by Marilyn Stern
Hezbollah is confident in its military strength, but realizes that "in the long run" its power is at risk unless it can provide for the people – which it cannot because "the country is falling apart".
Hanin Ghaddar, Friedmann Senior Fellow in the Washington Institute of Near East Policy's Linda and Tony Rubin Program on Arab Politics, spoke to an August 21st Middle East Forum Webinar (video) about the current status of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The following is a summary of her comments:
In the wake of the country's economic collapse in 2019, Hezbollah expanded control over Lebanon's security institutions, state institutions, and financial institutions. Yet, the terror organization also suffered setbacks. Since the 2020 assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Qasem Soleimani, Hezbollah has grown from a Lebanese militia to its current role as Iran's "main regional army." Shifting its financial resources to both "compensate their constituency" and prop up Lebanon's financial institutions strains Hezbollah's budget, particularly since the flow of cash from an Iranian regime constrained by economic sanctions has diminished significantly. Further complicating Hezbollah's position as it struggles to fill the shortfall is that even with the money flowing in from the amphetamine-based drug Captagon and from arms shipments to conflicts in Iraq, Africa, and Yemen, measures are being take to contain Hezbollah as these illicit sources come to light.
Hezbollah has acquired expertise with drones and precision guided munitions and has gained access to state and security institutions beyond Lebanon in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Despite the increased military know-how, Iran and Hezbollah know that threatening Israel with war is less costly than going to war against it. During the hiatus in the "war between the wars," Hezbollah has focused on strengthening its control of Lebanon's state and financial institutions. Hezbollah, in collaboration with Lebanon's Central bank and private money institutions, financially benefits from the country's cash economy.
In 2018, Hezbollah infiltrated the Lebanese government after winning seats in parliamentary elections and used state institutions to benefit itself, its constituency, and Iran's institutions and budget. After the country's economic collapse in 2019, Hezbollah became "solely responsible" for an increasingly discontented constituency and the organization's allies in Lebanon. The paternalistic narrative propagated among the Shia gained loyal followers, but has since worn thin, as evidenced by Hezbollah's loss in last year's parliamentary elections. This loss has made it more difficult to impose its agenda on the population.
Whereas Hezbollah previously had parliamentary allies, now it cannot unilaterally impose its presidential candidate, Suleiman Frangieh, a Syrian regime loyalist and "Hezbollah Iran puppet," without a parliamentary majority. Instead, Hezbollah is engaged in dealmaking with the Free Patriotic Movement in a bid to install Frangieh as the next president of Lebanon.
To maintain its hold on power, Hezbollah has turned its arms against the "disillusioned" Lebanese people, who face two "revelations": (1) The arms Hezbollah intended to use against Israel it instead uses against the Lebanese people as a "political tool," and (2) Hezbollah's narrative that protecting Lebanon's borders necessitated entry into Syria was in fact about protecting the Assad regime. The main shift against Hezbollah occurred in 2019, when the Lebanese people took to the streets to protest government corruption and the sectarianism plaguing their society, not realizing Hezbollah's link to the corruption. Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, sent his "thugs" to beat up protesters.
Although the people realized that Hezbollah's main conduit to infiltrate the state institutions is corruption, they attributed the 2020 Beirut port blast to a mistake in a failed system. A judge investigating the blast faced death threats from Hezbollah. During that time, Hezbollah instigated a violent clash in the Christian neighborhood of Tayouneh, where residents killed some Hezbollah members. The organization understands the Lebanese people no longer support it as they did and now consider it an Iranian militia occupying Lebanon.
Hezbollah's increased security actions against the Lebanese people has sparked a backlash against it. Examples include the Chouaya incident two years ago, when residents stopped a Hezbollah vehicle carrying rockets intended for use against Israel; the Haldi incident in which Sunni tribes attacked and killed a Hezbollah member; and the recent Kahale incident where a Hezbollah vehicle that overturned in an accident triggered clashes when the people discovered weapons in it. Hezbollah, for its part, is assassinating Lebanese activists or those who confront the terror group. Although the net result is "outrage" against Hezbollah, the people know they cannot afford a civil war. During the 1975 Lebanese civil war, the opposing sides were equally matched in their capabilities, but Hezbollah's increased power renders it too formidable for its opponents to defeat or seriously challenge it militarily.
Many who vote for Hezbollah do so because they risk losing basic food and necessities at Hezbollah's hands. It is confident in its military strength, but realizes that "in the long run" its power is at risk unless it can provide for the people – which it cannot because "the country is falling apart."
Plans to revise the political structure are stipulated in the Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon's Civil War in 1990 and established the power sharing between Christians and Muslims. Hezbollah's plan is to use the country's demographics to divide the system into three parties by allocating a third to Christians, a third to the Sunni, and a third to the Shia in a dangerous bid to gain more seats in parliament. The move, particularly when "one third of the parliament is represented by [an Iranian] militia," is Hezbollah's method of consolidating its long-term hold on power in Lebanon.
America can take three steps to counter Hezbollah. First, the U.S. can take advantage of the fact that, even though much of the Lebanese army works in concert with Hezbollah, commanders and generals in certain units oppose the terror groups' agenda against the Lebanese people. Such behavior occurred when the army supported the people against Hezbollah in the Tayouneh clash. The U.S. can gain leverage by targeting its aid to those particular units.
Second, the U.S. can rouse opposition to Hezbollah by exposing its use of the Lebanese people as human shields, as when Hezbollah hides its missiles under private homes and schools. Although Hezbollah was popular when it waged war against Israel in 2006, today "everybody wants Hezbollah out." Still, sympathies are complicated because, when Hezbollah is targeted in Lebanon, it retaliates without concern for killing and maiming civilians, and "people don't want to die." Third, although sanctions against Hezbollah are largely ineffective because of the cash economy, enforcing sanctions against its allies in Lebanon's financial institutions, individual financial figures, and the private business sector can be an effective way of restraining it.
Hezbollah's border skirmishes with Israel are Tehran's way of letting Jerusalem know that if it dares to strike Iran, Hezbollah is ready for war. Hezbollah's plan is to consolidate its power financially and maintain its fighters. It succeeds at recruitment because it pays in "hard currency," a change from the loyalty that used to drive the "core of Hezbollah's fighting force." Regardless of the recent maritime border agreement between Israel and Lebanon, which Hezbollah endorsed, the terror group knows that its waning "resistance rhetoric" against Israel further undermines its legitimacy in Lebanon. Hezbollah increased its provocations against Israel by taking advantage of Jerusalem's internal divisions as its government attempts to introduce judicial reforms. Ultimately, neither side can afford a war, but much is dependent on Israel and how it responds to Hezbollah's provocations.
Marilyn Stern is communications coordinator at the Middle East Forum.
Source:https://www.meforum.org/64738/hanin-ghaddar-on-hezbollah-quandary-more-power
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