The Israeli example - Lilach Shoval

by Lilach Shoval

Israel's fence on the Egyptian border has been a resounding success in curbing infiltrators and terrorist activity, which is why some European states are now taking an interest • The defense establishment's next concern pertains to the Jordanian border.

 

The Israeli barrier fence along the Egyptian border | Photo credit: Moshe Milner / GPO

Thousands of refugees are flooding into Europe. They are arriving from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, crossing Turkey and Greece on land, or dangerous waters on dilapidated boats. To the chagrin of many European citizens, several European countries have decided to take in these refugees. Other countries, among them Hungary and Croatia, have decided independently to close their borders with barbed wire and guards.

Several years ago Israel coped with a similar problem. Tens of thousands of refugees from Sudan and Eritrea arrived at the open border with Egypt and streamed into Israel, mainly to Tel Aviv. In contrast to Europe, the problem in Israel developed over a period of years. According to figures from the Population and Immigration Authority, until 2006 some 2,700 people entered Israel via its southern border. Beyond those who infiltrated, the border had become a breeding ground for illegal activities like smuggling drugs, prostitutes, cigarettes and sometimes terrorist elements. Prior to the Israel Defense Forces' withdrawal from Gaza in the summer of 2005, senior defense establishment officials believed the border between Israel and Egypt would become a primary weak point in relation to terrorist activity. The concern was that terrorist elements from Gaza would make their way into Egypt, and from there to Israel, through the breaches in the border.

The tale of a barrier

To cope with the problem the defense establishment came up with the so-called Hourglass plan, based primarily on the construction of an electronic fence along the southern border, along with dispersing other obstacles in the area. However, due to the high cost of the endeavor, estimated at a few billion shekels, the decision to begin the construction plan was repeatedly shelved.

Delaying the construction of the fence emerged as a mistake, as the defense establishment's early assessments proved accurate. After the IDF's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip the problem on the southern border worsened, and criminal activity along the border expanded in scope. 

Simultaneously, a stream of thousands of Sudanese and Eritrean refugees had begun making its way into Israel. In 2008, according to the Population and Immigration Authority, 8,799 infiltrators entered the country, while the number stood at 5,235 in 2009 (the drop due to Operation Cast Lead).

The directives issued to IDF soldiers were simple. The moment it became apparent the threat was not terrorist in nature, soldiers were to gather the infiltrators onto military vans. The soldiers were even given orders not to send them back to Egypt. Once the stream of infiltrators became unacceptable, and in light of the fact that the border was also being exploited for terrorist activity, in July of 2010 the government instructed the Defense Ministry to erect a border fence between Israel and Egypt. The Defense Ministry established a special administration, headed by Brig. Gen. Eran Ofir, who brought together the ministry's construction, operational and engineering departments for the project.

With the decision to begin construction of the fence, the number of infiltrators jumped significantly. In 2010 no less than 14,702 people entered the country illegally, while in 2011, when construction work was already well under way, the number reached 17,312.

The unyielding flow of infiltrators led the Defense Ministry to expedite the fence's construction, and in August of 2011 it announced the fence would be built at a pace of 700 yards per day. A year later, in 2012, with sections of the fence already built, 10,441 people infiltrated the country.

According to the Defense Ministry, over 100 contractors in charge of 600 construction crews took part in the complex project, using hundreds of machines and employing more than 1,000 workers. To shorten the timetable, the work took place at dozens of points along the designated fence line, every day of the week and often at nights. A little over two years after the work had begun, in December 2012, the Defense Ministry announced the completion of the 230-kilometer (143-mile) fence, not including several unfinished kilometers near Eilat.

It must be noted that the fence itself is not uniform, as it runs through completely different topographical areas. For instance, it covers a sandy plain on one area, and a mountain range in another.

Building the fence in the Eilat environs was the toughest challenge. The complex topography, including high and steep cliffs and wadis, required no less than a year and a half of work. 

According to the Defense Ministry, the barrier along the Eilat area was "the most complicated engineering project in the ministry's history, and one of the most complex projects since the establishment of the state." This was because the barrier was built in a rocky mountainous area previously inaccessible to vehicles. In spite of the difficulties, the defense establishment considered the fence's construction to be of the utmost importance, in this area in particular, because a great number of infiltrators crossed the border in that area.

Following the completion of the Eilat portion, the fence today stretches across 242 kilometers (150 miles). The effects were almost instantaneous: In 2013, a mere 74 infiltrators entered Israel; 43 of them were caught at the border. In 2014 only 43 infiltrators were recorded.

Beyond the fence's positive effects in preventing infiltrators to Israel, it is impossible to ignore the inherent security advantages it provides. Defense establishment officials always made it clear that criminal activity along the border can serve as a foundation for hostile and terrorist activity against IDF soldiers and Israeli civilians.

The next problematic border

Indeed, it is no secret that in recent years the Sinai Peninsula has become a terrorist breeding ground. At this stage, terrorist groups are primarily focusing their rage at Egyptian security forces, although we can recall attacks against Israeli targets, such as the 2011 attack at Ein Netafim and the "burning wheels" attack in 2012.

The main terrorist group active there today is the Wilayat Sinai, formerly known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. In October 2014, mostly due to ideological and economic considerations, the group swore allegiance to Islamic State, and today its operational capabilities in the region can no longer be ignored. Israeli officials assume it is just a matter of time until the group turns its weapons on Israel. We will only note that its members have already fired rockets at the southern Negev, and that the group also cooperates with Hamas in Gaza.

Therefore defense establishment officials stress that without the barrier fence, sections of which are currently being made into a "smart fence," Israel would be in an entirely different position today on its southern border. Try imagining for a moment, defense officials say, what terrorist organizations could do if the border with Egypt was fenceless.

With that, and despite the encouraging trend, it is important to note that it is still possible to breach the fence with heavy machinery. Indeed, there is no such thing as a complete seal, even when it comes to infiltrators. In recent months, specifically since the High Court of Justice decision to limit the amount of time a person can be held at the Holot detention center in the country's south, there has been a slight rise in the number of infiltrators from Sinai. Officials at the IDF's GOC Southern Command say that in the past few months several dozen foreigners have successfully bypassed the barrier by climbing it, often aided by tall ladders. As in the past, the present directives issued to soldiers is not to open fire at infiltrators if it is clear they are not involved in terrorist or criminal activity, rather to transfer them to the Holot detention center.

The defense establishment's next concern pertains to the Israel-Jordan border. Israeli officials point out that after the closing of the Egyptian border, it stands to reason that the open border with Jordan, which is also Israel's longest, will be exploited as an entrance point for infiltrators and hostile terrorist activity.

Israeli defense officials have a plan to build a fence along the Jordanian border as well, but due to budgetary considerations it has been decided at this point not to construct it. However, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently decided on the construction of a 30-kilometer (19-mile) section between Eilat and the Samar sand dunes in the Arava region. The decision primarily stemmed from the establishment of the new airport near Timna Park, slated to replace the airport in Eilat. The cost of building that section of the fence is around 300 million shekels ($76 million), and Defense Ministry officials said the planned barrier will be predicated on the model developed on the northern Golan Heights and Egyptian borders, in accordance with the Arava's unique topography.

It is doubtful these 30 kilometers will suffice, especially in light of the fact that Jordan has been flooded in recent months by thousands of Syrian refugees. We can only hope that this time Israel will have provided the cure before the malady spreads.

Lilach Shoval

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=28485

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