by Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen
Strategically, for the space to be organized for defensive purposes (as proposed by the Allon Plan of the late 1960s), Israel must control the entire area from the Jordan River to the ridge lines in Samaria on two levels
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| Jordan Valley, photo by Cycling Man via Flickr CC |
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,422, January 26, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The
Jordan Valley, in its full scope and broadest definition, is essential
to Israel’s national security. Its retention by Israel requires not only
military deployment but a comprehensive development plan—i.e., the
construction of housing, roads, and infrastructure—that will establish
this territory as Israel’s eastern wing.
Three fundamental questions help to clarify the
positions voiced over the past few days on the possible annexation of
the Jordan Valley:
- How wide does the Jordan Valley need to be to serve a security purpose? Does it need to run only from the Jordan crossings to Highway 90, or should it extend over 15 km west as envisaged by Yitzhak Rabin in his last speech to the Knesset?
- Is Israel’s need for the Jordan Valley conjectural or circumstantial, and therefore open to negotiation, or is it a basic and permanent requirement for Israel’s security?
- How does this area of land fit into an overall national outline for the construction of localities, roads, and infrastructure, to serve as Israel’s eastern wing?
Most people currently addressing this issue agree
that IDF control over the Jordan Valley is essential. The question is
how broad the area should be.
Strategically, for the space to be organized for
defensive purposes (as proposed by the Allon Plan of the late 1960s),
Israel must control the entire area from the Jordan River to the ridge
lines in Samaria on two levels: first, control of the hill line that
dominates the artery to the west, as absence of such control would mean
that movement on the artery cannot be secured; and second, along the
Allon Road, which would also require control of the ridge lines to the
west.
Those advocating ending the Israeli presence in
the Jordan Valley, including former PMs Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert, do
not deny this military necessity. Barak, who was prepared at the Camp
David summit of July 2000 to relinquish the entire Jordan Valley to
Palestinian control, was keenly aware of the security implications
attending this concession: As chief of staff, he defined the territorial
space extending from the Jordan border to the western ridges in Samaria
(i.e., Mount Ebal and Mount Gerizim) as vital for Israel’s defense.
Many changes have taken place in the region since
Barak’s and Olmert’s far-reaching concessions, including the advent of
the strategic threat from the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah’s acquisition of
some 100,000-200,000 missiles and rockets, Iran’s military entrenchment
in Syria, and the deployment of Iranian proxy militias close to the
Syrian-Israeli border. Meanwhile, international forces have been
repeatedly shown to have difficulty securing the peace in hostile spaces
over time.
Israel’s right-of-center approach to the above
three fundamental questions regarding the Jordan Valley is clear and
unequivocal: a full-scale, broad-based definition of this territory is
essential to Israel’s security and is not subject to negotiation. The
permanent retention of the Jordan Valley thus requires not only military
deployment but a comprehensive development plan—i.e., the construction
of housing, roads, and infrastructure—that will establish this territory
as Israel’s eastern wing.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/jordan-valley-not-up-for-negotiation/
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