by Prof. Eyal Zisser
The reality in Gaza has persisted for decades, perhaps dating back to the first Intifada and the subsequent Oslo Accords, which effectively shut the door on Gazans seeking to work in Israel.
The Gaza Strip
dominated the headlines this week. At the beginning of the week, the
State Comptroller issued his report criticizing the political and
military leadership's handling of Operation Protective Edge. Then, IDF
Military Intelligence Directorate commander Maj. Gen. Herzl Halevi said
Gaza was on the verge of an economic collapse that could lead to renewed
hostilities along the border. The week ended with Hamas' military wing
declaring its determination to answer any Israeli action by retaliating,
even if that retaliation is limited in scope, and even if it ends up
drawing the sides into all-out conflict.
Interestingly, the
comptroller's report on Gaza only created waves in the Israeli media --
in the Arab world, the report was largely ignored. A stark contrast to
the Winograd report on the Second Lebanon War, which was appropriated by
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah who still uses it as proof of
Hezbollah's "divine victory" over Israel. In this case, Hamas never even
tried presenting Protective Edge as a victory or an achievement for the
organization.
The important question
from Israel's perspective, however, isn't of course what transpired on
the Gaza border three years ago, but what could transpire in the coming
months. It was in this context that Halevi voiced his concern over
Gaza's dire economic situation.
In this regard, it
should be noted that the harsh reality in Gaza is not the outcome of the
past few months, or even years. The reality in Gaza has persisted for
decades, perhaps dating back to the first Intifada and the subsequent
Oslo Accords, which effectively shut the door on Gazans seeking to work
in Israel. The Gaza economy largely relies on broad financial aid from
the United Nations, and more recently from Qatar as well. It goes
without saying that Israel, too, gives Gaza water and electricity.
Things are indeed dismal, but the situation in Gaza is better than in
parts of the Arab world, certainly better than disaster areas such as
Syria; and Gazans have it better than the millions of Syrian refugees in
Lebanon and Jordan.
It is also worth
mentioning that Hamas is fighting on more than one front, and that its
conflict with Israel might not even be its top priority at the moment.
To its south, there is Egypt, which does little to conceal its desire to
settle a score with Hamas. Their relationship can only be described as
one of mutual distrust. Alongside its clashes with Israel and Egypt,
Hamas is also coping with jihadist-Salafi groups in Gaza that want to
undermine and replace it. These groups are responsible for the lion's
share of recent rocket attacks against Israel.
Hamas is currently
being steered by a new leadership lacking in experience. The movement's
current leaders hail from Hamas' military wing, which rushed to issue a
warning this weekend that if Israel continues to strike Hamas targets in
retaliation for rocket attacks, Hamas will feel free to force an
equation like the one between Israel and Lebanon, where Israel's hands
are effectively tied against Hezbollah. This declaration is undeniably
disconcerting, because it indicates the direction Hamas wants to pursue,
even if it appears to be trying to preserve calm along the border for
the time being.
Ultimately, Operation Protective
Edge teaches us that both sides can be dragged into a fight that neither
side wants. For Israel, the Gaza war didn't happen because it failed to
pursue diplomatic alternatives, of which Hamas can never be a part, but
because it misunderstood the actions of the other side.
Prof. Eyal Zisser
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=18541
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