by Yaakov Lappin
While an Israeli military probe detailed major failures behind the Oct. 7 catastrophe, former military officers warn that deeper problems remain.
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| IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen Eyal Zamir (left) and Maj.-Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman submit the findings of the Turgeman Committee probe to Defense Minister Israel Katz, Nov. 9, 2025. Credit: IDF. |
The Israel Defense Forces on Nov. 10 released the main findings of its comprehensive internal investigation into the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas invasion and massacre, identifying six primary causes for the catastrophe—led by severe intelligence, conceptual and operational failures.
These included severe failures in the “perception of reality regarding the Gaza Strip and Hamas,” and a “lack of engagement” with Hamas’s plan to launch a mass ground invasion, dubbed “Jericho Wall.”
The report, compiled by an expert panel headed by former IDF Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman, surveyed 25 separate inquiries and interviewed 80 officials. It was submitted to IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir.
According to the official summary, the surprise attack “did not emerge from a vacuum or a lack of information—quite the opposite,” stating that direct intelligence “could and should have led to an alert and a significant operational response” if properly analyzed.
Zamir stressed that the publication is part of rebuilding national confidence. “Transparency is a necessary condition for maintaining the public’s trust in the IDF. It is also a fundamental requirement for our ability to improve,” he said. “The committee’s findings are not the final word.”
Former officers told JNS that while the document lists breakdowns, it does not address the deeper military-doctrine crisis that allowed Hamas to maneuver undetected and strike with overwhelming force.
Col. (res.) Dr. Hanan Shai, a research fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, and a former member of the 2006 Second Lebanon War inquiry, said the current probe is incomplete because it lacks expertise in “the art of war.”
“It did not happen because suddenly everyone became undisciplined,” he told JNS. “The central thing that is not mentioned … is that the events occurred because the IDF operated in recent years according to the doctrine of deterrence, and not the doctrine of decisive victory.”
Shai described a force focused on precision strikes and “target banks,” rather than battlefield dominance. “Everything is locked through the databases of targets,” he said. This is “instead of seeing how to take down the forest quickly,” he said, calling it “a very severe malfunction.”
He warned that previous panels also identified these faults, but the institution failed to correct them. The current investigators “belong to a generation, ‘who did not know Joseph,’” he added, pointing to systemic amnesia.
A proper inquiry, he said, must explain root causes rather than merely describe events. “We need to also find out where it came from, and fix these things,” he said.
Shai also pushed back on the assertion that intelligence failed to interpret the threat. “The one who is responsible for explaining the situation is not intelligence, it is the commander,” he argued.
Stripped of autonomy and flexibility
Lt. Col. (res.) Doron Avital, a former commander of the elite General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal), told JNS that decades of centralized command stripped the IDF of autonomy and flexibility in the field.
He compared the army’s structure to a vehicle without independent suspension, “If everyone is on the same axis, you cannot absorb [individual shocks], and then the axle breaks,” he said. “The whole system was organized from a rigid structure.”
Avital also cited a dangerous drift toward technological dependence over combat readiness. “The iron sights of the army were eroded,” he said, noting the neglect of traditional early-warning procedures such as the dawn alert, where soldiers manning outposts and positions wake up early to ensure perimeter security and high readiness around first light.
A risk-averse culture made matters worse, he added: “Instead of dynamic risk-taking … This risk-taking is exactly what seeks friction with the enemy.” He pointed to the tragic deaths of civilians and soldiers in fortified bomb shelters: “It was in the shelter of death.”
The Turgeman report catalogues acute shortcomings across all commands:
• The General Staff underestimated Hamas and failed to prepare for a “terrorist army.”
• The Operations Directorate did not lead preparations for a surprise war scenario.
• Military Intelligence failed to track Hamas’s growing capabilities and detect final preparations.
• Southern Command failed in its warning and defense responsibilities.
• The Israeli Air Force did not develop a response to low-altitude threats and lacked situational awareness.
• The Israel Navy failed to secure the coastline at the outset.
The report notes that had alerts been raised earlier, both the IAF and the Navy could have responded faster.
It also highlights extraordinary courage under impossible conditions. “Many IDF commanders rushed immediately to the southern sector—without being called and without orders. … Some of them paid for it with their lives,” the report stated.
Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He is
the in-house analyst at the Miryam Institute; a research associate at
the Alma Research and Education Center; and a research associate at the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. He is a
frequent guest commentator on international television news networks,
including Sky News and i24 News. Lappin is the author of Virtual Caliphate: Exposing the Islamist State on the Internet. Follow him at: www.patreon.com/yaakovlappin.
Source: https://www.jns.org/doctrine-of-deterrence-enabled-idf-blindness/
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