by Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen
A linkage – tacitly if not explicitly expressed – has again been created between the White House’s support for Israel’s demands in the Iranian-Syrian arena and what is required of Israel in the Palestinian Arab arena. This is dangerous for Israel.
The greatest threat to Israel’s existence is
neither Shiite militias on the Golan border nor the Iranian nuclear
threat, which are of physical and military nature. It is instead the
threat of a Palestinian state within the Clinton parameters, which would
entail dividing Jerusalem and withdrawing to the 1967 lines. The
Netanyahu government’s reluctance to build in key parts of Jerusalem
such as Givat Hamatos, which is on the seam line between east Jerusalem
and the Beit Safafa neighborhood, shows how much – despite the change in
the White House – the division of Jerusalem is still seen as essential
to reaching an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.
A dynamic of change
A
critical look at recent developments in Syria reveals how unpredictably
reality can change. Only two years ago, the Israeli defense
establishment assessed that the collapse of the Syrian army, which
eliminated the scenario of a Syrian attack on Israel’s northern border,
meant the IDF could scale back its order of battle. Yet today, with new
threats emerging, Defense Minister Liberman is asking for a budget
supplement.
Taking the dynamic of change into
account also means reconsidering the premises of Israel’s security
concept regarding the threat of a Palestinian state. For years, security
experts have claimed that in the new era, territorial strategic depth
is no longer needed to defend the population centers in Israel’s coastal
plain. But media reports about the IDF’s recent large-scale exercise in
the north, which was aimed at the threat of Hezbollah forces invading
Israeli communities, puts that premise in doubt.
The
new challenge posed by Hezbollah and Hamas, together with the advent of
Shiite militias in the Syrian arena with no promise of their removal
through superpower intervention, requires a rethinking of the potential
risk of a Palestinian state. If, in the reality that is developing,
Israel should find itself no longer in control of the Jordan Valley,
militia forces could slip under the radar of international monitors and
reach as far as the urban seam lines of Jerusalem, Kfar Saba, and
Netanya.
A conception for 2017
The
Agranat Commission attributed the surprise of the Yom Kippur War to a
faulty conception. But a conception is indispensable to grasping reality
and functioning within it. The lesson, therefore, is not to eschew a
conception entirely, but to be aware of the need to subject it to
critical scrutiny.
The experts who support a
withdrawal from the West Bank in the context of a two-state solution
maintain an almost unshakable conception based on three assumptions:
- If Israel withdraws from the territories and the international community agrees to recognize this move as the end of the 'occupation', Israel will be granted legitimacy to act in self-defense;
- in the face of a serious threat, the Israeli leadership will be able to make the requisite decision at the right time – an IDF offensive in the 'West Bank'; and
- given their operational and technological superiority, IDF forces will be able to achieve victory in a few days.
It
is not only changes in the phenomenon of warfare that put this
conception in doubt. Its validity must also be questioned in a reality
that may well force Israel to fight on more than one front.
A change in the international arena
Since
the Oslo process began in the fall of 1993, dramatic changes have
occurred in the international arena as well. For Prime Minister Rabin,
Oslo was based on the superpower status of the US. The Soviet Union, and
with it the Warsaw Pact, had collapsed. The Cold War threat had ended
in Europe. The world appeared to be moving towards stability and
prosperity – a global order under American hegemony.
At
the time, the Arabs were in a state of crisis and aware of their
weakness – all the more so after the US vanquished Iraq in the First
Gulf War in the winter of 1991. American superiority was evident in
terms of technology and also in terms of its ability to lead the
coalition army, which included Arab expeditionary forces from Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria. It was that awareness of weakness, along with
the PLO leadership’s state of strategic inadequacy, that paved the way
to the Oslo process.
Meanwhile, over the years,
the US’s hegemonic power has declined while Russia has returned to play
an active and very influential role. A phenomenon has emerged of small,
protracted wars with a new logic. Western Europe is now threatened by
the Russian intervention in Ukraine. From Afghanistan to Yemen, Syria,
and Libya, radical Islamic forces have learned how, despite their
inferiority and in fact by virtue of it, they can engage in warfare that
constantly undermines the stability so needed by the West.
Something
essential has changed, too, with regard to expectations in the
Israeli-Palestinian sphere. At first, in the early days of Oslo, the
expectations were of mutual goodwill and reconciliation. Over the years,
however, as the cycle of blood has continued, the belief in Palestinian
acceptance of Israel in return for Israeli concessions has been
transformed in the Israeli discourse into nothing more than the need to
separate from the Palestinian Arabs – “They’re there, we’re here” – only
on our own behalf.
The more the proponents of
separation have honed their efforts to explain to Israeli society that
separation is mandated by reality, enabling Israel to preserve its
identity as Jewish and democratic, the more the Palestinians’ bargaining
power has grown. If a withdrawal from the 'West Bank' and the
establishment of a Palestinian Arab state is a clear-cut Israeli
interest, if the Israelis must retreat in any case for the sake of their
own future, why should the Palestinians give something in return? From
their standpoint, there is no need for reciprocity. They are only
getting what is coming to them in terms of their national right to
self-determination.
Hence the risk is increasing that a withdrawal from the 'West Bank' will not only fail to end the conflict but will in fact lead to its intensification. Here it is important to reconsider whether, if Israel goes back to the 1967 borders with minor adjustments for the settlement blocs (which constitute no more than 3% of the 'West Bank'), it will still retain the conditions necessary for self-defense. Beyond the physical aspects of security, it is worth heeding the words of senior Fatah official Abbas Zaki on why he supports the two-state solution:
"In
my opinion, the two-state solution will bring about Israel’s collapse.
If they leave Jerusalem, what will all the talk about the Promised Land
and the Chosen People be worth? What will the sacrifices they have made
be worth? They accord a spiritual status to Jerusalem. The Jews see
Judea and Samaria as their historic dream. If the Jews leave those
places, the Zionist idea will begin to collapse…to implode. Then we will
be able to go forward…. "(ANB/TV, May 7, 2009)
Abbas
Zaki well understands – better than many Israelis – the significance of
the Jewish spiritual dimension as a condition for the state of Israel’s
continued existence. The potential for implosion entailed by this
threat is far more dangerous than the Iranian threat, even including its
nuclear aspects. Given the changes in the region, the Israeli national
order of priorities now mandates rethinking and revising the logic of
the security discourse.
A BESA Center Perspectives Paper, published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen is a senior research associate the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He served in the IDF for 42 years, commanding troops in battle on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. He was a Corps commander, and commander of the IDF Military Colleges.
Source: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/21155
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