Beware the external forces pulling Syria's strings - Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

Syrian President Bashar Assad relies heavily on foreign support for his survival • Russia, Iran and Hezbollah's growing involvement and vested interests in Syria are a cause for concern for Israel, especially since the U.S. remains hesitant.

 

Syrian President Bashar Assad | Photo credit: Reuters

Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime has all but ceased to exist, even if he still seems to have a tight grip on most of Damascus and the coastal city of Latakia, a known Alawite stronghold. What is left of Assad's rule, however, relies heavily on the foreign support lent to his regime. 

One of the fundamental elements that affords Assad's battered regime a semblance of legitimacy is the slivers of loyalty still demonstrated by small portions of the Syrian people and army, alongside the various militias Assad has been able to rally to his side from among the minorities that fear the rise of the Sunni majority.

Another element allowing Assad some breathing room is Iran. Tehran has a vested interest in the Syrian president's survival, as he is a key component in the "Shiite spectrum" it is trying to establish from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, to Lebanon. Without Syria, the Shiite spectrum will crumble, especially if the Sunni jihadi elements overrun Iraq and aid the radical forces trying to topple Assad. This may translate into a direct threat to Iran, which is why Assad's survival is critical to it. 

 

The third element propping up Assad is Hezbollah. The Shiite terrorist group has so far lost over 1,000 operatives fighting the rebel groups seeking to overthrow the Syrian president -- a sizeable number for an organization believed to comprise some 20,000 operatives.

For Hezbollah, Syria represents a dual objective: Firstly, it is part of the Iranian-Shiite interest, and Hezbollah is, after all, Iran's proxy in the region; and secondly Hezbollah has its own reasons for hoping Assad weathers the storm, as it knows that without his sympathetic ear in Damascus it would encounter significant difficulties maintaining its own interests in Lebanon.

The fourth element is Russia. After cementing its grip in Crimea, and observing the U.S.'s conduct during the nuclear negotiations with Iran, Russia has realized that no one would try to stop its gambit in Syria, even if it is believed to exceed the acceptable parameters of aid to Assad.

Moscow is using Damascus as a means by which to showcase its military might, as seen from the scope, deployment, and advanced nature of the weapons introduced to the war-torn country. Russia may have always been Syria's partner in intelligence gathering and armament, but now it is its partner in fighting. 

The Russian interests are complex. Moscow is wary of the rise of Sunni Islam, knowing it would eventually bolster is [its] reach within Russia. It would also like to preserve its small naval base in Latakia, and perhaps even expand it. 

The Kremlin also seeks to prove that unlike the White House, Russia's allies can count on it in times of trouble; that it does not abandon its friends. If Russia has any say in the matter, Assad's fate will starkly contrast that of deposed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and it will clearly illustrate the difference between Moscow and Washington, even it if ruffles some U.S. feathers along the way.

The rebels do not have formidable forces such as Russia, Iran and Hezbollah by their side, which is why the three are likely to save Assad's regime. However, those supporting Assad would most likely have to increase their involvement in Syria to sustain him further, or the rebels will be able to consistently regain the upper hand. 

The embattled Syrian president has exhausted his resources and from now on, every crisis that befalls Syria will have to be dealt with by external forces. As a result, the Russians and the Iranians would have to coordinate their moves on the ground, and while this may prove challenging, it is not impossible.

The question Assad's allies will face in the future will be how far they wish to become involved in Syria, especially as its regime fails, over and over again, to fight the various Sunni groups. Given the Sunnis' absolute quantitative advantage in the region, this may prove a bottomless pit, especially since there is no doubt that the adversary Sunni coalition will spare no effort to undercut Assad's supporters. 

Even if the anti-Assad elements in Syria prove unable to defeat those standing beside him, they could still generate continued, unyielding resistance. This pro-Sunni coalition will be funded by the Saudis and the Persian Gulf states, and Turkey -- concerned by the growing Russian presence on their southern border and driven by its leadership's animosity toward Assad -- will undoubtedly provide it with the logistic support it needs.

The U.S. will soon have to decide where it stands in the Middle East, meaning if it will sit idly by or take an active part in the efforts to topple Assad, thereby undermining the Russian-Iranian effort to preserve the Alawite regime. 

Washington is hesitant at this time, because on the one hand it has decided to distance itself from the Middle East, while on the other hand, it is very involved in the war against the Islamic State group. 

This will all come down to whether the U.S. allows its adversaries in the Middle East and worldwide to take advantage of what is being perceived as weak American policies, or will it decide to act in a way that would reinstate its regional influence. The Russians and the Iranians will do their best to capitalize on what they believe is the U.S.'s hesitance, and while Washington will never admit it, this is the price it is paying for the weakness it demonstrated during the nuclear negotiations with Tehran. 

Assad's deterioration created a need, and the U.S.'s reluctance to get involved created a vacuum that enabled Russia and Iran to step in. Any American-Russian coordination on Syria will be interpreted as Washington's acceptance of the new reality, which will only undermine its position in the Middle East further. 

Israel has no clear interest in the results of the Syrian civil war, as nearly all the parties involved seek its annihilation. In my opinion, Israel would be better off dealing with enemies that do not enjoy the backing of any state, even if they happen to be offshoots of al-Qaida or Islamic State, than with an enemy that has the backing of a nation as powerful as Iran. For this reason, Israel must remain adamant in its efforts to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament, even if it may indirectly help the Syrian rebels. 

Israel must also retain the right to retaliate over attacks on its interests in the Golan Heights, even at the risk of undermining Iranian interests. Under no circumstances can Iran be allowed to establish yet another bridgehead from which it could wage war on Israel, this time from Syria. 

Israel should make its intentions clear to all, and it should state that it plans to follow its strategic principles, despite the Russian deployment in Syria. 

While the Russians have become neighbors parked on potential flashpoints between Israel and one of its most bitter adversaries, the Russian deployment cannot interfere in imperative IDF operations. This piece was written prior to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Moscow, and it is likely this was one of the issues he raised during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=28493

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