by Maj. Gen. (ret.) David Ivry
Maj. Gen. (ret.) David Ivry on the substantial changes in the credibility and validity of nuclear deterrence. Is there a point in promoting an agreement for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons?
Mathematically, deterrence is made up of the perception of
the capabilities times the intention and willingness to put them to use.
Over the last few decades, the number of military conflicts has risen
dramatically, but they were all local or regional in scope, and nuclear
deterrence was never considered.
The characteristics of the military conflicts of the last
few decades, that were mostly low-intensity or asymmetrical, led to a
situation where the limitations concerning the employment of
conventional power determined the dosage, or intensity of that
employment. Conventional power was never employed to its maximum
potential. Obviously, in such situations, no one believes that it is
possible to cause one of the sides to reach the threshold of justifying
the employment of nuclear power.
The intention element in the deterrence equation equals
zero. The result of anything multiplied by zero is, naturally, zero. In
other words, no nuclear deterrence exists in the context of such
conflicts.
During the Cold War era, many non-nuclear countries
sheltered under the nuclear umbrellas of the leading superpowers, thus
justifying their policies of avoiding the development of nuclear
capabilities of their own. Whereas these countries could still be
involved in limited-scope conflicts (and some were highly likely to
become involved in such conflicts), and whereas nuclear deterrence is
not actually a part of such conflicts, those countries must reconsider
their policies regarding their military capabilities. Can they still
rely on the assistance or actual involvement of other friendly forces?
Accordingly, they also have to reconsider their policies regarding
nuclear capabilities of their own.
We are witnessing the superpowers avoiding the employment
of conventional power in various conflicts, and considerable hesitation
on their part regarding the intensity of the power they do employ. The
USA hesitated about attacking in Syria after it was proven that the
Syrian Army had employed chemical weapons. When the issue of disarming
the world of chemical weapons was on the agenda, it was explained that
whenever chemical weapons were employed, the option of employing the
nuclear capability will always be available. In the Syrian case, even
conventional weapons were not employed. I do not ignore the diplomatic
achievement – Syria was disarmed of numerous elements of its chemical
weapon arsenal – but that had no effect on the fact that many countries
still faced questions marks regarding the extent to which they could
rely on external forces.
Two trends of thought have evolved among non-nuclear
countries, regarding the significance of the erosion in the credibility
of the nuclear umbrella. Does it necessitate the development of an
independent nuclear capability while risking a violation of the NPT, or
will it be pointless to develop such a capability as no deterrence can
be achieved through it in the context of limited-scope conflicts anyway.
In the new Middle East, the discourse regarding a regional
nuclear disarmament has restarted very intensively. In the early 1990s,
14 countries, including Israel, participated in the Arms Control and
Regional Security in the Middle East (ACRS) multilateral talks. The
countries from the region that did not participate in the talks were
Syria, Iran and Iraq. In those days it was already established that Iraq
had violated the treaty, and there were concerns about Iran and Syria
as well.
The substantial changes in the credibility and validity of
nuclear deterrence in the context of limited-scope conflicts and the
questionable credibility and validity of the NPT after three countries
from this region had violated their commitment to that treaty and were
not treated as required raise a serious question: is there a point in
promoting an agreement for a region free of nuclear weapons to which the
State of Israel should commit, subject to certain provisions? If we
only considered the credibility and validity aspects, it would seem to
me that Israel should avoid any such commitment, namely – it must not
rely on the credibility of disarmament. The considerations should be
contemplated in the context of other political interests, such as the
interests of initiating a regional discourse as a
normalization-promoting element.
Maj. Gen. (ret.) David Ivry
Source: http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/nuclear-deterrence-credibility-validity-seriously-eroded
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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