by Clifford May
Israel's military is
unusual in many ways, but start with this: A patch on Capt. Omri Levy's
sleeve alludes to a Mel Brooks joke. The patch reads: "It's good to B200
King."
The B200 King is a
Beechcraft used by the Israelis for reconnaissance. "It's good to be the
king" was a line delivered by Mel Brooks in his 1981 film "History of
the World Part I." The phrase entered American pop culture, where it has
remained ever since. In just one example: Jeffrey Goldberg used it as
the lead for his recent Atlantic profile of Jordan's King Abdullah II.
Capt. Levy, however,
born in 1986, is not familiar with the comedy of Mel Brooks. So I ask
about another patch on his uniform, one showing a camel sprouting wings.
This story he knows well: Back in 1947, Egyptians, Syrians and other
Arabs planning to go to war to prevent the partition of Palestine into
Jewish and Arab nations -- the original two-state solution -- scoffed at
the prospect of a Jewish air force, saying that would come about "when
camels learn to fly." And so, the following year, the first squadron of
the Israeli Air Force took the winged camel as its symbol.
I'm at a military base
in north Tel Aviv, among a group of American journalists being briefed
on Israel's use of air power. The Israelis use both drones and piloted
aircraft to gather "visint," visual intelligence. But their mission is
not just to identify targets. They also do everything they can to avoid
collateral damage.
"We make sure there are
no civilians around the targets," the briefer tells us. "We want to
destroy Hamas' ability to shoot rockets at us -- but we're not trying to
kill people."
We're shown a film,
taken from a B200 King, of two shadowy figures apparently preparing to
launch a rocket from Gaza into Israel. As soon as the figures move away,
the rocket is destroyed from the air. I ask whether those seen in the
film were targeted later. No, the briefer says, they were allowed to get
away because there was a chance -- however remote -- that they were not
terrorists, that they stumbled upon the rocket and were examining it
out of curiosity.
He notes that Israelis
now have weapons so precise they can target a single room in a building,
doing no harm to those in adjoining rooms. During last year's conflict
in Gaza, Israelis also would phone people to warn them to leave
buildings that contained ordnance, weapons caches or command-and-control
facilities. Sometimes, too, the Israelis would "knock": Very small,
relatively harmless bombs would be dropped on the roofs of buildings to
further encourage people to leave.
I point out how unusual
such practices are. Throughout history, military strategists have
sought to demoralize their enemies, to defeat them conclusively or at
least lead them to the conclusion that the cost of continuing the
conflict would be unacceptably high. I ask if Israelis may instead be
teaching Gazans that a long war, with Israel's extermination as the
goal, is tolerable. He says he's not sure but he does know this:
Israelis believe it is important to distinguish between Hamas and the
people of Gaza.
Is that distinction valid? Gazans voted for Hamas in 2006, but there have been no elections since. A poll taken in March shows
support for Hamas in Gaza down to about 20 percent. And, in the
aftermath of the last year's fighting, a clear majority of Gazans, 60
percent, believe that waging war against Israel does them more harm than
good.
It is against this
backdrop that Secretary of State John Kerry is attempting to restart
negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Among the hurdles he
faces: Hamas has no intention of giving up power in Gaza, nor does
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas speak for Hamas or the
people of Gaza. In 2005, Abbas also was elected to a four-year term, and
he, too, has not faced voters a second time. His popularity in the West
Bank is far from solid. An Israeli analyst, who also identifies himself
as a Palestinian and a Muslim, suggests what this means: "Abbas has no
mandate to make peace with Israel."
What's more, any
concessions Abbas might make would be seen by Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran's
rulers and other Islamists in the region as a betrayal. Could this
explain, at least in part, why Abbas has refused to negotiate with
Israelis for more than four years? Does it really make sense for him to
sit down for talks if (1) he knows he can't deliver a deal, and (2)
he'll be painting a bull's-eye on his back if he makes a serious
attempt?
I never fail to be
astonished by how many "experts" refuse to grapple with such questions
in their rush to propose the most banal and facile solutions. One
example: Dov Waxman, an associate professor at the Graduate Center of
the City University of New York, argues that the
key to peace is "applying pressure on Israel." Waxman goes on to lament
that "American Jews are not likely to exercise the same kind of
pressure on Israel that Irish-Americans applied on Sinn Fein-IRA, which
led it to renounce violence and disarm."
Does the professor
really believe that Israelis -- who confront terrorism every day and, as
noted above, go to extraordinary lengths to avoid harming Palestinian
civilians -- are themselves akin to terrorists? Is he seriously
suggesting that Israelis "disarm"? Is he unable to imagine the
consequences were such advice to be followed?
New York Times columnist Roger Cohen also promotes the dubious notion that
just as "Irish-Americans played a significant role in the Northern
Ireland peace" so too "American Jews can have similar influence on
Israel-Palestine."
But Cohen at least
acknowledges that many Palestinians "still dream of all the land, the
destruction of Israel" and that "nothing would advance the just cause of
Palestinian statehood faster than the irrevocable renunciation of
violence by all factions and reconciliation between them on the basis of
territorial compromise with Israel."
I envision Palestinian
leaders taking such steps when camels learn to fly. But as Israelis have
demonstrated time and again, anything can happen.
Clifford D. May is president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on national security.
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=4859
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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