergence between
Jerusalem and Washington. Consequently, the paralysis of Barack Obama's
Middle East policy increasingly becomes an Israeli interest as well.
Efraim Inbar is
director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, a professor of
political studies at Bar-Ilan University, and a Shillman/Ginsburg
fellow at the Middle East Forum.
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=11447
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
1 comment:
The Obama administration WANTS Iran to get the bomb ! END OF QUOTE !!!
THAT FACT has to be the main point of considering any new strategy against Iran.
In less than 2 years Obama is gone and out, but the mullahs will still be there.
It is clear, that Irans nuclear installations will have to be taken out during the rest of Obamas term and the fall of Assad would seriously weaken Irans possibility to strike in retaliation against Israel...all other considerations must be blacked out.
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