by Yaakov Lappin
Hidden from view is the titanic struggle raging 24 hours a day between Israel’s security forces and Palestinian terrorists.
Sgt. Solomon Gavriyah z'l, age 20, Israeli border policeman killed in the Har Adar attack on September 26, 2017
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The recent terror attack that
killed three Israelis in Har Adar is a reminder of the fragile security
situation across Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Most of the time, the
situation looks calm. But hidden from view is the titanic struggle
raging 24 hours a day between Israel’s security forces and Palestinian
terrorists. The latter work relentlessly to try and commit atrocities.
In July and August alone, the Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency and
the IDF thwarted more than 70 terror cells in the territories that were
planning and trying to execute attacks.
There are two main kinds of threats the Israeli security forces work to prevent: unorganized and organized.
When it comes to the world of organized terrorism,
Hamas leads the way. In Gaza, Hamas has become an Islamist government,
and it commands its own army and rocket arsenal. But in the territories,
it still operates like a terrorist organization. Hamas is continuously
trying to set up, fund, and arm cells in the territories, and dispatch
them on jihadist missions against Israeli targets – on both sides of the
1949 armistice line.
These efforts usually run into a brick wall, otherwise known as Israel’s counter-terrorism operations.
Those efforts include cracking down on weapons
factories in the territories. In recent months, the Shin Bet and the
army have raided dozens of weapons-producing metal workshops, seizing
large quantities of guns in the process. These raids have contributed to
the decrease in the number of shooting attacks.
At the same time, Israel has undergone a
revolution in its ability to tackle unorganized terrorism in the form of
lone attackers. Shin Bet chief Nadav Argaman said his agency has used the cyber domain to track down 2,000 suspected terrorists since the start of 2016.
Another key player in combating terrorism,
particularly Hamas’s brand of organized cells, is the IDF’s Military
Intelligence Directorate.
For decades, the directorate has been working with
IDF Central Command, the entity responsible for all military operations
in the territories. Together, they combat Hamas, working to prevent
mass-casualty attacks of the type that ravaged Israeli cities during the
second intifada. At that time, Hamas used strongholds in the
territories like Nablus and Hebron to launch waves of suicide bombers
and gunmen in a bloody terrorist campaign that peaked in 2002.
That year, the IDF launched Operation Defensive
Shield and re-entered cities in the territories, taking back control and
eventually stamping out attacks. Since then, those who plot terrorism
in the territories more often than not end up in custody, as Israel’s
intelligence web detects and pre-empts them. Although the territories
remained out of Hamas’s reach, Gaza fell to the terror group in a
violent coup in 2007.
Fearing Hamas would replicate its Gazan revolution
in the territories, the Palestinian Authority (PA) began launching
frequent raids of its own on Hamas, working to repress the Islamist
organization. Those efforts continue to this day.
By 2010, Hamas had grown frustrated over its
ongoing failure to set up shop in the territories. It decided on a new
route to create a presence, choosing to set up charities, religious
organizations, schools and mosques. This social-religious program, known
as “Da’wa” in Arabic, provides assistance to downtrodden Palestinians,
building up popular support for Hamas as an alternative to Fatah. Hamas
can eventually convert this religious-political affiliation into
terrorist recruits.
Palestinian families who have received years of
financial aid from Hamas will be open to its radical Islamic incitement
and more responsive to its call to act.
The same tactic is applied at Palestinian
universities in the territories. Hamas sets up student organizations,
known in Arabic as “Kutla,” which spread incitement and fundamentalism.
In 2011, Hamas’s efforts to re-establish itself in
the territories received a boost. In exchange for the release of
kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, Israel released more than 1,000
security prisoners, most of them Hamas members. Many had lots of
operational terrorism experience from the second intifada. The group
included Saleh al-Arouri, who was expelled by Israel from the region and
proceeded to found Hamas’s overseas headquarters.
Arouri travels around the Middle East with other
Shalit deal prisoners, and has essentially set up a shadow Hamas
government-in-exile. Its top goal remains coming up with ways of
resurrecting Hamas’s base in the territories. This overseas HQ exploits
the fact that its members are out of the reach of Israel’s
counterterrorist operations.
Hamas’s strategic goal is to rise to power in the
territories, just as it did in Gaza. But it recognizes that this goal is
out of its immediate grasp, so it feigns flexibility. Strapped for cash
and under pressure from Egypt to reform, Hamas recently said it was willing to join a unity government with Fatah.
Prof. Boaz Ganor, executive director of Israel’s
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, said Hamas’s
policies are made up of two parallel, complementary parts. “One is a
covert consolidation program throughout the West Bank, to create the
basis for a future violent clash with Fatah and the PA’s forces,” he
told JNS.org. “The second effort is about seeking rehabilitation from
the PA and Abbas, creating a unity government, and waiting for Abbas’s
passing, and for the unity government to fall like a ripened fruit into
Hamas’s hands, without the need for a violent clash between the two
movements.”
At the same time, Hamas keeps trying to blow up
Israelis. Its cells try to manufacture explosives and plant them on
Israeli buses, or as roadside bombs. It also plots kidnappings in the
hope that an Israeli hostage can be traded for more Palestinian
prisoners.
The terror group is willing to bide its time as it
seeks new ways to amass power. Hamas is not picky about how it will try
to take over the territories. Both elections and armed revolution are
acceptable routes – whichever works best.
In the meantime, Hamas charities gather donations
from around the world and pay poor Palestinians regular funds, building
up support. These same “charities” also channel fat salaries to senior
Hamas members who reside in the territories. These operatives are under
orders to sit tight until the time comes for a new phase of activities.
In the past year, Israeli security forces seized
$370,000 from Hamas members in the territories and impounded some 50
vehicles. The Shin Bet and IDF work more closely than ever, sharing
intelligence and missions. The Shin Bet heads the counter-terrorism
operations, while the army takes the lead in combating terrorist
financing.
The situation remains volatile, and any new
incident – such as July’s terror attack near the Temple Mount – can
cause a spike in violence. Hamas’s vision is as destructive as ever.
Israel’s security forces know they’re in the long game, playing for the
highest stakes.
This article was published by the Jewish News Service on October 2, 2017.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/har-adar-attack/
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