by Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen
[I]s the goal he presented achievable? And is it right to declare a strategic goal in that way
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| Moshe Dayan, photo via IDF Archives Flickr CC |
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,368, December 10, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In a
recent press conference, Defense Minister Naftali Bennett presented a
goal for IDF activity in Syria: “To cause Iran to give up its attempt to
entrench itself in Syria.” Unlike the common tendency toward ambiguity
in defining strategic objectives, Bennett dared pronounce a clear and
measurable goal. But is the goal he presented achievable? And is it
right to declare a strategic goal in that way?
Military correspondents have reported that in the
IDF General Staff’s assessment, it is doubtful whether expanding
offensive activity—however successful—can cause Tehran to renounce its
vision and its ambitions in Syria. The Iranian regime and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) are driven by an expansionist Islamist
ideology. The constraints of reality are certainly forcing them to make
changes and adapt to circumstances, but that is not the same as
forsaking their imperialist vision.
A historical perspective is needed here.
Having been enjoined to make sweeping cuts in its
order of battle in the wake of Israel’s War of Independence, the IDF
found it difficult to find a workable solution to the fedayeen
terrorism of the early 1950s. With the forming of commando Unit 101 and
its merging with the Paratroopers Brigade under the leadership of Chief
of Staff Moshe Dayan, a concept of retaliation gradually developed as a
response to this problem. It quickly transpired, however, that despite a
string of operational successes, the approach did not bring about a
real decline in fedayeen terror.
The Israeli government was perplexed—but Dayan,
with his quintessential creativity, reinterpreted the logic of the
retaliation operations and posed a different systemic objective for
them. Identifying the gap between the tactical aspects of the operations
and their strategic significance, he introduced a groundbreaking
conceptual framework that gave renewed relevance to the retaliatory
actions.
Although the deterrence of fedayeen
terrorism continued to be the immediate rationale behind the retaliation
policy, it was oriented toward a wider objective: positioning Israel
and its military prowess in the evolving regional and international
system. In Dayan’s words: “Our victories and our failures in small
battles along and across the border are of great importance. Not only
because of their direct effect on day-to-day security, but also because
of their impact on how the Arabs assess Israel’s power and Israel’s
belief in its power.”
In that way, a strategic framework was created
that was open to regional developments in anticipation of two possible
courses of action: either the ongoing retaliatory strikes would
gradually curtail the terror, or they would lead to war and a new
regional order. Meanwhile, by taking the opportunity to undertake
operational friction with the regular forces of Egypt, Jordan, and
Syria, the IDF built up its capability and established an awareness of
that capability in the eyes of both the enemy and the international
arena. The quality of the IDF’s performance in these operations
undoubtedly contributed to the eventual collaboration with France and
Britain in the 1956 Sinai Campaign.
Applying Dayan’s thinking to today’s strategic
context, the fighting against Iranian forces in Syria, especially on the
Golan border, can be viewed as a means of initiating a clash with those
forces out of a defensive motive rather than a direct interest in a
full-fledged war.
Having the audacity to use force, especially in a
situation that hovers on the very real threshold of war, does entail the
risk of escalation, but also holds the potential to give Israel a
prominent role in the crystallizing anti-Iran regional coalition. The
objective of such a clash would be to showcase Israel’s operational
superiority by proving its military capability and strategic daring,
thereby making clear that Jerusalem does not fear a military conflict in
defense of its vital interests.
A goal of that kind, in the spirit of Dayan’s
conceptualization and in contrast to Bennett’s clear-cut and closed
formulation, can manage unforeseen and uncontrollable developments.
Therein lies its special nature as an achievable strategic objective.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen is a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He served in the IDF for 42 years. He commanded troops in battles with Egypt and Syria. He was formerly a corps commander and commander of the IDF Military Colleges.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/getting-iran-out-of-syria/
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