by Prof. Eyal Zisser
The first signs of change in Nasrallah's position became noticeable as early as three years ago, when he ordered the terrorist attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria. Over the past year, however, the writing on the wall has become abundantly clearer, illustrated by a series of attacks against Israeli forces along the border
When the Second Lebanon
War ended, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah apologized to his Shiite
constituency for dragging them into a war with Israel.
"Had we known that the
kidnapping of the soldiers would have led to this, we would definitely
not have done it," he said at the time. "We did not think that the
capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask
me if I had known on July 11 ... that the operation would lead to such a
war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not." Since then, he has held
true to his apology and has stringently upheld the quiet along the
border.
This is no longer the
case. Over the past year a strategic shift has occurred along Israel's
borders with Lebanon and Syria. This shift doesn't necessarily stem from
a decision Nasrallah has made to go to war with Israel. Quite the
opposite, it appears he still isn't interested in such a confrontation
and would prefer to avoid it if possible. The essence of the change is
that in contrast to the past nine years, Nasrallah is no longer deterred
by the idea of war and is prepared to take risks that could drag him
and Israel into a new conflagration. Thus, to paraphrase the comments he
made after the Second Lebanon War, Nasrallah's message today is: Even
if I know the steps I take could lead to war, I am prepared to take that
risk and plunge the region into war.
It appears therefore
that the passing years have dulled Nasrallah's memory to the point where
he no longer remembers the ravages of the previous war, while perhaps
also restoring his lost self-confidence. It is also possible that
because of his weakness -- domestically, versus his political rivals in
Lebanon and outside it, against the rebels in Syria, where he has been
sucked into the quagmire of the bloody and yet undecided civil war -- he
feels he must show more daring and abandon restraint, lest Israel
interpret such restraint as weakness. Incidentally, the fact that
Hezbollah is bogged down in the Syrian mud has not diminished its
determination to confront Israel. Actually, the organization has
attained invaluable operational experience and its fighters and
commanders have gained confidence.
The first signs of
change in Nasrallah's position became noticeable as early as three years
ago, when he ordered the terrorist attack on Israeli tourists in
Bulgaria. Over the past year, however, the writing on the wall has
become abundantly clearer, illustrated by a series of attacks against
Israeli forces along the border -- first with roadside bombs and then
with short-range fire last January toward an IDF border patrol.
Nasrallah took full responsibility, in no uncertain terms, for each of
these attacks.
Over the past few
weeks, events along the northern border indicated another escalation.
Supposedly, there is no link between all these incidents, and yet the
fact remains that in most of the cases the trail leads back to Hezbollah
-- whether it was a weapons shipment earmarked for the group,
reportedly bombed by the Israel Defense Forces on Syrian soil; or
whether it was Syrian terrorists from the Druze villages along the
border, killed while trying to infiltrate Israel -- either inspired or
directly encouraged by Hezbollah.
Moreover, throughout
the years Hezbollah has refrained from retaliating to Israeli action
taken inside Syria, employing an approach that it must focus itself in
Lebanon and let the Syrian regime respond, if it wants to, against
Israel. We can also assume that Hezbollah knew it would struggle to
explain to the Lebanese people why they were being dragged into another
fight with Israel on behalf of Bashar Assad. But this is no longer the
reality. Hezbollah's increasing involvement in Syria has, in its view,
obligated the organization to its fighters in Syria and to its weapons
being moved from Syria to Lebanon -- and perhaps in the future to also
defend Assad from Israel. The possible significance of this newfound
commitment is that Hezbollah will retaliate to any Israeli action in the
Syrian arena, something the organization has thus far refrained from
and which would trigger a severe Israeli counter-response. Indeed, for
its part Israel cannot allow Hezbollah to limit its freedom of action in
the Syrian arena.
Hezbollah's increasing
involvement in developments along the Israeli-Syrian border, along with
its growing boldness against Israel, may be an indication that the
countdown to the next round of fighting has already begun.
Prof. Eyal Zisser
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=12437
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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