by Fred Fleitz
Trump reduced the North Korean threat through pressure and diplomacy. Biden’s passivity reversed those gains, deepened hostile alliances, and left a more volatile nuclear standoff.
President Trump’s first-term “Maximum Pressure” policies and aggressive diplomacy significantly lowered tensions with North Korea and set a path toward denuclearization and normalization of relations. Unfortunately, President Biden’s weak foreign policy and neglect of North Korea undermined Trump’s accomplishments and left him with new and complex security challenges to solve with Pyongyang in his second term.
These challenges will gain more attention later this month at North Korea’s 9th Party Congress, when North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will probably reiterate his new policy of an “unlimited drive” to expand North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.
Maximum Pressure Succeeded in Trump’s First Term
U.S.–North Korea relations were at a historic low at the beginning of Trump’s first term, when there were fears of a major war due to a large increase in North Korean missile tests and a sixth nuclear weapons test.
President Trump’s Maximum Pressure campaign, which included tough rhetoric, increased economic sanctions, and diplomacy, substantially reduced the threat from North Korea. Trump held a historic summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in June 2018 and other meetings in Vietnam and at the Korean DMZ. As a result of Trump’s first-term North Korea policies, there have been no North Korean nuclear tests since 2017, and Pyongyang halted long-range missile tests for the rest of Trump’s first term.
Trump’s first-term effort to denuclearize North Korea and normalize relations was interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 presidential election. Nevertheless, he left Biden a stable U.S.–North Korea relationship and the potential to build on his diplomatic efforts with Pyongyang.
Biden’s Incompetence Caused North Korean Threat to Surge
The threat from North Korea is much higher today because Biden dropped the ball. Biden mocked President Trump’s North Korea policies and tried to ignore the country. The Biden administration named a part-time special envoy for North Korea. There were no U.S.–North Korean talks during the Biden years, and Biden officials showed no interest in high-level meetings with Pyongyang until tensions soared in 2023.
In response to being snubbed by Biden and global perceptions of Biden’s weak leadership, Kim Jong Un appeared to reject diplomacy and return to his country’s former policies of confrontation, threats, and blackmail.
After halting its long-range missile tests in late 2017, North Korea resumed them after the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. North Korea tested a record number of missiles in 2022, including ICBMs, cruise missiles, a possible hypersonic missile, and an intermediate-range ballistic missile fired over Japan.
Worsening the situation, Kim Jong Un moved closer to Russian president Vladimir Putin in late 2022 when he supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and began to provide Russia with missiles and artillery shells. North Korea further strengthened its relationship with Russia with two Putin–Kim summits during the Biden years and a mutual defense pact.
Today, North Korea reportedly is supplying Russia with missiles, ammunition, and troops for the Ukraine war in exchange for Russian missile defense systems, satellite and submarine technology, and parts for Soviet-era military and civilian aircraft. Russia may also be providing North Korea with technology and assistance to improve the accuracy of its ICBMs and to build better reentry vehicles for missile warheads.
In addition, North Korea strengthened its relationship with China between 2021 and 2024 and joined a new anti-Western Russia-China-Iran “axis,” driven by the deterioration of America’s global leadership during the Biden years.
The North Korea Challenge for Trump 2.0
President Trump has often said that his North Korean policy was a major foreign policy success of his first term and that he hopes to resume his personal diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. However, due to Biden’s failed national security policies that caused U.S.–North Korea relations to deteriorate, Trump likely will find it difficult to restart diplomacy with North Korea during his second term.
The North Korean–Russian relationship, driven by the war in Ukraine, is the biggest obstacle to resuming U.S.–North Korea negotiations because of the financial, food, and energy support, as well as defense technology, that Russia is providing to North Korea. Because any new U.S.–North Korea agreement would require Pyongyang to halt its support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine—and would not replace the Russian assistance it is receiving in exchange for this support—it is hard to see Kim Jong Un agreeing to a new nuclear deal with the U.S. at this time.
But a Ukraine War peace agreement would not necessarily lead North Korea to easily agree to halt or cut back its nuclear weapons program. After Trump left office, Kim Jong Un significantly hardened his positions and policies toward the U.S. and South Korea. This included declaring in September 2022 that its nuclear weapons program was “irreversible” and permanent. In 2024, North Korea abandoned its long-standing policy of pursuing peaceful Korean reunification and redefined South Korea as a hostile state.
Kim Jong Un is likely to use the Ninth Party Congress to lock in his belligerent policies of the past five years and commit to an “unlimited nuclear buildup” that would expand his already large nuclear arsenal. According to a September 26, 2025, Congressional Research Service report, some experts believe North Korea may have produced enough fissile material for up to 90 warheads and assembled about 50. The report also cited concerns by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth during his January 2025 Senate confirmation hearing that North Korea is improving the miniaturization of its nuclear warheads.
In addition to calling for further advances in North Korea’s missile program, Kim Jong Un will probably call at the Party Congress to further develop its large missile arsenal—which includes ICBMs that can strike the entire continental United States—and new conventional weapons.
How New U.S.–North Korean Diplomacy Can Succeed
Although North Korea is a growing and increasingly intractable threat to regional and global security, there are several strategies the Trump administration could employ to resolve, or at least significantly reduce, this threat.
President Trump could increase the chances of negotiating an agreement to lower tensions with North Korea and halt threats from its nuclear and missile programs by striking a deal to end the war in Ukraine. Trump’s envoys are hard at work on this. I believe Russia’s current support for North Korea is transactional, and Moscow would end this support in exchange for the U.S. and Europe lifting sanctions on Russia. This probably would make Kim Jong Un more willing to negotiate with the U.S.
President Trump should name a high-profile, respected statesman as his special envoy to North Korea, and this person should press hard to hold talks with North Korean officials. This could be a current or former elected or appointed official, such as Senator Bill Hagerty (former Trump ambassador to Japan), former National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien, or CIA Director John Ratcliffe. The special envoy would press for Trump’s objectives in an agreement and arrange a meeting between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Kim Jong Un. If these meetings were successful, a Trump–Kim summit could be scheduled.
Trump and Kim appeared to get along quite well during their three meetings during Trump’s first term. I also believe Kim Jong Un enjoyed sharing the international spotlight with President Trump. If the special envoy could negotiate a new framework, I believe Trump’s personal diplomacy with Kim could again make progress in improving relations and moving the two countries toward an agreement.
It will be difficult and time-consuming to convince North Korea to denuclearize and give up its ballistic missile program, if this is even possible. Due to President Biden’s policy failures, this will be much harder than it was during Trump’s first term. The first steps will be to freeze these programs, improve relations, and lay the groundwork for a final agreement. President Trump’s strong leadership opens the door, though achieving any of these goals will take time and hard work by his special envoy and other diplomats. Given the seriousness of this threat to regional and global security, this effort should begin as soon as possible.
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Fred Fleitz previously served as National Security Council
chief of staff, a CIA analyst, and a House Intelligence Committee staff
member. He is the vice chair of the America First Policy Institute’s
Center for American Security. He is the author of “North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship and the Oval Office,” to be released by Texas A&M Press on April 7, 2026.
Source: https://amgreatness.com/2026/02/20/solving-the-north-korea-mess-that-biden-left-trump/
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