by C. Jacob
The tension and disputes between the PA and Hamas came to a head at the conference of Palestinian factions in Cairo on November 21, 2017, when representatives of Egyptian intelligence were forced to wield all their influence to keep the talks from falling apart.
Several
weeks after the signing of the October 12, 2017 reconciliation
agreement between Fatah and Hamas, the euphoria that had initially been
felt on the Palestinian street, and even more so in political circles,
seems to be waning, and there are increasing doubts as to the
possibility of reaching an understanding between the sides. The
disagreements are over several issues: the weapons of the various
Palestinian factions; the transfer of responsibilities, including for
security, from Hamas to the Palestinian Authority (PA); control of the
border crossings, in particular the Rafah crossing, and the future of
Gaza civil servants. In the background are also Hamas's demands that the
PA lift its sanctions on Gaza, stop the arrests of Hamas operatives in
the West Bank, and halt the security coordination with Israel.
The
tension and disputes between the PA and Hamas came to a head at the
conference of Palestinian factions in Cairo on November 21, 2017, at
which representatives of Egyptian intelligence were forced to wield all
their influence to keep the talks from falling apart. The PA insisted
that Hamas first of all meet the demand of tamkin (i.e., allow
the PA's national consensus government, headed by Rami Hamdallah, to
exercise full authority in Gaza), in all spheres, including security.
Hamas's representatives claimed that this has already been done, and
demanded to focus on other issues, such as the PLO reform and the
holding of elections. As for Hamas's demand that the PA lift its
sanctions on Gaza, the PA objected to the use of the term "sanctions".
Eventually it was agreed that an Egyptian delegation would oversee the
handover of authority. PLO Executive Committee member Ahmad Majdalani
tried to bring up the issue of the weapons, but the factions rejected
this out of hand and stopped the discussion.[1]
The
crisis between Fatah and Hamas was sharply reflected in an interview
given by PA Civil Affairs Minister Hussein Al-Sheikh, who said: "So far
Hamas has not allowed the [PA] government to govern [Gaza] on the
administrative, financial or security [levels]. The scope of the PA's
authority in Gaza is only about five percent."[2] An editorial in the PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida
likewise stated that Hamas merely wants the PA to extricate it from its
economic and social crisis, and does not intend to grant it any genuine
authority in Gaza.[3] (For a translation of excerpts from the editorial, see the Appendix to this report).
The
deputy head of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), Ahmad Bahar
of Hamas, said: "The [PA] government will be able to exercise its
authority in Gaza only after the siege on Gaza is lifted and the PA's
security coordination with Israel stops.[4] These conditions make the possibility of reconciliation even more remote.
The signing of the reconciliation agreement in Cairo (image: palinfo.com, October 13, 2017)
This report reviews the main disputes between Fatah/the PA and Hamas that are impeding the reconciliation.
The Main Point Of Contention: The Weapons Of The Palestinian Factions, In Particular Hamas's Military Wing
The issue of the weapons has been casting a
shadow on the reconciliation process from the start, and highlights the
scope of the disagreement between the two sides. Hamas firmly asserts
that the issue is beyond debate, since its weapons are intended for use
against Israel. For example, Hamas political bureau head Moussa Abu
Marzouq said in an interview with the Turkish news agency Andolu: "Hamas
will under no circumstances agree to negotiate with Fatah over the
weapons of its military wing. This issue has never been discussed in the
past and will not be discussed in the future. The weapons of the
resistance are intended for the defense of the Palestinian people, and
the resistance cannot conceivably cast down its weapons as long as its
land is occupied and its people are living in exile."[5]
As for the PA and Fatah, their position on
this matter is more complex. Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas has
consistently stressed that there must be only one government, one law
and one armed force. Other PA officials made contradictory statements,
some opposing Hamas's disarmament and others advocating it. Among the
former were Fatah official and former PA minister Ahmad Ghneim, who
said: "The weapons of the resistance must be regarded as one of the
assets of the Palestinian people in the struggle against the occupation,
and they do not belong exclusively to one faction or another. Everyone
zealously clings to these weapons and will never agree to surrender them
or give them up."[6]
Fatah representative in Bethlehem 'Awni Al-Mashni said, in a similar
vein: "The weapons of the government are not weapons of liberation, but
are intended to protect the safety of society and are not in dispute.
Conversely, the weapons of the factions are meant to be weapons of
national liberation... Whoever surrenders his arms and then negotiates
violates the most basic law of politics – that you talk about weapons,
even if their impact is small, only at the final [stages of]
negotiations, not at the beginning."[7]
Among the advocates of disarmament, who
are lately being heard more and more, were Fatah official 'Azzam
Al-Ahmad, who said at the close of the talks between the two sides: "The
Palestinian weapons must be one, regardless of various terms like
'weapons of the resistance,' etc."[8]
PA Civil Affairs Minister Hussein Al-Sheikh said in his interview:
"There will no longer be such a thing as 'the weapons of the
factions'... We will not allow any weapons apart from those of the
single armed [force] of the [PA] authorities."[9] The Al-Hayat Al-Jadida editorial took a similar line (see Appendix).
The dispute between Fatah and Hamas
deepened even further over the issue of security control. PA Prime
Minister Rami Hamdallah clarified that the PA could not govern Gaza if
it was not given charge of security: "The border crossings in the [Gaza]
Strip will not be able to function without [the PA being in charge of]
security... The government cannot continue [functioning in Gaza] without
clear solutions for the security issue."[10]
Hamas officials said in response that
Hamdallah's remarks, and the PA's failure to lift the sanctions on Gaza,
indicated an unwillingness on the part of the PA to implement the
reconciliation. The Hamas Interior Ministry expressed puzzlement over PA
officials' statements about the border crossings, saying that they were
attempting to "circumvent the mechanism for implementing the
reconciliation process."[11]
Nor did the transfer of other authorities
go smoothly. PA and Fatah officials complained that some Hamas
ministries and bodies refused to hand over control to the PA. The
Ministry of the Environment, for example, delayed the process, and the
Land Registration Bureau was not handed over at all due to the refusal
of its head to give up his authorities in Gaza.
The PA Al-Hayat Al-Jadida daily
reported that the Hamas authorities had damaged the Tel Al-Sakan
archeological site by destroying the fence that had been built around it
to protect it and leveling the area, and had barred the PA
archeological team from entering the site and threatened its members –
although a Gaza court had issued a restraining order to halt operations
at the site following protests about damage caused to it.[12]
In the meantime, Fatah and Hamas have
agreed, with Egyptian sponsorship, to postpone the deadline for the full
transfer of authorities from December 1, the date specified in the
reconciliation agreement, to December 10.[13]
Hamas Opposes The Firing Of Civil Servants It Has Appointed Since 2007
The reconciliation agreement states that
the PA government would, by February 1, 2018, establish a judicial
administrative committee to draw up solutions for the problem of Gaza
civil servants. The issue at hand is the payment of salaries to civil
servants who were appointed by Hamas over the past decade, and at the
same time bringing back in the PA employees who left their positions
after the Hamas coup in Gaza. Against this backdrop, senior Hamas
official Rohi Mushtaha expressed the movement's objections to the
replacement of civil servants appointed by Hamas with those appointed by
the PA, and declared that the Hamas employees "will not be removed and
will not be fired."[14]
It should be noted that at this point the PA is unable to pay the
salaries of some 40,000 civil servants appointed by Hamas after its
takeover of Gaza.
The Dispute Over The Border Crossings
A serious PA-Hamas dispute also emerged
regarding the Rafah border crossing. Fatah members argued that the
crossing would be operated according to the crossings agreement of 2005,
under which European observers would be stationed at the crossings.
According to senior Fatah official 'Azzam Al-Ahmad, it was agreed with
Hamas that the crossing would be opened as per the 2005 agreement, but
Hamas then retracted its consent.[15]
Senior Hamas official Khalil Al-Hayya said in response: "We rejected
the 2005 Rafah border crossing agreement in the past. This was concluded
with the PA two years ago in Lebanon, and this is documented in the
summaries of Hamas's meetings with PA representatives 'Azzam Al-Ahmad,
Hussein Al-Sheikh, and Majed Faraj."[16]
It should be noted that the Rafah crossing is currently closed,
although according to the reconciliation agreement it was to have been
opened on November 15.
The transfer of the administration of the
crossings to the PA was about to fall apart because PA representatives
insisted that Hamas members, both civilian and military, not remain at
the crossings, while according to Hamas this constituted a violation of
the agreement. In light of threats by PA border crossing administrator
Nizmi Mihana to quit, the Egyptian mediators persuaded Hamas official
Ghazi Hamad, who is in charge of the border crossings in Gaza, to comply
with the PA's demand and to hand the crossings over no matter what. In
response, the Hamas security apparatus departed from the Rafah crossing
and from the roadblocks near the Erez and the Kerem Shalom crossings,
leaving them in the hands of PA representatives who came with limited
manpower – only 70 personnel to administer three border crossings.[17]
As a result, security chaos reigned, with some of the residents taking
advantage of the situation to steal equipment and vehicles.[18]
In reaction to these events, senior Hamas
official Moussa Abu Marzouq said that the PA was not interested in
cooperating with Hamas, but only in gaining exclusive control over Gaza,
and noted: "The handover of the Rafah crossing was carried out
improperly, not as agreed. Any agreement that is unjust and does not
honor what was agreed will not succeed."[19]
Cartoon in Hamas daily Al-Risalah: PA President 'Abbas relaxes at the closed Rafah crossing (Alresalah.ps, November 16, 2017).
The Effect Of Inter-Arab And International Rivalries
The chances of the reconciliation's
success are also impacted by the struggles among the Arab countries, as
well as by international rivalries. The PA is considered part of the
Arab world's moderate axis, along with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
the UAE, while Hamas is currently revitalizing its relations with the
Shi'ite-Alawite resistance axis, led by Iran, relations that had been
close but gradually frayed after the Arab Spring. At one point, Hamas
drew closer to Turkey and Qatar, seeing them as a source of support,
until this relationship too became shaky. The lesson learned by the
Hamas leaders was not to pick a single axis to align themselves with,
but to leave themselves room to maneuver. Today, Hamas belongs to no
axis, and has good relations with both Iran/Hizbullah and with Egypt.
There have also been reports that it may be improving its relations with
Syria; however, tension between it and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states
remain.
Despite The Disagreements, Both Hamas And Fatah Are Committed To Reconciliation
Despite all the disagreements, tensions,
and mutual accusations between Fatah and Hamas, spokesmen for both
movements are careful to state that there is no turning back from the
reconciliation, so that they will not be accused of thwarting it. Senior
Fatah official 'Azzam Al-Ahmad said after the November 21 Cairo
dialogue that the sides had agreed that all obstacles to implementing
the reconciliation would be removed by election time. He said: "The
Palestinian schism is the handiwork of several international elements,
but faced with our will, no power on earth will divide the Palestinian
people."[20]
Yahya Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip,
said: "The schism is in the interest of the occupation, and we, as
Palestinian, patriots, and Muslims, must not permit this situation to
continue."[21]
Appendix: November 27, 2017 Al-Hayat Al-Jadida Editorial
"What is the connection between, on the
one hand, giving the national reconciliation government the possibility
of exercising its authority and functioning fully in the southern
districts, and on the other hand the weapons of the resistance – which
Hamas spokesman [Sami] Abu Zuhri claims in the media are the weapons of
the militias of his movement, the ['Izz Al-Din] Al-Qassam Brigades? How
does allowing [the government to exercise its authority] become an
'attempt to subordinate' the weapons of the resistance, if they do
indeed exist, when allowing this is aimed only at establishing
security and order in the southern districts and letting the government
continue its activity as it does in the northern districts? Likewise, as
noted, the weapons of the Al-Qassam [Brigades] are not the weapons of
the resistance, but are the weapons of a particular faction. These
weapons are, to some extent, a manifestation of the loss of security
control; specifically, these weapons were used against the legitimate
rule in Gaza [in the anti-PA coup that concluded, in June 2007, with the
Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip], and they killed more [PA] members
than they harmed soldiers of the Israeli occupation!!!...
"Abu Zuhri knows that there is no
connection between these [two] things, but he is clinging to his
movement's worn-out slogans so as to avoid the day when the obligations
for the reconciliation must be met, and in order to circumvent the
agreement in this matter. Thus, Abu Zuhri reveals that his movement's
attitude to the reconciliation agreement is for show and for media
purposes [only] – and thus he proves, unknowingly and unwillingly of
course – the truth and rightness of the words of Fatah leader Mahmoud
Al-'Aloul and, later, of Fatah Central Committee member Hussein
Al-Sheikh – that the government's ability [to exercise its authority in
the Gaza Strip] is still token, and not genuine, and its scope is no
greater than 5%.
"'Aloul and Al-Sheikh did not talk about
'weapons of the resistance' but about strengthening the government, and
about the issue of security, where not even a minimum of progress has
been achieved... Strengthening the government according to the
reconciliation agreement means, simply, that the government will receive
[responsibility for] all ministries, institutions, and departments in
the southern districts, in order to establish a single ruling authority
and a single law – a law that will protect security and stability and
will not, ultimately, allow the weapons of the militias to violate any
decision made by this single law – because the single law cannot coexist
with the weapons of the militias, and is in no way compatible with
them.
"But it appears that all Hamas wants is
for the reconciliation government to extricate it from its economic and
social crisis and, in the best case scenario, for it to run the affairs
of the municipalities – nothing more and nothing less!!! In fact, it
seems clear that Hamas is not interested at all in leaving power – as
Isma'il Haniya said three years ago: 'We have left the government and
have not left power.' This is the situation today [as well], in light of
[Hamas's] policy, which turned the matter of strengthening the
government into something token, not genuine at all.
"There are many examples proving this
reality, and perhaps one of them, now, is the misleading declarations by
Abu Zuhri that contradict reality and are even stated in the loathsome
language of schism, blame, and tension.
"But the national reconciliation is the
responsibility of the national echelon, which will not back down from
executing it as required, because it is meant to remove the suffering
from the shoulders of our people in the southern districts, so that they
can honorably restore the health of their daily lives. The national
reconciliation is not aimed at takeover, nor at sectarian division, but
at securing the national future by rebuilding national unity on the
strongest of foundations. [This is] so that we will continue the path to
freedom, until the actualization of all the just goals of our people,
and until the restoration of all its rights by overcoming the
occupation, actualizing independence in the State of Palestine whose
capital is East Jerusalem, and by means of a permanent and just solution
to the issue of the refugees.
"There is no way back from the
reconciliation, and there is no bargaining over its lofty goals. The
last word is in the hands of the patroness [of the reconciliation] –
sister Egypt."
*C. Jacob is a research fellow at MEMRI.
[1] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), November 23, 2017.
[2] Maannews.net, November 25, 2017.
[3] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), November 27, 2017.
[4] Palinfo.com, November 24, 2017.
[5] Samanews.ps, September 28, 2017, October 19, 2017.
[6] Maannews.net, October 15, 2017.
[7] Maannews.net, October 10, 2017.
[8] Maannews.net, November 23, 2017.
[9] Maannews.net, November 25, 2017.
[10] Palinfo.com, November 6, 2017.
[11] Amad.ps, November 7, 2017.
[12] Alquds.com, November 4, 2017; Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), November 6, 2017.
[13] Al-Ayyam (PA), November 30, 2017.
[14] Pssawa.com, October 12, 2017.
[15] Wafa.ps, November 15, 2017.
[16] Palinfo.com, November 16, 2017.
[17] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), November 2, 2017.
[18] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), November 2, 2017.
[19] Alquds.com, November 1, 2017.
[20] Wafa.ps, November 22, 2017.
[21] Palinfo.com, November 16, 2017.
C. Jacob is a research fellow at MEMRI.
Source: https://www.memri.org/reports/hamas-fatah-reconciliation-at-impasse
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